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Abstract
My dissertation emphasizes a cognitive account of multimodality that explicitly
integrates experiential knowledge work into the rhetorical pedagogy that informs so
many composition and technical communication programs. In these disciplines,
multimodality is widely conceived in terms of what Gunther Kress calls “socialsemiotic” modes of communication shaped primarily by culture. In the cognitive and
neurolinguistic theories of Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff, however, multimodality
is described as a key characteristic of our bodies’ sensory-motor systems which link
perception to action and action to meaning, grounding all communicative acts in
knowledge shaped through body-engaged experience. I argue that this “situated”
account of cognition – which closely approximates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology of perception, a major framework for my study – has pedagogical
precedence in the mimetic pedagogy that informed ancient Sophistic rhetorical
training, and I reveal that training’s multimodal dimensions through a
phenomenological exegesis of the concept mimesis. Plato’s denigration of the mimetic
tradition and his elevation of conceptual contemplation through reason, out of which
developed the classic Cartesian separation of mind from body, resulted in a general
degradation of experiential knowledge in Western education. But with the recent
introduction into college classrooms of digital technologies and multimedia
communication tools, renewed emphasis is being placed on the “hands-on” nature of
inventive and productive praxis, necessitating a revision of methods of instruction and
assessment that have traditionally privileged the acquisition of conceptual over
experiential knowledge. The model of multimodality I construct from Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology, ancient Sophistic rhetorical pedagogy, and current neuroscientific
accounts of situated cognition insists on recognizing the significant role knowledges we
acquire experientially play in our reading and writing, speaking and listening,
discerning and designing practices.
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Introduction
In this dissertation I emphasize a cognitive account of multimodality in an effort to
integrate experiential knowledge work into the rhetorical pedagogy that currently
informs so many college-level composition and technical communication programs in
the United States. I argue that mainstream versions of this pedagogy privilege
conceptual knowledge and learning. A paradigm that posits multimodality as a
function of cognition brings greater attention to their experiential dimensions. As we
know, “experiential learning” is a kind of buzzword in colleges and universities,
expressing the assumption that students learn best when there is a significant “handson” component to their education. I share that assumption but have also wondered:
What is the nature of knowledge-work in such a paradigm? This dissertation offers an
account of that type of “work” that I then apply pedagogically to the curricular areas
of Rhetoric-Composition (“Rhet Comp”) and Technical Communication (“Tech Com”).1
Multimodality is a site in both fields where an account of experiential knowledge can
be profitably developed and applied pedagogically.
We need, however, to think a bit differently about multimodality. In RhetComp, it is often envisioned in terms of what I call the “Big Three” modes of
communication: Written, Spoken, and Visual Communication. In addition, these modes
are usually articulated and taught within social and cultural contexts. The pioneering
multimodal theorist Gunther Kress, for instance, tells us that all modes of
communication are “social semiotic” in that they are shaped ultimately by the context
that is culture. In some emerging branches of cognitive neuroscience, however,
multimodality is described quite differently. The neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese and
the neurolinguist George Lakoff use “multimodality” to describe what they believe to
be the primary characteristic of our sensory-motor system, which links perception to
action and action to meaning. They argue that this neurological-perceptual system
shapes language and hence all of our communication practices. Culture plays a role,
yes, but it is not the only one. Such a model insists that our primary way of learning is
always-already experiential. We experience the world by interacting with it, and our
interactions are mediated by multiple sensory and perceptual modalities. I argue that
this mostly unconscious, dynamic, ongoing cognitive process is knowledge work – work
done not by our “minds” but by our bodies – and in this dissertation I associate that
6

knowledge work with the ancient Greek concept of mimesis. We learn quickly and
experientially because the multimodal sensory-motor systems are mimetically attuned
to the situations our bodies move through and are enmeshed in. Mimesis is what
situates us in what is essentially a cognitive environment. It is an essential function of
our sensory-motor systems and operative as what I will call in later chapters bodyengaged learning.
The work of Gallese and Lakoff and many other thinkers whose work I draw on
in this dissertation all subscribe to the theory that cognition is situated; that is, that
thinking and knowing is equivalent to doing and interacting with the people and things
that constitute our immediate situations. This theory of situated or embodied
cognition2 that in recent years has made significant inroads in cognitive psychology and
several branches of neuroscience is actually not new. The work of the French
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty posited such a theory as early as the 1940s by
emphasizing the integrated relationship between the body’s perceptual apparatus and
the people and things the body comes into contact with. His phenomenology of
perception, along with his theories on the role of imitation in habituating the body to
its surroundings, will serve as the primary theoretical framework for this study. By
putting Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology into conversation with neuroscientific
theories of situated and embodied cognition, especially those of Vittorio Gallese (one
of the discovers of the so-called “Mirror Neuron System”), a philosophy of mind as
inextricably bound to the body emerges, one which shares significant similarities with
the strongly mimetic pedagogy that informed ancient Sophistic rhetorical training. As
rhetorical scholars like Debra Hawhee have shown, the first “schools” of rhetoric in
ancient Greece developed in public gymnasia.3 Students learned the arts of rhetoric in
relatively dynamic spaces where no clear distinctions existed between philosophy and
athletics, rhetoric and wrestling, civic education and the musicopoetic arts. These
gymnasia were perhaps the first sites in Western history where experiential learning in
rhetoric, philosophy, civics, and art took on its first formal shape. It is here too where
mimesis emerged as a vital pedagogical technique – bodily knowledge-work through
repetition – as well as a rhetorical strategy for both invention and delivery, one that
would develop centuries later into the dominant school of Latin rhetoric known as
imitatio.
7

This ancient rhetorical pedagogy, which Hawhee describes as a “bodily art,”
would take a back seat to new forms of education that emerged with the dawning of
classical philosophy and the formalization of rhetoric, first by Aristotle, into telosdriven persuasion. Interestingly, Aristotle’s formalization of rhetoric resulted through
a kind of recovery effort of a practice that his former teacher, Plato, so famously
denigrated. As the founder the first “Academy” whose thinking significantly shaped
the tradition of Western education, Plato launched a prolonged attack against the
practitioners of what he called rhetorike, the Sophists, and the mimetic tradition that
had become associated with them and other so-called “poets,” the rhapsodes or
public performers, who bewitched and enchanted the public with their songs and
stories of historical events. The arguments and rhapsodies these public figures made
created a false impression of the world which Plato believed was an inferior
manifestation – a mere “copy” – of a more profound metaphysical Truth. In denigrating
techne – the practical and technical art of builders and craftsmen - and elevating the
“forms” and “ideas” of episteme, Plato helped set the stage for what would become
an institutionalized privileging of conceptual knowledge and learning throughout the
West. This is one reason why knowledge acquired experientially through body-engaged
learning has been traditionally devalued along with the school programs that cultivate
it. One thinks here of secondary level physical education programs, “Phys Ed,” or of
the industrial and vocational curricula that were once called “Shop,” which have
historically been treated as supplements to “academic” curricula in mathematics and
computer technologies, the social and physical sciences, even the arts and humanities.
The privileging of conceptual over experiential knowledge work contributes to a
stratification that still permeates most institutions of formal education and manifests
itself in a hierarchy which promotes theory over practice, research over teaching, and
critique over creativity. I believe that this hierarchy has its structural roots in Plato’s
separation of metaphysical mind from material body, an epistemology that reached its
culmination in the dualistic logic of the modern thinker Rene Descartes and lives on
through the designs of the modern institutions created within its conceptual
framework.
However, since the early 20th century, this paradigm has been slowly shifting.
Pragmatist inquiry that developed in the United States around the turn of the century
8

was highly skeptical of Cartesian logic and the reifying conceptual structures of
European philosophy, giving birth to progressive education and the concept of
“experiential learning.” In the world of 20th century continental philosophy, poststructuralism and deconstruction disrupted the dichotomous logic upon which the
hierarchies that support absolute distinctions are based, while phenomenology has
displaced the subject of classical humanism – “Man” – by insisting that the “human
being” is not a unique entity but an amorphous state of being-in-the-world.
Neuroscience has grounded the “mind” in the very material processes of the body’s
central nervous system, and cognition, as noted above, is increasingly seen as
extending beyond brain and body to include the environment in which that body is
situated. Theories of relationality have worked their way into educational philosophy
as well, supporting pedagogical models of collaborative learning that advocate
meaning making as an intersubjective rather than solitary enterprise. Meanwhile, the
advent of digital technologies and multimedia communication tools is rapidly
transforming traditional classrooms into smart environments, ushering in learning
outcomes that increasingly reflect hands-on components to academic work. I think,
then, that multimodality – a term in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com that is primarily
associated with digital technologies – is a good site to build a theory on what
experiential knowledge is and, hence, what “experiential learning” actually means
beyond project-based assignments and ethnographic field work in undergraduate
curricula.

My Pedagogical Objective and Methodology
In his “Memorial Address,” Martin Heidegger claims that just as a composer is present
in his or her composition, so too is meaning present in everything that exists. He
compares humans to plants that are meant by nature to rise from the earth in which
they are rooted to bear fruit in the sun (47).4 However, in the modern West, people
have lost their rootedness – their autochthony – due to the hegemony of a mode of
cognition he calls “calculative thinking” (46-49). This kind of thinking has replaced the
kind of “meditative thinking” humans are naturally inclined to (56). Whereas
calculative thinking “computes,” “plans and investigates,” meditative thinking
“contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is” (46). It has so
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objectified the world that “Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy
source for modern technology and industry” (50). In order to recover our rootedness,
Heidegger claims, we need to cultivate our capacity to think meditatively. Being open
to that which does not lend itself easily to calculation – Heidegger calls it “the
mystery” – seems, to me, to be not just a way to think meditatively but to act
mimetically since such “a vision of a new autochthony . . . someday even might be fit
to recapture the old and now rapidly disappearing autochthony in a changed form”
(55).
I would like to suggest that calculative thinking as described by Heidegger is
enabled in part by the West’s emphasis on conceptual knowledge as an abstract series
of metaphysical principles, disembodied “laws of Nature” that, once ascertained
through rigorous study and experimentation, can then be hylomorphically imposed on
dumb matter in the production of significance – or, in the case of calculative thinking,
of some kind of usable resource. It seems as though calculative thinking disembodies
concepts whereas meditative thinking, by “rooting” cognition in the actual world of
experience, seeks to embody them; in this sense, meditative thinking may be the
cognitive mode of the recent paradigm of embodied mind, which George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson famously claim “challenges” the entire tradition of Western thought.5 It
therefore also challenges how we think about teaching and learning. I believe that the
currently popular model of persuasive rhetoric that informs instruction, curricular
development, and assessment protocols not only privileges conceptual knowledge
acquisition over experiential knowledge making but anchors rhetoric in a model that
encourages calculative thinking. The classical rhetorical paradigm of persuasive
argumentation contributes to a linear transmission view of communication. As such, it
tends to support a nonmaterial account of information as a set of principles a skilled
rhetor draws on when imposing an argumentative strategy on a predetermined
situation and audience. Under certain circumstances, this rhetorical paradigm is very
useful. But is the best approach to all situations and audiences necessarily persuasive?
Can and should rhetoric be employed in ways that do not subscribe even tangentially
to the model of a skilled rhetor appealing to passive audiences with the calculated
intention of persuading them?
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My answer to this question is yes, and I want this dissertation to contribute to
the development of new rhetorical models that integrate experiential knowledge-work
into our undergraduate curricula. I believe that education will be stronger if
conceptual knowledge-work is appropriately balanced with the experiential. At this
point, I should explain more precisely what I mean by these terms. In the context of
this dissertation, conceptual will signify the following: an educational model invested
primarily in the transmission of ideas through the replication or imposition of
identifiable forms and formats (the eidos of episteme); it is concerned primarily with
the symbolicity of meaning and meaning-making; it is generally hypothesis-driven; and
it has a strong commitment to critique and “critical thinking.” It seeks to cultivate
knowledge with recourse to the “mind,” a construct that comes with a coded
architecture that needs to be programmed by filling it with information obtained
through critical contemplation, logical analysis, and credible research methods. The
term experiential, on the other hand, will be used in support of a model that attends
to knowledge-work as material praxis (techne); attends to the role of affectivity in
meaning-making; is generally data-driven (with data being conceived as material
information, not just empirical evidence in support of specific claims); it emphasizes
creative engagement with others and with things, and bases communication on
reflexivity rather than transmission. In this model, knowledge is first grounded in the
body’s sensory-motor system and emerges through that system’s mimetic attunement –
a word I borrow from Thomas Rickert and use throughout this dissertation6 - to the
conditions of the situation in which that body is situated.
I should make it clear that I am well aware of the constructed nature of the
dichotomy I posit here between the conceptual and the experiential. I do not believe
that these classifications reflect what some call “the Real”; rather, I see them as
reflective of a dichotomous logic shaped by cultural convention and entirely
susceptible to Derridean desconstruction. At the most basic levels of cognition there is
no real distinction between these two seemingly distinct forms of knowledge work.7
But Western culture’s historical adherence to dichotomous logic has helped create
conditions whereby certain world views are privileged at the expense of others. My
dissertation represents an effort to trouble what I argue is one such privileging. As I
hope I have clarified above, I do not want argue that conceptual knowledge is
11

calculative thinking and experiential knowledge is meditative thinking. All humans
naturally conceptualize, but not all humans calculate in the sense Heidegger means it.
Again, calculative thinking arises from the privileging of conceptual knowledge over
knowledge that I am calling experiential, one manifestation of which might be
conceived as what Heidegger calls meditative.
I would like now to describe my methodology and theoretical orientation. For
this dissertation I used a modified version of “Grounded Theory” (GT). GT was
developed by the sociologists Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser in the 1960s and used
for their 1965 book Awareness of Dying. In their work with terminally ill patients, both
men entered the caretaking environments with no preconditions other than to learn
about how people coped with their lives knowing that death was imminent. In the
process, they collected enormous amounts of data – personal notes, interviews, audio
and film recordings, observations of interactions between patients and their families
and caretakers, books that were circulated, medicines that were compared – from
which their theoretical concepts emerged and upon which they are “grounded.” As is
evident by this description, GT takes a data-driven rather than hypothesis-driven
approach to qualitative research. Most traditional research methodologies require the
application of a theoretical model to the phenomenon being studied. GT takes an
opposite approach, beginning not with a hypothesis but with the collection of data.
Once a sufficient amount of data has been amassed, GT researchers look for patterns
or “key points” that emerge from the data and which are then “coded” (Strauss, 1415). This initial stage of “open coding” naturally leads to one called “axial coding” in
which these coded data are grouped into concepts. At this point, coding becomes
more “selective” as clear relevant patterns emerge. These coded patterns are then
arranged into structured categories that are the grounds for “theoretical codes” (2526) The final stage of this research process is marked by the emergence of a theory, or
a state of “theoretical saturation,” when no relevant new patterns can be ascertained
outside of the scope of the research area (25-26).
This approach seems particular appropriate given the phenomenological
framework of my study, informed as it is by the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Phenomenology, as described by one of its pioneering figures Edmund Husserl, grounds
study of the world in the phenomena that are “things themselves.” So-called
12

“objective” interpretations of the world do not represent “the Real” so much as they
are abstracted from it. He believes that, first and foremost, we inhabit a “lived
world” (lebenswelt), the appearances of which do not exist as “objects” in a
geometrically mappable space and behind which exist the “real.” Instead, “the Real”
is generated in our perception of phenomena, in how the things of the world appear to
us not through analysis and contemplation but by literally experiencing them. Our
“theories” about the world, the “meaning” and “significance” of life, do not pre-exist
experience but rather emerge through it. In this sense is GT phenomenological: it is
grounded in phenomena and the theoretical suppositions it advances arise from the
ground in which it is always rooted.
I write above that I take a “modified” GT methodology. Because GT is
associated primarily with the social sciences, it is conceived as a method for studying
people in specific social contexts. As open-ended as Glaser and Strauss’s study was, its
focus was clearly on the personal struggles and interpersonal relationships observed of
people in the mid- to latter-stages of terminal illness. The theoretical framework of
this dissertation, however, did not arise from an ethnographic observation of people
but rather from an extensive engagement with a wide variety of texts. As early as
2009, I began to read texts that had a loose thematic affiliation among them –
specifically, theories that took into account the nonhuman dimensions of our worlds. I
read books and articles (I also read blogs and watched online videos) that related to
Posthumanism, Actor-Network Theory, Object Oriented Ontology, and many others
that were not easy to classify. My readings spread across multiple fields and research
areas – philosophy, rhetoric, anthropology, critical theory, animal studies, cultural
studies, cognitive neurosciences, reader response theory, composition studies,
technical communication. In the process of my readings I encountered the
phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My first exposure to his work came through
secondary texts like Glen Mazi’s Humans, Animals, and Machines and David Abram’s
Spell of the Sensuous, both of which apply Merleau-Ponty’s theories in such a way that
the nonhuman dimensions of experience were rendered both palpable and compelling.
I then read his Phenomenology of Perception, followed by a number of other texts that
I cite throughout this dissertation, and developed an interest in focusing on the body
as our (and these are his words) medium for having a world.
13

At the same time, I encountered references to the ancient Greek concept of
mimesis that seemed to lend themselves well not only to Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology, but to theories of material rhetoric and embodied cognition that
were emerging in my readings. My first encounter with mimesis was Morris Berman’s
1981 text The Reenchantment of the World. It popped again in Mark Hansen’s 2000
book Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing, where Hansen develops a
theory of “corporeal mimesis” drawn from the Marxist philosopher Walter Benjamin in
advancing a theory of embodiment that was phenomenological as opposed to
“epistemological.” I then remembered how mimesis had popped up in other works,
including Debra Hawhee’s 2000 study Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient
Greece, a book which sheds light on an ancient pedagogy that one reviewer has called
experiential learning.8 It was quite by accident, fortuitously enough, that I came
across Merleau-Ponty’s use of the concept of mimesis in his essay “The Child’s
Relations with Others.” His description of mimesis provided me with the basic building
blocks for a model for what I call experiential knowledge, something that I attempt to
trace the contours of in this dissertation.
I took an old-school approach to the data-collection process. I photocopied and
kept print copies of numerous articles and book sections in files that were arranged by
authors’ last names. In the “open coding” stages of my research I annotated these
print copies, writing notes in the margins and summarizing the article’s key points in
an available area of white space, usually on the last page. I then copied onto 3x5
notecards passages from the texts – mostly direct quotations, which, like the files I
kept, were arranged by authors’ last names and arranged alphabetically in plastic
containers. After having amassed literally hundreds of these data, I entered the stage
of “axial coding,” sorting cards into groups that designated some kind of thematic
consistency. Each group of notecards morphed considerably; it was not uncommon for
two groups – each suggesting a sort of semi-concept – to be combined with one or two
other semi-concepts, forming a more identifiable concept. Arranged across a variety
of physical surfaces that included two kitchen counters, a covered piano keyboard, the
cushions of my couch, and two small tables, these groups of cards slowly – with my
help, of course – arranged themselves into categories that later became the chapters
of my dissertation and the sections of these chapters. Although what I ended up with
14

(an account of experiential knowledge and how to integrate that into composition and
technical communication programs) was quite different from what I began with (an
investigation into our relations with nonhuman others), there remains an underlying
thread that weaves together both process and product. As Merleau-Ponty might
observe, I tapped into a “certain style,” a pattern with which I developed familiarity,
that culminated ultimately in an expression – a theory, a dissertation – that my effort
and knowledge-work helped to enact.

Mimesis: An Overview of this Dissertation’s Dominant Concept
I want this dissertation to contribute to a recovery effort of a lost dimension to
mimesis – a dimension that I call “phenomenological” in that it attends to the lived
world of everyday experience and takes as primary our bodies’ perceptual engagement
with the things we encounter. I am not interested, nor capable, of recovering any
“original meaning” for these words. In fact, I use recovery somewhat hesitantly
because in many ways my project is concerned with uncovering something that has not
been “lost” so much as metaphorically buried under misconstruals, reductive
definitions, and cultural prejudices. Conceiving of mimesis as the manner of producing
a direct copy of something cannot account, for example, of blurs boundaries between
categories that have historically kept far apart. One important example would be the
human and nonhuman. Some of the earliest recorded references to the word group
mimos, from which mimesis derives, reveal aesthetic and even intellectual intercourse
between the human and nonhuman worlds. The Thebian lyric poet Pindar employed
the verb mimeisthai to describe a choreography in which dancers were instructed to
match the movements of animals (Halliwell, 19). The fifth-century philosopher
Democritus believed that humans learned certain crafts, including music, through the
imitation or emulation of animals, a point Aristotle later tried to “correct” in his
History of Animals by observing how many mimemata (analogies, resemblances, but
not imitations) cut across both human and animal life (154). Aristotle also famously
described the aesthetic function of mimesis as an imitation9 of “nature” (phusis),
implying thereby that the mimetic arose through active observation by the human of
nonhuman patterns and activities.
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Unfortunately, as evidenced by the pejorative connotations of the word
“imitation,” which is the most common English translation of the Greek concept,
mimesis has endured a largely negative reputation. This is primarily Plato’s legacy.
Plato’s objections to mimesis were in part the result of his philosophical conviction
that representation simply imitated the world of mere appearance, thrice removed
from the ideational forms of Truth. In Platonic metaphysics, the couch upon which
Socrates sat was a mere material “copy” of true metaphysical Couchness. But Plato’s
distrust of mimesis went beyond that. According to the classical scholar Stephen
Halliwell, Plato’s distrust of mimesis was primarily psychological, “grounded in the
assumption that there is a continuity, even equivalence, between our relations with
people and things in the real world and to people and things presented in mimetic art”
(78). Halliwell contends that for Plato the highest degree of psychological absorption
was akin to what we know today as empathy, a state at which “the mind experiencing
the poetic representation is so immersed in the mind of the character as to have no
room for emotional or critical dissociation” (80).10 When audiences “surrender”
completely to the point of view of a performer or artistic representation, they fix
themselves ever more adhesively to the illusory imitations of reality projected on the
walls of the cave in which Plato so famously located the intellectually stunted masses.
So absorbed are they in the material appearance of things that they cannot rationally
detach themselves to contemplate epistemic matters of truth. In a sense, the
empathetic identification with others through the enactment of an event or
experience created an uncritically accepted false consciousness not unlike that which
the twentieth century Marxist playwright Bertolt Brecht sought to disrupt in
audiences.11 The only difference is that where Brecht desired to disrupt conformity to
the ideological status quo, Plato desired to uproot all obstacles blocking the ascension
of an intellectual orientation based on reason.
It is clear that mimesis to Plato was more than just mindless imitation. The
“imitative arts” seen in poets, performers, and public speakers were transformative of
a “real” that in essence was intransigent. Thrice removed from the true forms and
ideas that constituted authentic knowledge, they operated in a world of mere
appearances, hoodwinking all nonphilosophers who bought into the illusion. Despite
Aristotle’s efforts to reconstitute mimesis – something I will address in Chapter 2 – the
16

term never fully recovered from Plato’s disparagement. Reduced to the category of
imitative repetition and representation, mimesis carries the pejorative sense of being
trite and limiting, an obstacle to be overcome. For example, in 2010 Spring Press
published Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science as part
of its series Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science; the text explicitly
advocates moving “beyond” notions of mimicry, similarity, resemblance, convention,
and imitation in the arts and sciences. And for another example: In support of his
argument that rules governing human conduct should be slippery enough for people to
elude coercive traps social orders set for them, the political theorist Richard Flatham
cites the ability of such rules to “diminish the incidence of rote, mechanical, mimetic,
or otherwise submissive behavior” (qtd in Bennett, Enchantment, 155). Like Plato,
Flatham associates mimesis with the “submissive behaviors” of audiences. He also uses
another term that is often associated with mimetic imitation: “rote.”
In the field of rhetoric, mimesis is often figured in this fashion. Mary
Carruthers associates it with the aesthetics of “truthful representation” and artistic
“realism,” and she opposes its “rote” learning strategies to the complex memory
architectures used as rhetorical invention strategies by Medieval monks through the
practice of mnesis (2-3, 72). Nathan Stormer similarly cites mnesis as a way of moving
beyond the “age-old predilection to treat memory as mimetic,” as “copying”
(“Recursivity” 38), and elsewhere associates mimesis with “representational practices
of human beings seeking recognition” (“Encomium,” 225). No doubt these significant
scholars are thinking of mimesis through its popular representation as imitatio, a
doctrinal formulation of mimesis begun by the first-century BCE Greek rhetorician
Dionysius of Halicarnassus that promoted the emulation of literary and historical
works. Centuries later imitatio would be taken up and given new force by the Latin
rhetorician Quintillian and the Renaissance thinker Erasmus, whose widely-read 1512
textbook Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style instructed rhetors in how to adapt
pre-existing texts into their own compositions. In Chapter 4, informed by concepts of
Merleau-Ponty and others, I will offer an interpretation of imitatio that I hope will
bring to light its enactive and “expressive” dimensions which have fallen to the
wayside by the emphasis on the reproduction of ready-made forms.
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Although I work toward a reconceptualization of mimesis that is more positive,
I want to be clear that my dissertation will not shy away from aspects of mimesis that
some compelling thinkers have argued devalues individual identity, erases difference,
or reproduces static or idealized versions of “reality.” In Chapter 2, I will, for
example, look closely at the work of Rene Girard, for whom mimesis is the origin of all
that has plagued humankind from the inception of culture. But in doing so, I will point
to how difficult it is, for Girard as well as for Horkheimer and Adorno – in fact, even
for Plato and Aristotle – to pin the concept down to a single signification. Mimesis is
and has for long been a slippery idea. As the literary scholar Matthew Potolsky fittingly
puts it:
Mimesis takes on different guises in different historical contexts, masquerading
under a variety of related terms and translations: emulation, mimicry,
dissimulation, doubling, theatricality, realism, identification, correspondence,
depiction, verisimilitude, resemblance. No one translation, no one
interpretation, is sufficient to encompass its complexity (1)
The classical scholar Stephen Halliwell, in a study of the aesthetic tradition of
mimeticism,12 argues along similar lines for broader conception of mimesis. He
describes one of the guiding aims of his study as tracing and exposing “the complex
diversity of mimeticism, from Plato to the present,” and he cites the “still regrettable
translation of mimesis as ‘imitation’” as the greatest obstacle to a “sophisticated
understanding of all the varieties of mimeticism” (13). It should be noted that
Halliwell uncovers varieties of the concept within a framework restricted to aesthetic
mimesis – mimeticism – and intentionally does not attend to its nonaesthetic
dimensions.
In this dissertation I will attend explore the nonaesthetic dimensions of mimesis
and argue for why I think they are important for education, both in general and for the
fields of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com where multimodality continues to emerge as a
significant force. I therefore concur with the mimetic scholars Gunter Gebauer and
Christoph Wulf that
[c]onventional understandings of mimesis fall short of the complexity and
significance of the concept. It is restricted in some cases to aesthetics, in
others to imitation. These definitions reveal neither the anthropological
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dimension of mimesis nor the variety of meanings that can be and have been
attached to the term (1).
With this dissertation I join these scholars and others who seek “to expose the buried
dimensions of [mimesis] and to correct and move beyond reductions . . . that result in
an impoverishment of the term (7).
To sum up, my particular approach to mimesis will employ a phenomenological
framework informed by key concepts drawn from the work of Maurice Merleau Ponty.
In the process, I hope to develop a phenomenology of what Walter Benjamin calls the
“mimetic faculty,” a cognitive model of mimesis that I will frame as multimodal and
offer as a paradigm for praxis in writing and communication. Mimesis is a vital function
in our sensory-motor perception and hence central to body-engaged doing, making,
and learning. I will link my reading of Merleau-Ponty to recent neuroscientific theories
throughout my study. This will help me to show reconceive the largely disparaged
term imitation – and its rhetorical instantiation as imitatio – as a key component of
experiential knowledge. Through our social interactions, we all automatically – some
might say instinctively - engage in a form of imitation that Vittorio Gallese calls
embodied simulation, a term that captures how our bodies intentionally attune
themselves to situations and contexts and to other humans who inhabit them.
Experiential knowledge, from which all of our concepts derive, is cultivated in this
basic mimetic capacity that all human beings, like many other species, possess. 13 I
believe that the mimetic theory I develop in this dissertation aligns nicely with recent
incarnations of rhetoric as a form of attunement to situations conceived multimodally
(Rickert would use the term ambient here)14, an attunement that is originary in the
what the Greeks called phusis and which Enlightenment philosophers and Romantic
poets idealized as “Nature.” Conjoined with Merlea-Ponty’s phenomenology, I will
offer a pedagogy that I will call, simple enough, mimetic-multimodalty with the hope
that it will influence scholars and teachers in the fields of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. I
will now provide some background to my putting into pedagogical conversation
mimesis and multimodality.
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The Organization of this Dissertation
In addition to this introduction, my dissertation is divided into five chapters. Each one
is subdivided into sections. My conclusion is integrated with Chapter 5 and in that
section I provide an account of the kind of rhetorical theory I would like to see
balanced with the current emphasis on persuasive argumentation. Endnotes can be
found at the end of each chapter and a comprehensive bibliography (Works Cited) is
provided at the conclusion of Chapter 5. I will conclude this introduction with a brief
overview of the chapters that lie ahead.
I begin Chapter 1 by first situating Merleau-Ponty in the philosophical
movement known as phenomenology whose founder was Edmund Husserl and which
includes as well the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Where Heidegger provided theories
of relationality between people and their worlds, Merleau-Ponty focused on the actual
“lived body” as the medium of those relations. For this reason, he was interested in
how the body played a role in knowledge making and communication and identifies
mimesis (in a version of the concept he borrows from the developmental psychologist
Henri Wallon) as a key function of what he refers to throughout the corpus of his work
as the body schema – a formulation that approximates what today is called by
cognitive neuroscientists the sensory-motor system.15 Because Merleau-Ponty’s
discussion is foundational to the reconceptualization of mimesis that I develop in this
dissertation, I trace its shaping power through several of his key ideas, including the
body schema, his theories of style and expression, and the thin line between the
actual and virtual - the experiential knowledge of the body and the conceptual
knowledge that derives from it and has long assumed to stem from “the mind.” Of all
of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, though, intercorporeity perhaps best aligns his
phenomenology of perception with neuroscientific theories of situated cognition whose
nexus, I argue, supports the mimetic-multimodal pedagogy I will develop in the last
chapter of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 provides a phenomenological exegesis of the concept of mimesis, a
continuation and elaboration of the rough sketch I provide above. I argue that the
historical reduction of mimesis is in part the result of an overemphasis on its
representative aspects, on rote “copying” in the service of aesthetic realism, which
has effectively buried its nonrepresentational dimensions. Using Merleau-Ponty’s
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phenomenological framework and drawing on the recent work of several mimetic
scholars, I reveal how this expressive dimension is inherently bodily (which is one
reason for its suppression by metaphysical conceptualism) and hence expressive and
enactive, not just representational. I will show how this “dual-aspect” of mimesis that
Stephen Halliwell sees as central to Aristotle’s theory of mimesis reveals itself in the
work of even its most vitriolic critics, including Plato, Rene Girard, and (less
virulently) Theodor Adorno. After attending to some of its more compelling
problematizations, I consider Aristotlean mimesis from the vantage point of MerleauPonty’s phenomenology and map its cognitively embodied instantiations in the
philosophy of Walter Benjamin, the neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese, and the affect
theorists Anna Gibbs and Mark Hansen.
My objective for Chapter 3 is to pose my philosophical reconceptualization of
mimesis for pedagogical application in embodied and material rhetorics. I begin by
pointing out how the denigration of mimesis by Plato was intimately linked to his
attack on the “imitative art” of rhetorike as practiced by the Sophists. The hegemony
of Platonism in Western educational philosophy resulted in the privileging of highminded conceptualism, marginalizing the mimetic experiential pedagogy linking
ancient rhetorical training with athletics (specifically grappling and wrestling) that
took place in ancient gymnasia under the Sophists tutors. However, what Debra
Hawhee calls the “bodily arts” of these ancient training regimens persisted in
rhetorical education through the school the Romans called imitatio – a term that, in
this dissertation, should be seen as a somewhat doctrinal formalization of the Greek
mimesis. I argue that the “law of propriety,” which the Greeks called to prepon and
the Romans saw as a key strategy of imitatio, preserved – and, in fact, exploited - the
expressive and enactive dimensions of mimesis through the stylized representational
enactments of epideictic oratory. I argue that the imperative to enact through
language, vocalization, and gesture historical events in such a manner that listeners
would palpable experience them speaks to an affective and thoroughly material
rhetoricity that subtends symbolic representation and is a significant force in
persuasive influence.
Chapter 4 applies the mimetic theory I have developed to multimodal
composing. I begin by noting how the multimodal compositionists Kristin L. Arola and
21

Anne Frances Wysocki offer Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the body is one’s primary
medium – “taking medium here in its grounding sense of that which is between, in the
middle” (3) - in advancing a view of media not as a carrier of messages but as a living
environment in which we are “always already embedded—embodied—in mediation”
(4). The communication scholar Anna Gibbs takes this perspective even further by
conceiving the body as an affective site of what she calls mimetic communication16 in
which it “is not so much a medium as a series of media, each of which connects in its
own way with technological media, including writing” (201). These and other recent
theories of media allow for a phenomenological investigation of the sometimes
ambiguous relationship between “multimedia” and “multimodality.” Where some feel
we need to distinguish both terms, I argue in favor of the ambiguity. While distinction
is important in production-based contexts of a course, I believe that in process-based
contexts the blurring of the distinction between “modes” and “media” (a distinction
even Gunter Kress struggles to maintain) can be pedagogically useful in having
students cognitively situate themselves in creative or ambient environments. I believe
that a cognitive rendering of multimodality insists on the (at least occasional) blurring
of modalities and medialities, and between expression and representation, since
similar perceptual and sensory overlaps occur sensory-motor body schemas and
cultivate the experiential ground in which even conceptual knowledge is rooted. I
believe that students (and instructors) should be able to think and experience multiple
modes/media together for the purposes of invention as well as to distinguish one from
the other for purposes of production.
In my fifth and concluding chapter, I offer pedagogical application of what I
call mimetic multimodality to the disciplines of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. I believe
that we need to explicitly integrate this approach into the rhetorical pedagogy that
informs so many undergraduate composition and tech writing programs. I begin by
critiquing the standardizing of rhetoric in undergraduate curricula as persuasive
argumentation, a model that subscribes to a transmission view of communication and
is invested in conceptual knowledge work. I end by offering a re-envisioning of
rhetoric as receptive and enactive of influence as opposed to being beholden always
to persuasion. While the broader category of influence includes persuasive
argumentation, influencive rhetoric17 opens our disciplines more fully to the
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experiential dimensions of communication – embodied, material, affective – which I
view as reflexive and, following Merleau-Ponty and Gallese, intercorporeal before it is
intersubjective. In between these two ends, I argue for a body-engaged (as opposed to
hands-on) approach to teaching and learning in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. This
involves, first, recognizing how the mimetic tradition of classical imitatio lives on
through the increasingly popular pedagogy (especially in multimodal composing) of
remediation and remix – the repurposing of the old to create the new. It also involves
attending much more to the role of play (tinkering, fiddling, playing with) as a form of
knowledge-building praxis; a re-envisioning of information (conventionally viewed
conceptually as disembodied facts and details for transmission purposes) as enacted in
material spaces or “cognitive ecologies”; and a re-integration of “writing” into a
communicational model that inextricable weaves it with reading, speaking, and
listening. I call such a model OVAL (an acronym for Oracy, Visuacy, Auracy, and
Literacy) and offer it as an alternative to current writing-centric models whose forms
and formats dominate undergraduate composition and technical communication
courses.
Finally, I would like to say a few words about my slightly heterodox critique of
persuasive argumentation, which I see as the dominant rhetorical theory informing
undergraduate composition and technical communication programs. While my model
of mimetic multimodality could perhaps be employed to critique some current
institutional practices that Sidney L. Dobrin claims are “haunted by academic
prescription, economic and management thinking, and subject-driven approaches”
(94), I want to my project to be perceived as congenial to the necessary procedures
many academic programs have been forced to adopt in recent years under pressure by
university administrations eager to satisfy accreditation criteria. In Postcomposition,
Dobrin argues that the future of composition studies “demands disruption,
epistemological and bureaucratic” (7) of student-focused, classroom-based, pedagogyoriented scholarship, practice, and program assessment. He attacks the CWPA (Council
of Writing Program Administrators) – an organization I belong to – as a body that is
“overtly about control and maintenance of power … over writing programs and writing
pedagogies” (98) while only minimally acknowledging the influence exerted by wider
ideological structures on the assessment processes and other “management” protocols
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these programs have institutionalized, almost always through collaboration across
disciplines and with periodic revision.
While his posthumanist, postpedagogical, poststudent account of
postcomposition compels philosophically, ultimately as professionals we need to work
with and within existing structures. This dissertation will therefore advocate for a
compositionism of the kind the philosopher Bruno Latour calls for in “An Attempt at a
‘Compositionist Manifesto.” As he frames it, compositionism offers an alternative to
critique, which “has all the limits of utopia: it relies on the certainty of the world
beyond this world. By contrast, for compositionism, there is no world of beyond. It is
all about immanence” (4). This view is, surprisingly for Latour, quite
phenomenological.18 I would argue that it is also mimetic if we take immanent to
mean expressive and enactive. But the larger point is that the things of the world
which people like Dobrin perceive to be obstacles can reversibly be perceived as
gateways. This is the view I take of the privileging of conceptual knowledge and the
systems of instruction and assessment that help to maintain its dominance. It is not a
boogeyman or even a necessary evil. It is simply the status quo, which every now and
then needs to be balanced with an alternative in order to create a new way of
thinking, doing, and living. I believe that my mimetic theory of multimodality and
influencive rhetoric, by shedding light on the significant role experiential knowledge
plays in everything we do both inside and outside of traditional classrooms, can help
us and our students not only to think differently about learning and communicating,
but to attune ourselves to the situations in which we learn and communicate, opening
up a whole new horizon of knowledge work that is actually much more familiar to us
than we may think.

1
By “curricular area” I have in mind primarily undergraduate courses offered through programs
coordinated by a director. “Rhet Comp” is the popular shortened version of the field commonly called
Composition and speaks to that field’s association with the rhetoric, a classical discipline that in recent
scholarship has been going through marked transformation. Composition is sometimes called “writing
studies,” a term I eschew in this project since it marginalizes modes of communication that I feel
composition should attend to (this is discussed in the last chapter). Composition programs are variously
called “freshman English,” “writing programs,” or simply “composition programs.” The Council of Writing
Program Administrators uses the term “First Year Writing Program” (FYW) and calls directors of such
programs “Writing Program Administrators” (WPAs). “Tech Com” is a shortened version of Technical
Communication, a younger discipline and has not established itself as firmly as has composition in the
general education curricula common to most higher education institutions in the United States. However,
that may change given the technological sophistication of so many professional practices and the demand
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for people to know how to communicate that sophistication across multiple professional fields. Technical
Communication is the scholarly and professional field that developed around specialized curricula that
was originally designed for students in the engineering and technical fields for professional
communication. However, with the proliferation of so many different specializations both across and
within professional fields and academic majors, undergraduate courses in technical communication must
address the needs of students with a wide variety of majors. As a result, undergraduate programs in Tech
Com are often a mix of traditional technical writing (writing about technology in genres such as training
manuals or user guides), scientific writing (lab reports, research articles), and professional writing
(business proposals, grants, career documents). The term Tech Com refers to both the scholarly field and
to the programs it encompasses.
2
I will use the more general adjective “situated” for understanding cognition as embodied, extended, and
distributed. Each one of these terms designates a specialized research area within a general framework
that understands cognition as involving more elements that just the human brain and “mind.” The term
that most generally applies to such a framework, situated, I will use primarily in this dissertation.
3

In this dissertation I draw frequently from Hawhee’s 2004 book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in
Ancient Greece.

4
This comparison is made through a reference to a quote by Johann Peter Hebel (Heidegger’s citation:
Works, ed. Altwegg III, 314): “We are plants which – whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not – must
with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and bear fruit.”
5
This is clear in the subtitle of their 1999 book Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its
Challenge to Western Thought.
6
The title of Rickert’s 2013 book is Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being. Although
my own study only occasionally references Rickert’s major concepts, I do feel that there are strong
parallels between his work with kairos and my work with mimesis, his drawing on Heidegger and mine on
Merleau-Ponty, as well as his conception of rhetoric as ambient and my model – given at the end of
Chapter 5 – of a rhetoric of influence. I very much like how he describes attunement as “given in its
dynamic unfolding by an originary, world rhetoricity, an affectability inherent in how the world comes to
be. Attunement conveys the countless modalities of responsiveness to this affectability . . . . [which
means that we] are always already attuned; there are only changes in attunement” (8-9). In this
dissertation, I offer mimesis as a force in how we structurally and materially attune ourselves with others,
our situations, and environments.
7
I base this statement on the compelling argument made by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in
Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought: conceptual thinking is
rooted in the body’s experience of material space as evidenced by the spatial metaphoricity of language,
even in its most abstract instantiations. A similar argument is made by Lakoff and Vittorio Gallese in their
article “The Brain’s Concepts: The Role of the Sensory Motor-System in Conceptual Knowledge.”
8
See Chris Drew’s “Sophistic Training and Experiential Learning: A Methodology of Mind-Body Syncretism”
(Pedagogy, 7:2, Spring 2007, pp. 303-8)
9
Halliwell considers this definition of mimesis by Aristotle reductive, failing to capture the philosopher’s
broad conception of both “imitate” and “nature.” I will discuss this in Chapter 3.
10
Halliwell compares empathy with a slightly more congenial approach to identification achieved
emotionally through sumpaschein, (“sympathy”) that, while bad in Plato’s eyes, at least allowed a
subconscious degree of mental disassociation (80).
11
In a similar mode, the playwright Bertolt Brecht sought to denaturalize theatrical productions that
allowed for the sympathetic identification of audiences with characters and situations in order to create a
“critical spectatorship” (Halliwell, 91). Such a perspective would, he hoped, shake awake mass audiences
from the bourgeois spell cast over them, a perspective they would then bring to the everyday world
where their lives were controlled by an aristocratic elite. Though they occupied opposite poles of the
political spectrum, both Plato and Brecht believed that rationalist critique would have liberatory effects.
12
Throughout his study, Halliwell uses the term mimeticism for a mostly artistic tradition that is informed
by cultural understandings of the concept mimesis. In many cases, both terms are used interchangeable.
13
As I will show in Chapter 1, not all human beings possess this capacity in full. Merleau-Ponty reveals
how a brain-damaged WWI veteran is unable to mimic a salute that he once had performed many times.
While at the level of basic perception his body is able to translate the world so that he can engage with it
in meaningful ways – such as holding a job – his mimetic capacity is seriously diminished due to damage to
his brain. As for the mimetic faculty of nonhuman species: there is a vast body of literature detailing how
insects, frogs and toads, fish, and many mammals attune themselves to intimately to their environments
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that their bodies, as Caillois noted, blend into it. The Mirror Neuron System that I discuss ahead was
discovered by scientists working with monkeys. As a cognitive function, mimesis is shared among many
living things.
14
For Rickert, the “attunements of rhetorical being” inherent in our existence require a
reconceptualization of rhetoric as ambient (the Latin ambientem attends to what is surrounding,
encircling, environing; p. 5). Importantly for my purpose, ambient rhetoric is phenomenological, Rickert
tells us, in its attention to the “ensemble of things, situations, and purposes that define the everyday”
(171), and its participation in the “world” as thought through Martin Heidegger as a mutually achieved
composite of meaning and matter. What is presented to us through our doing and making “is disclosed as
already fitted into material environments and holistic forms of significance” and includes nonhuman
elements (xii-xiii). In line with similar proposals made recently by the rhetorical scholar Diane Davis,
Rickert asks us to reconceive rhetoric as ontological – not just persuasive – since it engages with questions
on how we interact with each other, generate and negotiate knowledge, and how the “human being” and
the world simple are (xv, 162). Ambient rhetoric offers a framework that reveals the enactive dimension
of praxis – practice, doing and making – that I will argue is not only fundamentally rhetorical but mimetic.
15
The Merleau-Ponty scholar Scott Marratto, a member of my dissertation committee, has noted how
neuroscientific discussions of the sensory-motor system tend to focus predominantly on the neurological
processes of the brain at the exclusion of the body’s many other attributes and functions which altogether
contribute to the body schema. While the mimetic theories of Vittorio Gallese (such as intentional
attunement and embodied simulation) extend outward to the social realm, they are very much rooted in
the so-called Mirror Neuron System of the brain’s pre-frontal cortex – a theory discovered long after
Merleau-Ponty had died – and of which Gallese was one of the discoverers.
16
I will discuss Gibb’s theory of mimetic communication in Chapter 2.
17
I prefer this spelling to “influential” and its connotation of persuasive appeal rooted in some kind of
power structure.
18
In Pandora’s Hope, Latour somewhat reductively writes: “Phenomenology deals only with a world-forthe-human-consciousness” (10). Although Merleau-Ponty in later years recorded a similar criticism about
his book Phenomenology of Perception, Marratto believes that this text along with other work from his
early years was nonetheless “not inattentive to ontological concerns . . .” (6).

26

Chapter 1: Mimesis in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty
Abbreviations of sources by Merleau-Ponty:1
x

PhP – Phenomenology of Perception

x

WP – World of Perception

x

PoW – Prose of the World

x

CAL – Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language

x

VI – Visible and Invisible

x

CRO – “The Child’s Relations with Others”

x

EO – “The Experience of Others”

Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenological Tradition
Before exploring Merleau-Ponty’s work in relation to imitation, I would like to situate
him in the philosophical movement known as phenomenology. Founded around the
turn of the twentieth century by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl,
phenomenology offered an alternative to the scientific realism that influenced
European intellectual trends for some time. Scientific realism attempts to discover
what is “real” by examining the properties of objects and things that can be measured
and quantified. Properties that do not lend themselves to this kind of mathematical
analysis were not deemed to have “reality.” The distinction that Plato made long ago
between reality and appearance, wherein with appearance was associated with the
physical world and matter, and hence with the body, became concretized. The couch
that Socrates sat on was of the realm of appearance, a vague formulation of a
metaphysical Couchness. But where Plato saw the material world as an inferior copy of
ideal reality, the scientific tradition saw it instrumentally, as a means of obtaining
insight into the “Nature” that was reality or what the Greeks called phusis. The
seventeenth century philosopher Rene Descartes’ separation of “mind” from “body”
contributed to this clear-cut distinction in an intellectual movement that culminated
with the Scientific Revolution. Neoclassicism represented the body not as we actually
know it – from an experiential first-person perspective – but more as an object
observed from a third-person, or “objective,” perspective. Phenomenology attempts
to turn this entire tradition inside out.
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Although Husserl did not discount scientific accounts such as Galileo’s
mathematically rendered representation of the world, he argued that objective
interpretations did not represent the real so much as they were abstracted from it. He
believed that, first and foremost, we inhabit a “lived world” (lebenswelt), the
appearances of which do not exist as “objects” in a geometrically mappable space and
behind which exist “the Real.” Instead, the “the Real” is generated in our perception
of phenomena, in how the things of the world appear to us not through analysis and
contemplation but by literally experiencing them. Simply put, we come to know the
lived world through experience, by literally living in it. All theories about the things
that we perceive, including scientific realism, are secondary to the primacy that is
perception itself. This means that knowledge is, fundamentally, the ongoing product
of experience. Our conceptual knowledge rests solely on the foundation of knowledge
we acquire by interacting with the very material world in which we live.
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy takes up Husserl’s idea of a lived world but shifts the
focus from how it appeared to human consciousness to how it was registered by the
human body’s sensory-motor perceptual system. He considers not only how we become
conscious of the living world but how we come to inhabit it through direct experiential
contact. In doing so, he offered a radically first-person perspective that called for a
revamping of the received accounts of human behavior that in his time were accepted
across a wide range of philosophies and scientific fields, including psychology. His
phenomenology also offered a radical rethinking of the classical separation of ontology
(being) from epistemology (knowing). To Merleau-Ponty, the meaning of things, their
“significance,” is not the product of interpretation by the mind after it has processed
data transmitted to it via the senses – a model famously proposed by John Locke and
which later served as the theoretical basis for a “computational” paradigm that long
informed theories of cognition; rather, significance is generated at every moment by
the body’s interaction with its Umwelt, its surroundings, its world. Since action itself
is meaning, there can be separation between “mind” and “body” or between “body”
and “world.”
This account departs radically not only from the empirical and intellectual
traditions that Merleau-Ponty saw as constituting the framework of our received
knowledge,2 but also from classical humanist accounts of subjectivity whereby the
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“human being,” in addition to being the measure of all things and the highest of all
living species, was a distinct entity whose individuality bespoke of an independent self
with full agency. In ways that complemented and in some ways completed the
phenomenological work of his contemporary Martin Heidegger,3 Merleau-Ponty
advanced the idea that humans are beings-in-the-world, not separate from it, not over
and above it, but simply in it and of it. By recasting the human “self” or “psyche” as a
body-subject, Merleau-Ponty rooted human being in a body that was itself rooted in
the world and whose “sense” of the world is generated through embodied experience
with it – again, “sense” not being a product of consciousness but the interaction
between one’s body and world that is itself significance. Life does not “have a
meaning”; it is meaning.
One gets the impression in reading Merleau-Ponty that he sees phenomenology as
a kind of recovery effort. In a series of radio broadcasts in 1948, he repeatedly
describes what he calls the “world of perception” – “the world which is revealed to us
by our senses and in everyday life” – as something that modern art and philosophy is
just to beginning to “rediscover” (WP 31-2). He wants to bring this world hidden from
us beneath the sediment of received knowledge and social life “back to life” (69).
The slow-moving paradigm shift from the classical to the modern era was the initial
spark of this “reawakening” (53) and things are still changing radically. In his
Phenomenology of Perception he flatly states that the empiricist and intellectualist
models upon which Western intellectual culture has been built are “collapsing before
our eyes” – bringing down with it the “ideality of the objective, the objectification of
the living body,” and the reduction of experiential phenomena “to third-person
processes” (64-5). Philosophy therefore needs to return to the “actual” world that is
prior to the objective world and “rediscover phenomena” as the layer of experience
through which other people and things are first given to us. Experiential existence he
calls “the system of self-other-things” and its incessant coming into being at each
moment of our lives we have lost sight of (65-6).
Clearly, my aspirations for this dissertation resonate with those he held for
phenomenology. I, too, wish to contribute to a “rediscovering” of experiential
knowledge and the role it plays in learning and living. I want accomplish this by
unearthing the buried phenomenological dimensions of mimesis. In this sense what I
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have been calling a reconceptualization is primarily a rediscovery or, better (given the
metaphor of burial I am using here), a recovery effort. Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology will help me in this endeavor, and it is toward his theories about
imitation that I now turn.

The Function of Mimesis “in its Most Fundamental and Irreducible Form”
In the pages ahead I will provide a general overview of the role played by “imitation”
in Merleau-Ponty’s work. I put “imitation” in quotation marks because that is the word
which appears most frequently in the English translations of his work I am working
with. He also uses the term “mimic” and “mimicry,” sometimes in seemingly specific
ways,4 when describing certain manners or styles of imitation, and at one point he
employs mimesis itself to describe a fundamental “function” in the body’s sensorymotor perception of things. While Merleau-Ponty does not offer an explicit theory of
imitation, the human imitative capacity is clearly fundamental to, and significantly
broadened by, four of his concepts that I will refer back to in the chapters ahead: the
body schema, intercorporeity, style and expression,5 and our bodies’ ongoing
reversible slippage between actual and virtual modes of existence. Threaded
throughout all three categories are other concepts whose significance to imitation can
be teased out with reference to the contexts in which he touches on them as well as
to scholarship on his work. They include reversibility between subject and object,
identification through habituation, intersubjectivity, the body as a form of media, and
perceptual apprehension as the enaction of meaning or significance. These concepts
are not distinct from each other but are interwoven with each other along with the
three that I identify above.
I will embark on Merleau-Ponty’s theory of imitation by grabbing the proverbial
bull by the horns and zeroing in on his direct use of mimesis. The term is used several
times in his essay “The Child’s Relations with Others” when describing the renowned
child psychologist Henri Wallon’s theories of infant development. Sympathy, he tells
us, paraphrasing Wallon, appears in the child “on the foundation of mimesis” (154).
Merleau-Ponty describes mimesis as “an ensnaring of me by the other,” an attitude by
which we assume the gestures, conducts, words, and ways of doing things of those we
confront. He elaborates:
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Mimesis, or mimicry, is the power of assuming conducts or facial expressions as
my own; this power is given to me with the power I have over my own body. It is
the ‘postural function appropriate to the needs of expression’ (Wallon). The
constant regulation of bodily equilibrium, without which no function (and in
particular no perceptual function) would be possible in the child, is not merely
the capacity to reunite the minimal conditions for balancing the body but is more
generally the power I have to realize with my body gestures that are analogous to
those I see. (154).
He describes how Wallon shows “great insight” in relating mimesis to the postural
function of what Wallon calls the “postural schema” and what Merleau-Ponty calls,
following other researchers, the “corporeal schema” (schema corporel) or body
schema.6 He notes in particular Wallon’s idea of “postural impregnation that is
resolved in gestures of imitation” – that is, the bodily absorption of another’s conduct
which is manifested in its imitation (for example, a yawn) – and cites Wallon’s
description of a child who, after watching a chirping bird for some time, “sets himself
to reproducing the bird’s sounds as well as something of the bird’s bearing” (145).
Merleau-Ponty observes that “not only the perception of another child but even that
of an animal quite different from the child himself shows up, thanks to the postural
function, in attitudes that resemble those of the other and have their same expressive
value” (145).
It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty uses the term “expressive,” not
representational, to describe “attitudes that resemble those of the other.” Mimesis
here, grounded as it is in intersubjective identification through sympathy, is not
rendered as copying which I feel bears a closer relationship to representation than
does expression. The child’s mimicry speaks to a bodily association that may indeed be
“mindless” in its replication, but that does not mean it lacks significance. What we
see in this example, I contend, is an instance of experiential knowledge work. But as I
asked in my introduction: what is the nature of that knowledge work? Merleau-Ponty
here provides an answer. In fact, he uses this example to distinguish somewhat his
own view of mimesis from Wallon’s. Whereas Wallon sees the postural function as an
“inward formulation” of gestures, Merleau-Ponty sees “the unfolding of different
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phases of this process” where the perception arouses in the perceiver “the
preparation of a motor activity related to it” (146):
It is this fundamental correspondence between perception and motility . . . that
allows the perception . . . to translate itself into an original motor organization.
This is what would be the function of mimesis or mimicry, in its most fundamental
and irreducible form. (146)
This fundamental correspondence between perception and motility that enables an
original motor organization – mimesis in its most fundamental form – is apparently the
operation which allows an infant of around three months old to imitate a smile even
though it has no visual experience of her own body that would allow for a “point to
point correspondence” between the smiling mouth of the adult and the her own
mouth. Merleau-Ponty sees the “motor smile” that the child makes as generated not
by her “mind” but by her body schema. Constituted kinesthetically, introceptively,
cenesthesically, and tactilely, the body schema allows the young child to “globally
identify” with the actions she observes performed toward her by others (116-117).
Her body is able to “translate” the smiles and other facial expressions she observes
because “they all have in common a certain style of action, a certain gestural
meaning that makes of the collection an already organized totality” (118; emphasis
his). Because global identification arises from a “coupling” – Merleau-Ponty cites
Husserl here – between the body schema of the perceiver with the body schema of the
perceived, there arises a kind of attunement, a sense of the familiar, a “certain
style,” wherein “the other’s intentions somehow play across my body while my
intentions play across his” (118-119). The culmination of significance engendered
through an attunement through to a situation’s “style” Merleau-Ponty calls expression,
which I will describe in the next section.
The (intercorporeal) coupling between body schemas allows for (intersubjective)
expression and, ultimately, communication. Merleau-Ponty observes how sympathy –
“the system ‘me-and-other’” – would emerge from this complex “foundation of
mimesis” since what is being “translated” from perception to motility in the
observer’s body simulates what is being transferred, via perception, from the body of
the other to the observer. Sympathy stems from a global bodily identification that in
the stages of “precommunication” is characterized as the absence of a division
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between the self and others. The phenomenon Wallon calls “syncretic sociability” is
hence exemplary of sympathy: when a group of babies are together and one responds
to something with a cry, they all start crying – a kind of “contagion” that MerleauPonty believes disappears only as visual perception develops. (124, 125-6). While at
one level syncretic sociability reveals how human infants are so attuned to each other
that the cry of one becomes the cry of all, at another level we understand that their
attunement is also situated. To say simply that “the babies cry because they identify
with each other” ignores the global parameters. The babies also identify with the
situation. What does that mean? Merleau-Ponty gives the example of a child who is
scolded by his father for having a glass in his hand. After putting the glass down, the
child forgets about it and moves onto other things. But five minutes later, upon
hearing the sound of breaking glass, the child becomes just as agitated as if he still
were holding the forbidden item. “The child confuses himself with his situation,”
Merleau-Ponty explains. “He is someone who has been holding a glass in his hand,
someone who has had a relation with the glass, so that the subsequent breaking of the
glass concerns him” (146-7). This, along with a few other examples, demonstrates how
“[t]he child is, in fact, the situation and has no distance from it” (147).
Merleau-Ponty’s description of mimesis, based as it is on Wallon’s account, is
by far more complex than the word’s conventional association with imitation
conceived as rote copying and monotonous repetition. Before moving on, I would like
to point out a few important details here. First, following Wollan, Merleau-Ponty
conceives of mimesis as a fundamental function of our body’s sensory-motor system in
that it governs the process by which a perception “translates itself” into a motor
action while simultaneously transferring that action across an intersubjective field.
Second, mimesis, while primarily introjective in psychoanalytic terms,7 seems central
to the enactment of a global identification that is not limited to human others. The
relations between the child and his world are evoked in his interaction with animals as
well as things (the glass) and extend to include the situation in which these
interactions occur. Hence “[w]e must link the notion of ipseity [selfhood] to that of
the situation,” he tells us elsewhere, “the ego ought to be defined as identical with
the act in which it projects itself” (CAL, 49). What might be said to be intersubjective
relations – relations between human subjects – are not the only set of relations
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mimesis functions to enact; relations are also intercorporeal if we see corporeality as
including bodies that are not limited to human subjects. Third, imitation stems not
from an act of copying but from “coupling” or attuning to others and situations; in
imitating one identifies not so much with a specific action but with its larger context –
its “style” – that arises through this coupling. No metaphysical or symbolic meaning is
transmitted here; rather, “conceptual meaning must be formed by a kind of gestural
meaning” which is immanent in all our communication acts, including speech (PhP,
208; italics in original). Finally, and in sum, complex mimetic operations occur at the
level of affect and are embodied – that is, mimesis is a function of the sensory-motor
body schema.
It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty in this essay conveys the idea that
the child’s “ensnared” mimetic relation with others erases their distinction and
eliminates difference. In the following pages, I will show that this is not quite the
case. Because “The Child’s Relations with Others” was composed as a series of
introductory lectures for a university course he was teaching, his primary concern
seems to have been to represent the theories of Henri Wallon and other experts in
childhood psychology and development. His own views on these theories seems to take
a back seat to this exposition. Still, in addition to showing how Merleau-Ponty engaged
with mimesis itself, this essay serves as a nice initial foray into his complex
understanding of imitation, which I will now delve into in greater detail beginning with
the concept of the body schema.

The Body Schema and Our Capacity for Intercorporeal Embodied Simulation
According to Merleau-Ponty, the idea of a corporeal schema (or “body schema” as it is
more popularly rendered in English) was pioneered by the English neurologist Henry
Head before being taken over and “enriched” by Henri Wallon, who preferred the
term postural schema. (CRO, 145). Merleau-Ponty describes it as a system “whose
different introceptive and extroceptive aspects express each other reciprocally,
including even the roughest relations with surrounding space and its principal
directions” including the vertical, horizontal, and other axes that coordinate our
positions within an environment (CRO, 117) . The “consciousness” we have of our
bodies is not of an “isolated mass”; rather, it is the body schema that is evoked
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(however, as I will discuss below, some researchers distinguish between the body
image that we are “conscious” of and the body’s proprioceptive awareness of itself,
which would be the body schema). In actuality, we never perceive an integral “self” or
“psyche” in the people we interact with; instead, we perceive “conduct” that is
expressive of their intentions as coordinated by their body schemas (117). Following
Wallon, Merleau-Ponty believed that experience, hence experiential knowledge,
begins introceptively as a way to navigate the “chaos in which I am submerged” (118).
It only begins to take on discernible shape between the third and sixth months as the
interoceptive system collaborates with the exteroceptive system to create a “minimal
body equilibrium” (122 ) that ultimately serves as the foundation of a sense of self.
The child has a “tacit understanding” of his or her being-in-the-world but this kind of
subconscious self-awareness is not, he stresses, a “positional consciousness, a
representation, Vor-stellung” (PhP, 119).
Empirical studies of neonate imitation in recent times provide support for the
existence of a body schema and how Merleau-Ponty described its functions, but with
an important exception. Contrary to Wallon’s and Merleau-Ponty’s belief that the body
schema developed after birth through a child’s intersubjective perceptual relations
with others, evidence suggests instead that a general structure consistent with a body
schema is innate. Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff contend that all humans, at
the time of birth, possess “a built-in neural framework or substrate; a schema from
the very beginning, but one that is also open to modification by multimodal sensory
experiences” throughout their lifetimes (214). Whereas Merleau-Ponty believed that
an infant’s neurological immaturity at the time of birth blocked an elaboration of the
body schema, studies conducted by Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore8 have shown that
infants are capable not only of external perception but of outright imitation of the
gestures of others within the first hour of birth (one infant who “showed a strong
imitation” effect was just 42 minutes old) (212, 221). The ability of the child to
engage in invisible imitation – the “motor smile” that Merleau-Ponty calls the
expression that appears on a child’s face in response to the “visible smile” perceived
in another (CRO 116) – is not something that comes to her over time but something
that can be enacted immediately after birth.
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What does develop over time is what Gallagher and Meltzoff describe as the body
image, which they distinguish from the body schema in ways that are not always clear
in Merleau-Ponty.9 They describe the body image as “a complex set of mental
representations of the body” that derives from a subject’s perceptual experience of
his body, conceptual understanding of the body in general, and emotional attitude
toward his body; though the latter two are not necessarily conscious, because they
contribute to a set of beliefs or attitudes they form part of an “intentional system.”
In contrast, the body schema is a system of motor functions operating below the level
of self-referential intentionality and “involves a set of tacit performances,
preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic role in governing posture and
movement” (216).
What links the body image to the body schema is proprioception, which has a
twofold function: (1) it consists of nonconscious, physiological information that
updates the body with respect to posture and movement, and therefore plays a vital
role in the body schema; and (2) this proprioceptive information can be the basis for
proprioceptive awareness – allowing me to tell you where my legs are when my eyes
are closed – which helps support the perceptual aspect of the body image (223).
Because the child is born with a “primitive” framework for both of these systems – the
body schema and body image – she possesses a proprioceptive awareness of her own
(invisible) body that allows her to simulate novel facial expressions and gestures she
observes in others as well even to “monitor, correct, and improve imitative
performance” (225). Meltzoff and Moore have called this primitive framework a
“supramodal perceptual system” in which proprioceptive and visual modalities of
perception are already in communication with each other and “enables the infant to
recognize a structural equivalence between itself and the other people” (225-6).
Interpreting what Merleau-Ponty terms a “certain style of action” (CRO 118)10 as a
“translation” between perception and motility in the “transfer” of gestural
signification, Gallagher and Meltzoff offer as an alternative model this “supramodal
code.” Consequently, they argue,
no “translation” or transfer is necessary because it is already accomplished, and
already intersubjective. A supramodal code already reaches across the child’s
relations with others. Infants already apprehend, with quickly-improving
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precision, the equivalences between the visible body transformations of others
and their own invisible body transformations which they experience
proprioceptively. The concept of supramodal code means that the visual and
motor systems speak the same “language” right from birth. . . . The [body]
schema, working systematically with proprioceptive awareness, operates as a
proprioceptive self that is always already “coupled” with the other. (225-6)
The “proprioceptive self” the authors describe here is what the body intuitively
perceives as its distinction from others and situations, even in infants whose excess of
sympathy Merleau-Ponty saw as “ensnaring” them with others. Frederique de
Vignemont argues that this implicit sense of “self” – which she hypothesizes is
grounded exclusively in the body schema

11

– is what keeps us from confusing self and

other despite evidence that shows how observing pain and other bodily effects in
others activates the same (“mirror”) neural network in the somatosensory cortex as in
those directly experiencing it (431). It is what gives us a first-personal sense of bodily
“ownership” and has a permanency that lasts longer than a single bodily experience
(445). Vittorio Gallese, Morris N. Eagle, and Paolo Migone reach a similar conclusion.
Although fMRI studies of people witnessing disgust exhibited in the facial expressions
of others directly experiencing disgust activated the anterior insula in the same
overlapping location – indicating how first- and third-person experiences of a specific
emotion “are underpinned by the activity of a shared neural substrate” (141) – their
embodied simulation of the phenomenon is not a “mere repetition” because of
different “degrees of activation” in the same somatosensory areas that support the
“disentanglement of who is who” (152,142). In other words, we are born with an
innate sense of difference. Identification with others or with a situation is never total
despite nearly identical neural activations. Similarly, our bodily imitations are not
“copies” of some external model (as Plato would argue) or emanations of some
essential inner form (as Aristotle would suggest); rather, they are approximate,
appropriate simulations that correspond to actions we perceive in others. We are
“ensnared” only in the sense that we respond automatically to the other bodies we are
(intercorporeally) coupled with, but this does not erase our distinction as individual
entities.
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At this point, we might need to update the term “imitation” as used by MerleauPonty in the work he produced during the mid-20th century. In our situated
interactions with other people and things, we all12 automatically engage in what
Gallese, et al., call “intentional attunement,” a specific, shared, phenomenal state
generated in part by the mirror neuron system. This system allows for embodied
simulation that is “automatic, unconscious, and noninferential in the observer of
actions, emotions, and sensations carried out and experienced by the observed” (131).
They oppose embodied simulation to theories of “standard simulation” which posit
that observers generate mental representations by imaginatively adopting the
circumstances of the observed target (143). The authors make it clear that this
mandatory, prereflexive mechanism “is not the result of a deliberate and conscious
cognitive effort” and instead “generates a peculiar quality of familiarity with other
individuals” (143-4). It is notable that Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror
neurons, joins his colleagues in arguing that the term mirroring is “misleading” since
“simulation does not necessarily imply overt imitative behavior.” If a baby cries, they
write, the mother does not also cry, “a response that would reflect contagion rather
than empathic attunement”; instead, her response is “in some way congruent with”
the bodily state of her baby (151). Similar observations made by the psychoanalytic
theorist Daniel Stern about how this kind of cross-modal translation process enacted
by a baby’s cries is productive of difference – “isomorphism without identity” – helps
to facilitate the infant’s gradual recognition of its “self” (its body image) over time
(Gibbs, 195).
As we will see, this concept of embodied simulation nicely complements what
Merleau-Ponty’s refers to as the “imitative way” through which we attune to, or
couple with, the situations or people we come into contact with. It also helps to detotalize his example of syncretic sociability which implies that all babies cry
automatically when one sets off the chain reaction; while there is a “degree of
activation” in each one’s mirror neuron systems that allows for global identification,
there are also degree of simulated response to the situation, including the fact that
some babies in some groups may very well react in ways other than crying.
There is another component to embodied simulation that we need to consider
before moving on. Like Gallagher and Meltzoff, Gallese elsewhere (“The Two Sides of
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Mimesis”) contends that at the moment of birth “humans are engaged in interpersonal
mimetic relations” that occur in a shared “we-centric” space (11). This makes
embodied simulation a crucial component to what recent theories in developmental
psychology call a “shared mind” (12) that is intersubjectively constituted. But Gallese
suggests the term intersubjectivity – that is, comprehension and communication
between human subjects - does not adequately capture the bodily dimension of our
behavioral simulations that subtends comprehension and communication. These bodily
“instantiations of unconscious mimesis” (9) is best understood, he contends, through
an account of “intersubjectivity viewed first and foremost as intercorporeity”(13), a
term he apparently appropriates from Merleau-Ponty.13 Our neurologically responsive
“situated motor systems” creates a pragmatic “openness to the world” before and
below our theoretical takes on it which allow humans to “share the same intentional
objects” (4). If we are “ensnared,” Gallese would argue, it is at the level or
intercorporeity. Intersubjectivity simply stems from this.
While Gallese’s emphasis on a primary intercorporeity has the potential to bring
us to the brink of a nonhuman dimension to embodied simulation – the role of objects
in our interactions – his focus remains centered on human interaction.14 In the
chapters ahead, I will make the case that Merleau-Ponty’s account of intercorporeity
allows for a coupling with bodies that include nonhumans, often through mimetic
imitation and repetition is the foundation of our habits. Scott Marratto points
generally in this direction when he attends to Merleau-Ponty’s description of a simple
handshake: “he and I are like one single intercorporeity” (qtd, 144). Marratto
interprets intercorporeity as a “field” in which the unity of one’s body is accomplished
unconsciously through the “mutual involvement of bodies” in certain interactions.
Whereas intersubjectivity concerns a relation between (conscious) subjects, the point
to be made about intercorporeity is that “my body is already bound up with the
other’s body before there can be any relation between conscious subjects” (144), a
statement with which Gallese would agree. Taking a cue from Merleau-Ponty, I will
similarly adopt the perspective of intercorporeity as binding relations between bodies
– not subjects – but will include nonhumans in the former category since they are, with
the exception of some animals perhaps, clearly excluded by the latter.
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In the Phenomenology of Perception, nonhuman bodies intersect with human
ones in ways most of us (due to an ingrained anthropocentrism perhaps) are rarely
cognizant of. Merleau-Ponty points out how our habits – which are acquired primarily
through imitation15 – help to give us “our anchorage in the world” (167). It is, he says,
“literally true” that a subject learning to type “incorporates” the keyboard space into
his bodily space; similarly, the experienced organist “incorporates within himself” the
dimensions and directions of an organ he has never played before, settling into it “as
one settles into a house” (168). In these examples and in others, Merleau-Ponty clearly
demonstrates Gail Weiss’s contention that to “describe embodiment as
intercorporeality is to emphasize that the experience of being embodied is never a
private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual interactions with other
human and nonhuman bodies” (5). These interactions are accomplished through our
attunement to certain frequencies (this is my term here) that emerge from the
situations in which we are immersed. These currents Merleau-Ponty calls “style” and it
is one of two intimately related concepts that I will turn to now.

Enacting Expression through Mimetic Attunement to Style
Two key concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy – style and expression – are so closely
entwined that it makes sense for me to discuss them together. “One cannot say that
style stands apart from expression,” he tells us. “The expression of sadness, for
example, is a means of being sad” (EO, 49). Merleau-Ponty describes style as a
“certain manner of dealing with situations … by taking over that manner myself in an
almost imitative way, even though I may not be able to define it” (PhP, 382). Our
“existential mimicry” of a situation’s style enacts a “process of expression” that
“brings the meaning into existence as the very thing at the heart” of situations (212).
Style is a sort of frequency one attunes to when their actions help give rise to the
significance of a situation or event. Expression is that significance. Both concepts help
Merleau-Ponty to develop an ontology wherein our bodies, threaded through the global
fabric of this process, enact the world through perception and motility; this
enactment is simultaneously the world expressing itself through our bodily actions.
Before continuing, I want to foreground a word I have been using all along:
enactment. I use this term as a very general equivalent to expression, a sense
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captured in Marratto’s statement that “expression is always the enactment of a
decision about the sense of sensible being . . . (188). It is not a decision reached and
acted upon by a single human agent. Like style, expression is a complex concept in
Merleau-Ponty and probing its ontological layers is impossible within the scope of this
dissertation. But in numerous descriptions – for instance, “[e]xpression is everywhere
creative, and what is expressed is inseparable from it” (PhP, 455) – expression is
clearly figured as an enactive process or event. This is important, the “expressive”
powers of mimesis (Halliwell 14, 293) that so alarmed Plato and strongly inclined
Aristotle toward an enactive conception of the term16 (168) resonate both with
Gallese’s (2009) association of mimesis with enactive cognition through embodied
simulation and with what Merleau-Ponty’s provocatively describes as the “magic” of
expression in dramatic events. The actor’s enactment of another’s bodily gestures and
expressions through the “nonlogical operation” of imitation – an operation whose roots
sink into our body schemas – has the power to “animate” (his word: entraîne) our own
bodies, stirring up “highly ambiguous feelings” between actor and audience (52-53).
The basis of this “magic” enacted by the actor, he writes, “is in the intentionality
which links our body to the world” (53). In this sense, the “actor’s art is therefore only
an extension of the art we all possess. My body schema directs itself to the perceived
world and to the imaginary as well.” For some people, there is a real danger in that
“movement of transcendence that represents the expressive signification of the
body.” It is precisely this expressive signification – the “sympathy” Plato saw
generated from mimesis – that Merleau-Ponty says “explains the history of why actors
have been so admired and nevertheless excluded from normal civil rights” (53).
Clearly, Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of imitation in terms of style and expression
provide a useful way to think about mimesis as expressive and enactive. But, like the
body schema as well as style and expression, these are not ideas he came up with on
his own. They worked their way into this vocabulary through his readings of the
phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler as well as his research in early
childhood development. A small hint of expression, in fact, occurs in the opening
paragraph of Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language when Merleau-Ponty
directs attention to something most people often conceive as insignificant: the
babbling of babies:
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During the first months of life, the child cries; he makes expressive movements;
and then he begins to babble. One must consider babbling as the ancestor of
language: it is, above all, extraordinarily rich and includes phonemes which do not
exist in the language that is spoken around the child, and which he himself, once
he becomes an adult, is incapable of reproducing. (11)
He goes on to identify this babbling as “a polymorphic language, which is spontaneous
with respect to its environment” and is constituted by a “large amount of imitation.”
This imitation is “rudimentary” in that the child does not “grasp the meaning of that
which he is imitating.” But still there is a lesson to be learned here: “This imitation
concerns the melody of the sentence just as much as the words, because the child
tries, as it were, to speak ‘in general’” (11). Babbling is to language, he tells us, as
scribbling is to drawing. The baby’s babbling suggests a graduate attunement to the
sounds – many of which are other human voices – that are themselves styles of spoken
language: not words, not sentences, just rough phonemes and muscular gurgitations
that have been refined into what we might call “tone,” “intonation,” “stress,”
“accent,” and other features of adult linguistic behavior. The babbling is the
“imitative way” the baby attunes herself to these styles.
As the child grows older the imitation becomes “immanent” in that the child
seeks to replicate results rather than amorphous patterns. Merleau-Ponty here draws
on the work of the child psychologist Paul Guillaume, who “goes beyond the classical
conception” of imitation as actions that replicate cognitively registered
representations (32). Guillaume provides an example of a child who, upon seeing his
father using a pencil to draw, seizes the pencil upside down and hits the table with its
eraser; after a few times, he turns it right-side-up and puts the point on the paper;
weeks later the child uses the pencil not for hitting but for tracing lines on paper. In
all phases, Merleau-Ponty notes, following Guillaume, it “is not a question of the child
reproducing the gesticulation of this father, but rather a question of obtaining the
same result as he” (33-4). In other words, imitation cannot be reduced to a monkeysee monkey-do model of representation. What we observe instead is the child’s
attunement to an intentional dimension in the situation that includes but is not
limited to his father. This, too, is an instantiation of a situation’s style, and it is
clearly vital to the child’s motor and cognitive development.
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We need to be careful not to confuse this notion of style with conventional
understandings of the term. It is not something that lends itself to identification, as
does the spare “style” of Ernest Hemingway’s prose or the arpeggiated “style” of Elton
John’s piano playing. Merleau-Ponty insists that style “is not a concept, an idea: it is a
‘manner’ that I apprehend and then imitate, even if I am unable to define it” (43).
Even when one partially imitates the behavior of others, one takes on the “total
attitude” corresponding to that behavior. In other words, we are told, “true imitation
permeates beyond conscious limits and becomes global: once it has become
accommodated, imitation supersedes itself.” It is this superseding that allows for the
appropriation of new structures, including the acquisition of language (40). It is in the
perception of other people’s behavior that the phenomenologist Husserl and the child
psychologist Guillame share a “completely parallel” analysis, one that touches on an
intercorporeal aspect of imitation that Merleau-Ponty describes this way:
When I witness the setting in of the behavior of others, my body becomes a means
of understanding them, my corporeality becomes a comprehending power of their
corporeality – I regain the final meaning … of other people’s behavior, because my
body is capable of achieving the same goals. (42)
This is precisely embodied simulation as described by Gallese, in which one becomes
empathically attuned to another so that one’s bodily state “becomes in some way
congruent with” that of another’s (Gallese et al, 151). But style is not enacted solely
through our bodies’ relations with other human bodies. Merleau-Ponty describes how
style arises in language use – his example is the word “sleet” – as a “meeting of the
human and the nonhuman, as it were, a piece of the world’s behavior” (PhP, 469).
When a book, for example, “takes possession of the reader,” an “expressive moment
occurs” (PoW13). Significance is generated on the spot. It is not transmitted as data
into the reader’s mind where it forms a representation, like a photograph captures
and transmits an image. Instead, the language-knowledge the reader brings to the text
– “the stock of accepted relations between signs and familiar significations without
which he could not have begun to read” – “couples”17 with the “certain arrangement
of already available signs and significations” embodied in the text, transfiguring each
so that “in the end a new signification is secreted” (13). Here is described a meeting
place of systems, not of subjects but of body schemas.
43

This coupling that occurs in global contexts has “real world” effects for human
subjects. For example, before reading a book by Stendhal, Merleau-Ponty knew what a
“rogue” was and this “sedimented” awareness of rogue allowed him to understand
Stendhal’s description of the character Rossi the revenue man as a rogue. But as he
continued reading, this sedimented meaning of rogue begins to break up, the term is
given a new twist, “the cross-references multiply,” until the term rogue takes on a
new significance. The meaning the reader brings to the text is not erased, for rogue
still retains that general familiarity; but as “[m]ore and more arrows point in the
direction of a thought I have never encountered before,” Merleau-Ponty’s “imitative
way,” his manner of engaging with rogueness as expressed by the text, becomes
productive of new dimensions of that word. We see at work in this enactive moment
what Marratto identifies as the “dual manner” of style in Merleau-Ponty, one that
individuates things as singular identities while simultaneously adhering to a typicality
that cuts across things and situations (102). The expressive moment of “rogue” is
enacted through the individuation between the familiar significations of rogueness
that enables Merleau-Ponty to tap into the style of rogueness as expressed by the text.
The new “rogueness” enacted is transformative of rogueness but without losing its
sedimented typicality that links it always to the sense Merleau-Ponty had of it prior to
reading Stendhal.
What is important to note here is that our bodies do not remain idle as we read or
look at things. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty tells us that when we
run our eyes over a text our perceptions do not stir up representations but, rather,
“patterns are formed” which are “endowed with a familiar physiognomy” (167). In
other words, we respond to a text and other artifacts similarly to how we respond to
the facial and bodily conduct of people we encounter. Gallese et al. refer to numerous
studies conducted in the past thirty years which assumes an understanding of language
as “embodied.” One showed that the mirror neuron system was activated in specific
ways when people were read different kinds of sentences, with most activity
registering to action-related sentences (139). Evoked Readiness Potential (ERP) studies
of people reading silently noted that arm-, leg-, and face-related words showed
different somatotopically arranged activation sources, with face-related words
registering the strongest inferior frontal source and leg-related words showing a
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maximal superior central source (140). The art historian and critic James Elkins notes
that when people are first confronted with a unfamiliar object – a blot, a funny smear,
a wild landscape, a building, a cloud – they seek a body in it: “[W]e try to see
something like ourselves … or even just a part of ourselves – a face, a hand or foot, an
eye, even a hair or a scrap of paper” (129). This automatic response stems from our
proprioceptive “sense” which weaves our bodies “so deeply and tightly into our
thought that we have to work to see how little we would understand without them”
(159, 137). Merleau-Ponty takes a similar stand when he tells us how “normal
imitation”18 operates not in an objective or representative space conjured through
thought; rather, that space “is already built into my bodily structure,” an “open
system of equivalents” called the body schema19 (PhP,162-3). Clearly, the cognitive
ground in which mimetic identification has its roots is bodily.
As I said above, I consider expression here as the enactment of meaning and
significance that is sometimes brought to consciousness as a happening, an event.
Attuning ourselves to the style emanating from our encounters with people, with
situations, with things, is essentially what makes this happening happen. Figuring this
process mimetically lends support to William Schweiker’s reclamation of mimesis as “a
figure for the fundamental actus, the being-in-act, of understanding, action, and
language” which he sees as a common thread in recent philosophical interpretations of
it (specifically by Gadamer, Derrida, and Ricoeur) (34). Schweiker argues that the
performative dimension of mimesis embodies a convergence of figure and practice, “a
specific form of action that is not iconic ‘imitation’ or ‘mirroring’” (34) but something
more fundamental: praxis. “There simply is no ‘world’ out there independent of our
practice; the world comes to be through our enactment” (37). Schweiker calls this
enactive, “performative” aspect of mimesis “figurative practice” and it clearly
corresponds to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that thought (“figure”) and speech (“practice”)
are not independent but interdependent: “The orator does not think before speaking,
nor even while speaking; his speech is his thought” (PhP 180).
In the next section, I will contextualize mimetic praxis as described by Schweiker
by Merleau-Ponty’s identification of the reversible relationship between actual
experiential knowledge and virtual conceptual knowledge. Before concluding this
section, though, I would like to address one scholar’s interpretation of expression in
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Merleau-Ponty that might be seen as posing a direct challenge to my mimetic approach
to expression. In Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy, Lawrence Hass tells us that expression
offers an extremely promising new account of thought, language, and knowledge that
Western culture has traditionally conceived as in representational terms (147):
For at its core, expression is not about imitation (mimesis), correspondence, or
isomorphism – these are the basic watchwords of representation theories of
thought, language, and knowledge. Rather, expression is about the creative
transformation of some previous data or experience so that it yields new
knowledge or radiates a powerful, new sense about the original without the
original data disappearing or being covered up (155).
While I agree with Hass20 that expression is creative transformation, clearly I must
respond to his statement regarding mimesis. He’s right that expression is not “about”
mimesis (yes, he actually uses the term in parenthesis as cited) or these other
watchwords of representation; but as I have shown, mimesis is about more than
representation. We see here yet another example of how the term has been reduced
to such a narrow scope that even a scholar of a philosopher who read and wrote
extensively about imitation – and even about mimesis – loses sight of the breadth of
imitation in the work he is expounding on. We must not follow suit. Just as the
imitative babbling of babies is an expression of the melody of language, which is itself
an expression of the world, so too are common everyday words expressive of
dimensions that exceed the narrow definitions we confine them to.

Contextualizing Practice: The Mimetic Interface of the Actual-Virtual
In The Aesthetics of Mimesis, Stephen Halliwell identifies in Aristotle an “enactive”
conception of mimesis – revealed most acutely in his discussion of music – which gives
a “double sense” to the mimetic operation. Aristotle saw as desireable an aesthetic
perspective he called suntheorein, which means “to contemplate or observe at the
same time” (181). Mimetic representation included two complementary aspects: its
status as an artifact, as a product of an artistic shaping of materials, and its capacity
to signify and “enact” the patterns of supposed realities. His assumption that art
forms maintained an “internally organized identity” – an idea I will depart from – made
him accept the need for ways of talking about art that kept “the artifact and its
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meanings, the ‘materials’ and the ‘object’ of mimesis, conjointly in focus” (172).
Mimesis is at once “iconic,” or representational, and “expressive” of “the perceived
affective content of the musical work and the corresponding pattern of the listener’s
experience.” (153). This “dual aspect” of the concept not only aligns Aristotle’s theory
“with a much broader current in ancient mimeticist thinking,” it also conceives of
mimesis as “constituted partly be the experiences that it opens up for, and induces in,
its audience” (161-2). Halliwell concludes that, in Aristotle, to call a work mimetic “is
to situate it in a context of cultural practices that grow out of certain human
instincts,” which means that the “intentionality” of mimetic works is not located only
in the design plans of an artist but in shared conventions, traditions, and possibilities
of a culture. (153).
I will come back to Aristotle in the next chapter. I begin this section with him,
though, because I hope to show that there is also a kind of “dual-aspect” mimesis at
work in the domain perception as described by Merleau-Ponty. I have already
described his account of mimesis, following Henry Wallon, as a “translation” between
perception and motility. Now I will look at another level of operation: the interfacing
of actual and virtual, or what might be called for the time being a transfer from
“concrete” perception to “abstract” conception in the enactment of significance.
Merleau-Ponty illustrates this phenomenon by considering how an individual who
suffered a permanent brain injury has lost, among other things, his capacity to imitate
and, in a very real sense of the word, invent – perhaps the fundamental principle of
praxis. I will understand this capacity as something similar to what Walter Benjamin
described as “the mimetic faculty,” which I will come back to in Chapter 3 but here
will approach through the lens of the cultural critic Brian Massumi, who conceives
Benjamin’s notion of “nonsensuous similarities” that derive from sensuous (bodily) as
the virtual. They are also heavily contextualized. At this point, I will depart somewhat
from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of imitation, which is anchored primarily in the
individual body schema, to consider mimesis as a current that cuts across the multiple
modalities that constitute context, the situatedness of which our body is one
constituent. Here I will draw on Herbert Spiegelberg’s application of Edmund Husserl’s
phenomenology of constitution to construct a phenomenological theory of context.
This will help me to connect the actual, sensuous, perceptual account of mimesis I
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draw from Merleau-Ponty with the virtual, nonsensuous, conceptual accounts of it that
we find in its aesthetic incarnations in Aristotle and many other thinkers. Most
importantly, it will help me lay the foundation for a mimetic-multimodal praxis that I
will elucidate in later chapters.

Praktognosia and the Mimesis of the Phantom
Merleau-Ponty tells us that “the perceived, by its nature, admits of the ambiguous,
the shifting, and is shaped by context” (PhP, 13). He knew that it takes a special type
of intelligence to make sense of ambiguous, shifting, highly contextualized
phenomena. He uses the term praktognosia, a “practical intelligence” or “practical
wisdom,” to describe knowledge obtained and retained experientially “as original and
perhaps as primary” (PhP, 162). It is the innate, pre-reflective, tacit knowledge of the
body schema on which all other knowledge is based. A disruption in the praktognostic
functions of this “primary” level of knowing affects all other levels of thought. If that
disruption incapacitates our imitative abilities, our conceptual skills necessary for
invention and communication can be seriously impacted.
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates this quite vividly in Phenomenology of Perception in
analyzing the condition of a 24 year-old WWI veteran who suffered two head wounds
that had penetrated the occipital lobe of his brain. The patient, “Schneider,” was
examined by two prominent neuropsychologists, Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein,
whose meticulously described observations became the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s
considerable study. Although Schneider was capable of performing a large number of
actions, including working with scissors, thread, needles, and leather for his job
making wallets, the injuries to a certain region of his brain caused lesions that
impaired his ability to perform actions that cognitively-abled people do automatically
“without thinking.”
Following Gelb and Goldstein, Merleau-Ponty adopts the words “concrete” and
“abstract” to designate two types of active movement that I contend reflect two types
of knowledge work, the actual and the virtual or what I call the “experiential” and
“conceptual.” According to Merleau-Ponty, concrete movement occurs “in the realm
of the actual” and abstract movement “in that of the virtual,” a realm projected by
the body which results in a “free space in which what does not necessarily exist may
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take on a semblance of existence” (PhP, 128). He makes it clear that this virtual
“semblance” should not be thought of as a representation (Vor-stellung), which
“yields the object to us quite unambiguously” through a positional and objective
consciousness outside of one’s “bodily space” (119). When Schneider is asked to mimic
a salute he can no longer replicate what he did habitually in his past. Rather, he must
consciously create a context in which to situate the salute by “pantomiming” a series
of concrete actions: he repeats the command in a questioning tone of voice, then he
makes his body assume the position required for the task; but the actual salute
emerges only in conjunction with added actions such the combing of his hair with one
hand while holding a mirror with the other (119).
Merleau-Ponty contrasts Schneider’s process of enacting a salute with that of
“normal”21 person who, like an actor, can restrict movement to its most important
elements by “slip[ing] his body into the ‘great phantom’ of the character to be
played” (120). Most people can easily extricate their bodies from the actual, concrete
realm “to make them breathe, and if need be, weep in the realm of the imagination.
This is what [Schneider] is no longer able to do” (120). His condition keeps him “tied
to actuality” and hence he “lacks liberty” to create that semblance of free space
before him that “comprises the general power of putting oneself into a situation”
(157), in this case an imagined one. Because the “normal imitation” of which
Schneider is incapable is built into his bodily structure and therefore cannot be
located in an objective or representational space, he cannot do what cognitively-abled
people do automatically: re-enact a virtual rendering of a concrete action by
synthesizing time and space. Lacking the imaginary “liberty” to make the salute, he
must arduously go about creating a context by pantomiming related motor actions that
ultimately leads him to pull it off.
William S. Hamrick observes that pathologies like Schneider’s play a “key role” in
Phenomenology of Perception because of their ability “to illuminate what lies at the
center of that phenomenology, the lived-body (le corps proper)” (181-2). Pathological
behaviors allow for an understanding of the lived body “as a system of motorintentional powers of inhabiting situations spatially and temporally” by being
“involved in a practical network of relationships with physical objects and other
people” (182). Schneider’s impairment reveals how his involvement in this “practical
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network” is seriously curtailed by disruption to his powers of motor-intentionality. He
is confined to a hylomorphic “mode of consciousness” to which, as Hamrick observes,
“the classical form/matter analysis of experience” would apply. The meaning of
actions like performing a salute must be “expressly, thematically constituted” in such
a way that the sign becomes a representation of the signified (183). His actions must
arise from what Merleau-Ponty referred to repeatedly as an “I think” mode of
consciousness – in which the mind is a thing separate from the body – rather than from
an “I can” mode of being-in-the-world through which mind and body are unified. As a
result, oddly enough, Schneider is the ultimate Cartesian: he must deductively
conceive its form by classifying it in relation to other forms before shaping it into a
product. This is, ironically, his pathology. Consequently, he cannot engage in the
“imaginative process” that the philosopher Gilbert Simondon, a student of MerleauPonty’s, described as integral to invention:
[A] more profound analysis of the imaginative process would undoubtedly reveal
that the determining factor playing an energising role is not forms but that which
supports form, that is, their background. . . . The participational relationship
connecting forms to their backgrounds is a relationship which straddles the
present and brings the future to bear upon the present, that which brings the
virtual to bear upon the actual. This is so because the base is a system of
virtualities, of potentials, and of moving forces, whereas forms are a system of
the actual. Invention is a taking into account of the system of actuality by a
system of virtualities; it is the creation of a new system from these two (On the
Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 51)
Imprisoned as he is in the system of actualities, Schneider cannot inhabit that middle
ground – or even oscillate between the two systems – in order to invent or enact. He
cannot perform externalized acts that the cognitive neuroscientist Merlin Donald
contends are enabled by a mimetic capacity that has been fine-tuned through our
evolutionary process (he calls this capacity “mimetic culture”). Such acts are
predicated on “a brain capacity that allows us to map our elementary event
perceptions to action, thus creating, at a single stroke, the possibility of action,
metaphor, gesture, pantomime, re-enactive play, self-reminding, imitating diffusion
of skills, and proto-pedagogy, among other things” (33). This is precisely what we see
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in Schneider. Because he is incapable of “play-acting” (of “play” and “playing”),22
Merleau-Ponty observes, he cannot “enter into a fictitious situation without converting
it into a real one . . .” (156). He cannot even for a moment slip into the “great
phantom” (120) and play the role of the solder he once was.23
The “great phantom,” a term Merleau-Ponty appropriates from the playwright
Denis Diderot, emerges again in his essay “The Experience of Others.” On his reading,
Diderot’s ideal actor develops his character through a “special operation of a
prelogical character” rather than through “conventional imitation” (EO, 50). When the
actor “turns into a phantom,” he essentially “performs an expressive operation by
which the body lends itself to the expression of a role other than the one with which it
is ordinarily associated” (50). This “existential operation” is something which we all do
– minus people like Schneider – on a regular basis, most obviously though habits that
Merleau-Ponty argues are “plastic” and not “fixed once and for all.24 “These analyses
of imitation” drawn from his reading of Diderot Merleau-Ponty opposes to imitation
“posed in classical terms”25 (52) which does not adequately account for its
fundamentally embodied dimension. Because the body schema of each one of us
“directs itself to the perceived world and to the imaginary as well,” he tells us, “the
actor’s art is therefore only an extension of the art which we all possess,” the only
difference being that for the actor it is “a much more complex case of such an
operation” (53, 52).
While Merleau-Ponty associates Diderot’s great phantom in this essay with a kind
of dramaturgical “magic,” the basis of which “is in the intentionality which links our
body to the world” (53), in Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty offers it as an
analogue of the virtual – the metaphoric or conceptual “reality” that we produce by
drawing on the actual concrete knowledge structurally inscribed in our body schemas
through experience. In an enactment, the virtual significance emerges through
concrete action. While that significance has representational characteristics, it is in
itself an emanation of embodied experience and as such cannot be reduced solely to
“a” representation.26 As I pointed out earlier, Gallagher and Meltzoff eschew
“transfer” along with “translate” in describing the infant’s ability to imitate others
immediately after birth since an intercorporeal “supramodel” coding has already
coupled its body schema with others. For this reason, I will use the verb interface
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instead of “transfer.” Interface, in fact, articulates nicely with Merleau-Ponty’s
description of the body as our our general medium for having a world (169) as well as
in Anna Gibbs’ slightly different take on the body’s being “not so much a medium as a
series of media” that connects it to media we see as external: writing, technology
(201). It also fits Gibb’s description of space as enacted through mimesis: “Mimesis
produces the virtual by enabling the reassembling of these disparate media, giving rise
to what is ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract,’ as Proust writes of
dreams” (201). Schneider’s inability to produce a “normal” imitation can easily be
conceived as an inability to interface the actual medium that is his body with the
virtual media that constitute the larger contexts in which he is situated. It is to these
contexts that I now turn.

How the Body’s “Mimetic Faculty” Infolds Contexts
In her study of virtuality, the late visual scholar Anne Friedberg compares the function
of virtual to that of metaphor. Metaphor does not involve transcending or detaching
from the actual. “This room is an oven” is a virtual rendering in language of an actual
event in time and space experienced bodily. Language is a form of media, but as
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson convincingly argue, because language is steeped in
metaphor, which is itself steeped in the body’s sensory-motor capabilities, what is
virtual about language is always-already embodied and, hence, always-already
mediated.27 In his short but densely complex essay “On the Mimetic Faculty,” Walter
Benjamin argues that all beings possess a “mimetic faculty” that, like nature,
produces similarities. This faculty has a history “in both the phylogenetic and
ontogenetic sense” and, he claims, its “highest capacity” belongs to human beings
(333). What he calls the “phylogenetic significance of the mimetic faculty,” however,
can no longer be understood by the concept of similarity because our evolution has
occurred simultaneously with the development of language. Because it is an
abstraction of the concrete, the sensuous similarities from which it derives – captured
in the phenomenon of onomatopoeia – gives way to the “nonsensuous similarity” of
which symbolic systems like language and all written scripts are archives (335). But
what else is nonsensuous similarity, Brian Massumi asks,
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if not a lived analogy that brings relational differences together in the similarity
of an event to its own repetition? Virtual form is the direct, analogical,
differential, eventful experience of a ‘semblance which does not appear’ but is
really felt. Being of the nature of an event, it cannot be coded. It can only be
activated through codings . . . [i]ts expression takes the form of a directly felt
perceptual event that is relational in and of itself, whether it is explicitly
‘interactive’ or not.28
We must completely rework how we think about the body, Massumi continues, and in
doing so come to understand it “as immediately virtual as it is actual” and to see the
virtual “as a lived paradox where what are normally opposites coexist, coalesce, and
connect” (91). The body, Massumi continues, “infolds contexts, it infolds volitions and
cognitions that are nothing if not situated” (91).
But in order to do this productively, we must also rework how we think about the
contexts it infolds, the situatedness that shapes the body’s perceptions and actions.
This is, in effect, the mimetic method Diderot reflects on in his Paradox of the Actor
whereby the actor infolds the personal and situational contexts of the character (see
Gebauer and Wulf, Chapter 14). It is also, I might add, not unlike the kairotic current
in Thomas Rickert’s reconceptualization of rhetoric as ambient, and the conclusions
numerous studies in cognitive neuroscience have reached in the past few decades
about human behavior. But Merleau-Ponty’s use of Diderot’s phantom to emphasize
the body’s role in the production of the virtual does not quite capture the multiple
contexts this phantom haunts. It is in the conjunction of body and its situational
contexts that a phenomenology of mimetic practice can be prosperously articulated.
The American phenomenologist Herbert Spiegelberg believed phenomenology was
particularly helpful in bringing to our awareness the contextual nature of experience,
one that was not restricted to sense-experience but included relations, meanings,
values, other minds, social and cultural phenomena; within these contexts people
entered into “cognitive contact” with each other’s individual as well as global bodies,
personalities, thoughts and feelings (327). Writing in 1964, Spiegelberg noted that the
term “context” did not appear often in phenomenological accounts of experience;
rather, the terms “horizon,” “field,” “Umwelt,” and in the most comprehensive sense
“world” had the most popular currency (330). Although he does not say so explicitly,
53

his interest in context has a heuristic – not just philosophical or ontological – value.
Whereas Merleau-Ponty increasingly sought to move beyond intentional human
consciousness that so much of Husserl’s phenomenology was anchored in, Spiegelberg
worked squarely within that framework.
Spiegelberg was interested in how Husserl’s phenomenology of constitution can
“tell us how the phenomenon of the context presents itself” (330). In doing so, he
wishes to bring to awareness, if only temporarily, the “configuration” that emerges
around a “thematic text” (330), which can be any object, a magazine, a table, a play,
a work of art. “It is in this manner that the context, first presented only vaguely and
peripherally, constitutes itself into a firmer framework on an equal level with the first
thematic text” (330). At this point, what was in one moment the “text” in the next
moment becomes “context.” Becoming aware of their reversible relationship can
vastly enrich the perspective one has of engaging with and producing “texts,”
certainly a vital dimension of praxis in composition and communication, and one I will
emphasize in the chapters ahead.
Classical analyses of perception, Merleau-Ponty argues, reduce experience to a
single level whereby what is seen is judged to be true. This objectification of
perceived things decontextualizes them and they become identifiable concepts. It is
because of this objectification that I must endeavor mightily in developing an
argument that broadens the concept of “mimesis” – and, hence, the concepts of
“imitation,” “representation,” “repetition,” “practice,” and other words – in ways
similar to how Merleau-Ponty increasingly sought to broaden the terms “style,”
“expression,” and even “perception.” We can do this, however, by backing up and
considering “the whole setting” – the wider context or ‘l’entourage – through which
“another modality” is revealed (“Primacy,” 14). Because phenomenology asks us to
see how the things we perceive are embedded in larger contexts – an all-encompassing
and dynamic phenomenal field that is in a constant state of regeneration as we
perceptively move through the world – it is, before anything else, the “study of the
advent of being to consciousness, instead of presuming its possibility as given in
advance” (PhP, 71). In the chapters ahead, I will apply what is fundamentally an
ontological study to a number of concepts that come together under the broad aegis of
mimesis – as a theory of “imitation” – with the hope of bringing to light a dimension of
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thinking, learning, making, teaching, influencing, and communicating that has for long
been buried under the weight of misunderstandings.

1

I will use these abbreviations throughout this dissertation.
Historically, these traditions have been loosely aligned with the classical Platonism (idealism and metaphysics) and
Aristotelianism (empiricism and science).
3
I say “completed” in that Merleau-Ponty inserted into phenomenology something Heidegger tended to ignore: the
body. I’m sure, however, that some Heideggerians would object to this assertion.
4
For example, Leonard Lawlor suggests that Merleau-Ponty uses the word “mimique” to describe an expressive
operation in which one who mimes evokes “the power to stylize,” to generate something that can be put into words
but which, while recognizable as a repetition, does “not merely resemble the object.” Rather the mime generates
what is virtual, not real, in the object” (26).
5
I suppose that, technically, style and expression are separate concepts. But as I state ahead, Merleau-Ponty himself
has noted that the two are intimately linked and so I conflate them here into a single idea.
6
There are two points I should make here. First, because the term “body schema” is used in translations of MerleauPonty’s most well-known work, The Phenomenology of Perception, English-language researchers have adopted that
term (for example, Shaun Gallagher) in their discussions. To avoid confusion, I will use “body schema” instead of
“corporeal schema,” although I prefer the latter since it resonates with the term intercorporeity, a term I will discuss
later in this chapter. Second, as I point out in the next section, the body schema that Merleau-Ponty writes about has
been revised as a result of recent empirical studies on neonate imitation. Shaun Gallagher and Andrew N. Meltzoff,
drawing on empirical studies, make the case for distinguishing between a body schema and a body image, something
Merleau-Ponty does not do. In this description of postural impregnation, the latter category—body image, and not
body schema or what Wallon called “postural schema” – would most likely be the one Gallagher and Meltzoff would
see evoked here.
7
In psychoanalytic terms, Merleau-Ponty describes mimesis as “the equivalent of introjection” whereas the
phenomenon that gives rise to syncrethic sociability, transitivism, is the equivalent to projection. (CRO, 148)
8
See Gallagher and Meltzoff, p. 232, for direct references.
9
Scott Marratto, a member of my dissertation committee, made this note about my statement here: “Merleau-Ponty
does, I think, actually distinguish the ideas involved here, but he just doesn’t employ this kind of terminological
distinction. For body schema he uses the term schéma corporel, and for what Gallagher et. al. call body image he uses
a number of terms suggesting something like ‘objective’ body.”
10
This term may be read a bit out of context. Style (which I discuss in the next section) is a complex concept in
Merleau-Ponty and no doubt Merleau-Ponty had this larger dimension in mind when he used it. But he does not
contextualize the term in this essay, leaving it open to interpretation.
11
Unlike the body image, the body schema is not shared between the self and other and applies only to the subject’s
own body. It is first-personal not because “it represents the body as one’s own, but because it represents exclusively
what counts as one’s own body” (443).
12
I am generalizing here. In fact, studies suggest that some people with autism or disorders that affect brain function
– something Merleau-Ponty explores as well – do not interactively engage in the same way people without those
conditions do. See Gallagher’s How the Body Shapes the Mind, Chapter 9, 235-6.
13
Gallese is well aware of phenomenology, Husserl’s lebenswelt, and Merleau-Ponty’s work generally. In his 2009
article “Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social Identification,” he discusses
intercorporeity at some length, later citing Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the “comprehension of gestures come about
through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others. . . . as if the other person’s intention inhabited
my body and mind his” – a comprehension that is communicated, according to Gallese, “first and foremost” (523)
intercorporally, between bodies, subtending the intersubjective level, between subjects. Of Merleau-Ponty’s passage,
which I only quotes a part of here, Gallese writes: “These words fully maintain their illuminating power in the present
century, even more so as they can now be grounded on solid empirical evidence” (526).
14
I attribute this focus to two things. First, this article was written for collection of essays about Rene Girard’s theory
of mimesis, which I will discuss in Chapter 3. Briefly, Girard understands mimesis in terms of a triangulation between
an object and at least two people who desire it; this triangulation, he claims, is the root of violence in human
civilization. Gallese strikes me as at pain in attending to Girard’s theory of mimesis to which his own essay offers an
2
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alternative interpretation. Second, as an expert in physiology and neuroscience, Gallese grounds his theories in
empirical studies that almost exclusively focus on human-to-human interaction.
15
Jack Reynolds makes this statement more than once in his discussion of habituality in Merleau-Ponty’s work for the
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (accessed August 2013; www.iep.utm.edu)
16
I will discuss this at length in Chapter 2.
17
This “coupling” is Husserl’s “lively phrase referring to the perception of others” (13). Because style for MerleauPonty is a mode of perceptive experience in general, it is not limited only to acts of direct communicaton between
subjects. Here it signifies Stendhal’s success “in converting us to his system of harmony, [so that] we adopt it
henceforth as our own,” resulting in what he describes as “the pure relations of spirit to spirit” between the reader
and the book’s author (12).
18
He uses “normal” here to describe the kind of imitation a brain-damaged war veteran is incapable of executing.
19
It is important to recall that Merleau-Ponty did not distinguish, as do Gallagher and Meltzoff, between body schema
and body image. What they describe as body image is entwined with Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of body schema.
20
I do wonder, however, if his rendering of expression as a process that yields new information without covering up
existing information tends to absorb too easily the role of style. It sounds like Hass is describing style in the last
sentence of this passage; however, since style seems to have a somewhat reversible relationship with expression then
I suppose what goes for the former goes for the latter as well.
21
Advocates of people with disabilities would use the term “abled.” Merleau-Ponty is simply employing the
terminology used at that time.
22
The term “play-act” comes from the Colin Smith’s translation of the book. In Donald A. Landes’s translation (2012),
however, the words given are “play” and “playing” (136). Since “play” is a pedagogical concept I will come back to in
another chapter, I wanted to cite this alternative translation here.
23
It is vital to note that his “great phantom” is not Merleau-Ponty’s phrase. His footnote indicates that the term is
from Denis Diderot’s Paradox sur le comedien (Paradox of the Actor), in which Diderot reflects on imitative mimesis as
an acting method (see Gebauer and Wulf, 175). Paradox is the driving force of this method, according to which the
performer simultaneously is and is not the character being performed. The philosopher and literary critic Phillippe
Lacoue-Labarthe sees in this work a “modern” conception of mimesis that – because it is an imitation of phusis, of
natura naturans, and hence a form of poiesis – is not so much about imitation but about making something new. (For
more on Lacoue-Labarthe’s interpretation of mimesis in the context of Diderot, see Gebauer and Wulf, 182-3).
Indeed, the mimetic arts were counted on by Aristotle as belonging to the class of techne, but, more specifically, as
forming a subdivision of poiesis or productive craft” (Halliwell, 153). In this sense, we should add enactment to the
English words Halliwell offers – expression, emulation, representation – as a way of rounding out the oftentimes
“narrowed and impoverished” translation of mimesis as copy-producing imitation (14).
24
“A habit it an aptitude for responding to a particular type of situation with a particular form of solution. Thus habit
as an operation is both bodily and spiritual” (52).
25
He describes this classical model as an “unsolvable problem”: “In order to imitate what I have seen, I would need
what I do not have: a double knowledge which includes both the muscular contractions of the model and the means
to realize this series of movements” (52).
26
The late visual studies scholar Anne Friedberg describes the Latin etymology and definition of virtual as referring
“to the register of representation itself – but representation that can be either simulacral [with no referent in the
real] or directly mimetic” (8); in her own work, her use of the term does not imply “direct mimesis”26 but a “transfer –
more like a metaphor – from one plane of meaning and appearance to another” (11).
27
“Because our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our bodies. Because
the vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence
theory of truth is false” (6).
28
This reference comes from Massumi’s essay “The Archive of Experience” that appeared in Information is Alive: Art
and Theory on Archiving and Retrieving Data, eds. Joke Brouwer and Arjen Mulder (Rotterdam: V2 Organisatie/EU
European Culture 2000 Program, 2003, 142-151). The citation here, however, comes from a copy of this essay (p. 13)
posted on his website, brianmassumi.com. (http://www.brianmassumi.com/textes/Archive%20of%20Experience.pdf)
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Chapter 2: The Complex History of Mimesis – An Overview
Recovering the Expressive Side of Mimesis
I will open this chapter with an example of the kind of popular representations of
mimesis that this dissertation seeks to move beyond. In a 2006 article published in
Comparative Literature Studies, Cecile Chu-chin Sun, a professor of East Asian
Language and Literatures at the University of Pittsburgh, describes a “radical
distinction” between Western and Chinese poetic traditions that, in her view, comes
down to the “dominance of mimesis in one tradition and that of xing in the other”
(326). She translates xing as “evocation,” an “affective-responsive interplay between
the ‘mind’ and the ‘object’” (object being wu, or “scene”) which evokes an intimate
and organic relationship between human beings and the material world (335), “a
memorable resonance between poet and environment with its particular locale and
moment of time” (351). Opposed to xing is “the whole notion of mimesis,” which
according to Sun is not only rooted in a “hierarchically-oriented view of reality, but is
itself the very product of it” (339). She defines mimesis as a mode for conceptualizing
reality with a “distinct anthropocentric privileging of human beings over external
nature” (326), making it “diametrically different” from the resonance that is evoked
through xing (338-9). Her view of mimesis is shaped, she tells us, entirely by her
readings of Plato and Aristotle, “the chief architects of the conceptual construct of
the mimetic tradition” (328). The mimetic concept of reality the West has inherited
from these thinkers is, following Plato, hierarchical in that a superior plane (ideas or
forms) is privileged over an inferior one (sense or matter) and, following Aristotle,
anthropocentric in its celebration of human aesthetics and artifice over engagement
with the sensory world of experience (330). Western poetry hence cannot take
account of the “penchant for natural spontaneity implicit in the xing mode of
creativity” that is the driving force of the Chinese poetic tradition (329).
As noted above, Sun’s version of mimesis here exemplifies the kind of
conventional understanding I will be building an argument against in this dissertation.1
I will bring to light significant dimensions of mimesis that are nearly identical to Sun’s
description of xing, but in doing so I will not ignore other dimensions that may be
palatable to her negative rendering of mimesis. In this chapter, I will attend to what I
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call the dual aspect of mimesis.2 I will flesh this meaning out more fully in the pages
ahead, but by way of introduction it is worth noting how Gunter Gebauer and
Christoph Wulf attribute to human mimetic capacities two sides: an expressive side
that serves as an entrée to the world and to others by allowing for a partial
overcoming of the subject-object split, and a more instrumental side that can lead to
an assimilation to an ossified environment that results in a subordination or even
dissolution of the self (265). The gradual historical suppression of the former
“expressive” side, according to the authors, has helped create conditions that
contribute to a loss of immediacy in our encounters with others and the world at
large, a loss that impacts our ability to communicate since such conditions result in a
“reduction in the expressive side of language in favor of its semantic content and
instrumental function” (267). Recovering this suppressed “expressive” side to mimesis
is the primary aim of their 1992 book Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society and one I adopt as
well more than two decades after its publication.
Recovering this suppressed “expressive” side to mimesis requires us first to
acknowledge that the concept’s complexity has been greatly hindered by its
translation – an observation made by many thinkers and scholars. The rhetorician and
philosopher Kenneth Burke complains that the translation of mimesis as “imitation”
cannot possibly sum up the “full range of meanings” – including its puns and
soundscape (Attitudes, 243). The classical scholar Vivienne Gray tells us that this
standard translation of mimesis is “often unhelpful” for a term that has “a wide range
of technical meanings” in ancient Greek literary criticism, including what a historian
does in creating history (467). The anthropologist Michael Taussig believes that
because of its association with imitating and representing reality, mimesis has been
lambasted in the recent times “as a naïve form or symptom of Realism,” a straw man
“against whose feeble pretensions post-structuralists prance and strut” (44). Stephen
Halliwell complains that Jacques Derrida’s fixation on Plato and Platonism results in a
“restrictive construal of mimesis” that assumes a dependence on a metaphysics of
truth in reality underlying virtually all versions of mimesis in Western art and
philosophy (376). These complaints by scholars of mimesis speak to an abiding
frustration that arises from attempts to work with an idea whose narrow conventions
have been so thoroughly naturalized. To conceive mimesis simply as the reproduction
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of sameness privileges its representational characteristics over its expressive ones,
marginalizing its role in the production of difference and its capacity to enact
multiplicity while paradoxically sustaining a general unity. As I hope I showed in the
previous chapter, I believe that key concepts in the phenomenology of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty provide us with a theoretical method for teasing out this other side of
human mimetic capacities Gebauer and Wulf call expressive and claim has been
historically suppressed by the Western philosophical tradition.
In Chapter 1, for example, I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s example of how the
muscular gurgitations and rough phonemes of babies’ babbling are slowly refined into
language as the infants attune themselves to the intentional dimensions of situations.
This capacity to engage meaningfully with the world is powered by their body
schemas’ mimetic ability to “translate” perception into motility and generate an
original motor action – perhaps the primary block upon which all subsequent
knowledge work is built. I refer as well to his example of a young boy who gradually
learns how to use a pencil not by reproducing the gestures of his father while writing
but by seeking to obtain the same results of his father. In both cases, the young
humans initially identify with situations. In Merleau-Ponty, the “almost imitative way”
in which we actively engage and ultimately incorporate the multiple dimensions of a
situation is through a mostly unconscious operation he calls style. Scott Marratto
describes Merleau-Ponty’s concept of style as having a “dual manner”: it individuates
things as singular identities while adhering to a typicality that cuts across them (102).
What is expressed in the process, then, conforms to the typical and familiar while
simultaneously enacting something new. Hence, expression in Merleau-Ponty in many
ways comes close to what Sun associates with xing’s evocation of resonance: as the
body attunes itself to the style of a situation or world that situation or world
reciprocally expresses itself through the medium of the body.3 More importantly for
later chapters, the “dual manner” of style that individuates a form while conforming
to its prior instantiations is characteristic of the most basic methods that guides nearly
all forms of building, making, and composing. It also resonates with the guiding
principle of imitatio, a major movement in rhetoric and other arts whose key concept
was mimesis and to which, I will argue in the chapters ahead, current multimodal
pedagogies of repurposing, remix, and remediation are historically beholden.
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In the following sections I hope to develop this picture to an even greater
resolution by showing how there is and, in fact, has always been a dual aspect to
mimesis that renders the term much more dynamic, nuanced, paradoxical, and
ultimately enactive than its conventional stereotypes allow. In the section below I will
introduce what one mimetic scholar identifies as Aristotle’s “enactive” conception of
mimesis which attends equally to both its representational and expressive sides. After
briefly considering the etymology and early history of the term, which I feel supports a
dual-aspect account, I will show how even in the hands of three of mimesis’s harshest
critics – Plato, Rene Girard, and Theodor Adorno – the concept’s underlying dual
nature resists its assignation to a singular (and in these cases largely negative)
definition. I will then, in the following section, draw on the mimetic theories of
Aristotle, the cultural theorists Walter Benjamin, Mark Hansen, Morris Berman, and
Anna Gibbs in shaping a view of mimesis that provides an innovative framework for its
application to rhetorical theory (Chapter 3), multimodality (Chapter 4), and
pedagogical approaches to the teaching of composition and technical communication
(Chapter 5).

The Dual-Aspects of Enactive Mimesis
Aristotle plays an important role in the history of mimesis, and I will return to discuss
that role at some length later in this chapter. For now, though, I want to set up as a
framework for the rest of this chapter a particular understanding Stephen Halliwell
argues Aristotle held of mimesis, one he describes as “dual-aspect” and which strongly
inclined the philosopher, in Halliwell’s view, toward an enactive view of the concept.
Although Aristotle recognized several varieties of nonartistic mimesis, 4 his most
significant treatment of it is in relation to music, poetry, drama, and visual art,
thereby reifying an orientation that no doubt resulted in a curtailing of its
anthropological and philosophical dimensions. However, I believe that Aristotle’s
enactive conception of mimesis as described by Halliwell, even though it occurs within
the context of art and particularly music, can serve as an entrée to a dimension that
in many ways complements Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression that is not confined
solely to the aesthetic realm.
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I cannot in this space fully represent Halliwell’s extensive study of Aristotelian
mimeticism with justice. I will instead focus on an important observation he makes of
that thinker’s description of the reception of art by observers. Mimesis for Aristotle
operates on the principle of simultaneity: it is at once “iconic” (representational and
conceptual) and “expressive” (emotional, affective), and the aesthetic experience
depends to a great extent on being able to perceive both at the same time. This
“dual-aspect mimeticism” (172) encouraged an audience experience that involved a
“combined and balanced consideration of the media as well as the ‘objects’ of media”
so that when we encounter art we need to “keep the artifact and its meaning, the
‘materials’ and the ‘object’ of mimesis, conjointly in focus”5 (172; italics in original).
Aristotle believed that in aesthetic contemplation pleasure is derived from the
interplay of two different manners of apprehension that occur simultaneously: a
consideration of an artifact’s demonstration of its maker’s techne (technical and
artistic skill) and a response to its “sensuous properties” such as color, texture, or
other material properties that evoke its representational significance (181). Dual
aspect mimesis, according to Halliwell, involves an “appreciation of both medium and
‘object,’ of the material artifact and the imagined world that it represents, [both of
which] coalesce in a complex state of awareness”6 (181-2; italics in original).
I will suggest in the pages ahead that this complex state of awareness is not
limited simply to two views or perspectives. Rather, the dual nature of mimetic
experience creates conditions for the emergence of multiplicity while sustaining an
underlying cohesiveness or unity. In his essay “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty describes
the nature of perception in seemingly dual terms as an integration of sensory ability
with movement. When we see, he claims, we also see ourselves seeing. But this kind
of double-vision does not confine us to dichotomous thinking, as demonstrated in by a
painter whose work Merleau-Ponty greatly admired, Paul Cezanne:
Cezanne did not think he had to choose between feeling and thought, as if he
were deciding between chaos and order. He did not want to separate the
stable things which we see and the shifting way in which they appear. He
wanted to depict matter as it takes on form, the birth of order through
spontaneous organization. (EM 73)
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In a sense, Cezanne serves as a nexus between “dualing” modalities, the integration
of which powers his ability to express the world’s “insurpassable plentitude” through
an arrangement of colors that also capture the “imperious unity” of the “indivisible
whole” (75). Clearly the dual nature of perceptual and sensory engagement with the
world in which we are situated, as demonstrated by Cezanne, is simultaneously
enactive and expressive – not just of two things but of “plentitude,” of
“insurpassable” multiplicity. Like style and expression, these two terms are so
interrelated that separating them potentially impoverishes the significance of the
multitude of perceptual and sensory experiences to which they apply.
In the chapters ahead, I will attempt to construct of scenario in which all of us,
as perceivers of the world and observers of that its various multidimensional
representations, need to experientially inhabit the nexus between the things that
cultural convention often requires us to “choose”: modes and media, idea and
artifact, style and expression. We need always to try and keep the dual perspectives
that arise through our experiences conjointly in focus in the manner in which Aristotle
apparently conceived our mimetic experience with art. In the section to which I turn
now, I will show how the “dual aspect” conception of mimesis that Halliwell identifies
in Aristotle has avatars in other realms where mimesis matters, including areas outside
of aesthetics. I will begin by going back to the earliest pre-philosophical instantiations
of the concept before moving on to more recent ones.

Mimos: Who Can Distinguish the Mime from the Mime?
When we piece together its fragmented and complex etymology, the picture that
emerges of ancient conceptions of mimesis is one of bodily representational practices
that endowed not only human performers with expressive force but also larger
contextual elements. Although the origin of mimesis is a matter of dispute – Halliwell
tells us that the etymology is irrecoverable, rendering the best efforts of several
scholars speculative at best (17) – most scholars agree that the mimeisthai family to
which it belongs derives from the root word mimos. By the fifth century B.C. mimos
was used often within the context of sound effects or musical accompaniment.
Aeschylus’s lost play Edonians, for example, associates mimos with the booming
sounds of primitive instruments known as “bull-roarers” that sounded like, or
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imitated, the voices of bulls (17). A member of the mim- family turns up as well in
another text dating to around the same time, the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, in which
the poet describes how a group of Delian maidens bewitched audiences by vocally
mimicking (mimesthai) the voices of men as well as the “literal” sounds of castanets
(19). Pindar’s use of the same word to describe the choreographic simulation of animal
movements leads Halliwell to conclude that by the fifth century B.C. the mim- root
“had already come to be associated with the musicopoetic arts in general” (poetry,
music, and dance, or mousikē collectively). Gebauer and Wulf come to a similar
conclusion, interpreting the references by Pindar and Aeschylus as evidence for an
interpretation of mimesis as meaning “to represent through dance” and as “expression
by means of sound and gesture” (27).7
We can see how later translations of mimesis as imitation and its association
with representation, aesthetics, repetition, and realism has its logical origins in this
ancient history. But there are dimensions that have been lost in translation. Lexically
mimos balances dual significations, denoting both the person who represented,
imitated, or portrayed something and the context of the dramatic action (Gebauer and
Wulf, 27). This dual aspect is retained in the word mime, which as a noun signifies
both actor and art of miming, and as a verb signifies the action of miming. Mimos,
then, suggests a fundamental correspondence between doer and the doing. One is
reminded here of the paradoxical conundrum underlying Yeat’s famous query: “How
can we know the dancer / from the dance?” Similarly, what differentiates the mimos
of actor from the mimos of act? Both are intertwined in such a way that there does not
seem to be a distinct form/matter hierarchy of the kind introduced into philosophy by
Plato. The seat of this conundrum resides in its affordance of the opportunity to
perceive difference while simultaneously resisting any clear demarcation in which to
classify it.
Such a conundrum was undoubtedly at play in the “bewitching” of audiences
who could not distinguish the sounds of nonhumans (bulls and castanets) simulated
vocally by humans. In this moment, two distinct realms – human and nonhuman commonly thought as separate become intimately entwined. The astonishment could
not have been generated in the absence of difference. Because they knew the human
and the castanet were not “the same,” the vocal mimicry of the sounds culminated in
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an expression of paradox that briefly dissolved difference while simultaneously
insisting on it. It is a moment that Merleau-Ponty might label “reversible”: humans
touch castanets and are touched back, blurring the corporeal distinctions between
human subject and nonhuman object. Or, as Anna Gibbs puts it, “mimesis is like an
image in which figure and ground can always be reversed, so that sometimes
subjectivity is in focus, while at other times it recedes into the background, leaving
something new to appear in its place” (187). The mimetic task of the audience, then,
is to “know through which optic it is most productive to look at any given moment”
(187). As in deconstruction, when a stabilized meaning is destabilized by disrupting a
conceptual binary (human/nonhuman, dancer/dance), categorical distinctions dissolve
and resolve in an ongoing play of dynamic reversibility. This is not just a conceptual
theory but an actual practice that we all engage in when confronting the paradox of
sameness being difference. When people are confronted with identical twins, for
example, they almost instinctively look for something that differentiates them.
We also see in this ancient account of mimos how mimesis is not as
anthropocentric as Sun claims in her attempt to distinguish it from the Chinese xing.
The vocal mimicry suggests an intense level of identification between the human
performers and the nonhumans whose sounds are being represented through vocal
mimicry. Indeed, mimesis in its most ancient accounts suggests productive intercourse
between human beings and nonhuman beings. Its first occurrence as a noun comes
from a tract by Democritus suggesting that the origin of music was in human imitation
of birdsong (Halliwell, 19). In addition, Pindar’s use of mimeisthai to describe a
choreography in which dancers are instructed to match their steps to the movement of
certain animals suggests that performers were more than just “aware” of them in an
identifiable sense but actually identified with them at the bodily level. Perhaps the
mimoses’ attunement to animals and their uncomfortably accurate representation of
them – along with their affiliation with an oral genre Halliwell describes as
“subliterary, low-life dramatic sketches” that represented life as experienced by
common people8 – was what made the practice so unpalatable to the aristocratic
Plato, whose high-minded metaphysics insisted on the separation of humans from
animals and other lower forms of life.9 However, as Derrida so famously demonstrated
in his deconstruction of Phaedrus, the dichotomous logic of Platonic metaphysics
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collapses under the weight of its own dualism, generating difference and multiplicity
as it stubbornly insists on a stable, coherent, unified, absolute Truth. In the next
section, I will show how Plato’s seemingly clear-cut denigration of mimesis is actually
undercut by the dual-aspect dimension to his own rendering of the concept.

Plato’s Dual-Aspect Mimesis: A Mimetic Master in Denial?
In my introduction, I aligned Plato’s treatment of mimesis with the denigration and
disparagement of experiential knowledge. My representation of Plato’s treatment of
mimesis, though in keeping with the vast majority of scholarship on this matter, did
not attend to dimensions of a concept that, according to Halliwell, in Plato “is much
more complex and much less easily condensed into a unified point of view than is
normally supposed” (24). While Halliwell, like many others, concede that Plato is the
first to give to mimesis its perjorative connotation, his contention of its complexity is
something I would like to attend to in this section. First, however, I want to look more
closely at those aspects of mimesis that so troubled Plato and resulted in his
denigration of it – even while he arguably embodied many of those aspects.
One thing that seemed to have troubled Plato was what the Greek
mathematician Theaetetus observes about the word in his Sophist: that “the mimetic”
(to mimetikon) is “a multifarious and extremely diverse category” (qtd in Halliwell,
64). In the latter part of this dialogue, we learn that it is a form of techne, a
productive activity (poiesis), but one whose products – like those produced by the
rhetors known as Sophists – were categorized as secondary, illusory, or false (64). As
an imitation of something else, mimesis was thrice removed from the true forms it
sought to represent. In The Republic, for example, Plato’s Socrates describes three
types of couches. The first, the highest, is that which is “in nature”: the one true form
(eidos) of couch. The second, the actual couch that Socrates sits on, is a material
artifact produced by a craftsman, a necessary but inferior copy of the original. The
third is a painting of the couch – a copy of a copy of an original, thrice removed from
the “real” and hence impoverished of “reality.”10 Like Rene Magritte’s famous
Treachery of Images painting (“This is not a pipe”), the painting is a representation of
a material object that is itself a mere representation of “the Real,” the eidos of
couchness. It is like the shadows that appear on Plato’s cave wall: vague adumbrations
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of a material world projected by the light of Truth that itself dissolves into the
background, leaving people duped by the images dancing before them. As a mode of
representation, mimesis in Plato becomes associated with practices that cluster
around the motif of “deception,” a motif that resurfaces throughout the history of
that concept (20).
Halliwell contends that fear of the imagination was the “psychological core” of
Plato’s critique of the mimetic arts and most certainly of the rhapsodes and
performers – including Sophists – who practiced them. Plato believed that within each
person existed many potential selves into which the soul can be diffracted. Because
the imagination was stirred not only by dramatic performances but also, as Halliwell
puts it, by a “disordered or constantly changing multiplicity [which] is given by the
very nature of the human mind,” one risked losing “self-control” (sophrosune) under
its influence. In a dramatic performance, mimesis enabled sympathetic identification
(sumpatheia) between poet and audience, between self and other, thereby
threatening to release a plethora of potential selves that are locked up within us all.
What alarmed Plato, if Halliwell’s interpretation stands, seems to be an
intersubjective dimension to mimesis that threatened to dissolve the distinct and
coherent selfhood of the subject. In other words, he could tolerate difference only as
it served to demarcate self from other and, in so doing, stabilize the self; if and when
difference encroached on the subject, as would be the case with intersubjective
relations, absolute distinctions would blur and render the subject relative and
mutable. The many selves Plato saw lurking in the human mind could only be
“integrated into a single, stable self under the rule of reason” (95), and in the absence
of cunning, deceptive, outright fraudulent mimesis. He therefore banned poets,
rhapsodes, and Sophists from his ideal republic.
And yet, despite this seemingly clear-cut portrayal of Plato’s attitudes toward
mimesis, he nonetheless occupies a complex position in its theory and history. As the
first thinker to discuss the concept at length, he may be thought of as the “founding
father” of mimetic theory (Halliwell, 24) despite having also “invented the pejorative
sense” of the term (Haskins, 11).11 Just as we cannot reduce mimesis to any one
definition, we must be careful not to reduce Plato to a monolithic stereotype that he
held an unchanging and consistently negative attitude toward mimesis. Such a
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stereotype is presented by Eric Havelock’s profoundly influential Preface to Plato
(1963),12 which reproduced Plato’s representative poet as an automaton whose
rhythmical repetition, melody, and dance produced nonrational “memorization” in
audiences, placing the audience “under the minstrel’s control” (qtd in Haskins, 11)
and hence denying oral poetic mimesis the reflective capacity he assigns to literate
cultures of reading and writing (13). While this stereotype represents an anti-mimetic
position that perhaps was dominant in Plato’s thought, we need also to attend to
Hallowell’s contention that Plato discusses mimesis with a “remarkably large range of
contexts” and warns against assuming that there is a “unitary, monolithic conception
of mimesis at work in the dialogues” (24, 38). Mimesis, Halliwell argues, “receives
fluctuating and constantly revised treatment from Plato” and is “approached from
various angles in different works” (38). Indeed, Per Bjornar Grande identifies in Plato
a “mimetic inconsistency” that has him, on the one hand, dismissing poets from his
Republic while, on the other, allowing for a select few to participate in artistic
education. Indeed, Plato’s Socrates tells Adeimantus in Book III of the Republic:
It is not only to the poets therefore that we must issue orders requiring them to
portray good character in their poems or not write at all; we must issue similar
orders to all artists and craftsmen, and prevent them from portraying bad
character, ill-discipline, meanness, or ugliness in pictures of living things, in
sculpture, architecture, or any other work of art . . . . [A]nd then our young
men, living as it were in a healthy climate, will benefit because all the works
of art they see and hear influence them for good, like the breezes from some
healthy country, insensibly leading them from earliest childhood into close
sympathy and conformity with beauty and reason. (401 b-d).13
As this passage shows, mimetic identification in the form of sympathy is not inherently
bad providing it is oriented toward the Good. In his Sophist, Plato’s visitor from Elea,
the hometown of Parmenides, divides mimetic imitation into “belief mimicry” and
“informed mimicry,” the former of which is insincere, manipulative, and characteristic
of Sophists. Mimicry that is informed, however, is accompanied by knowledge and
associated with sincerity. Bjornar Grande says that the informed, hence sincere,
imitator “is fearful of his knowledge. He has the Socratic attitude of not knowing
anything a priori” (9), a reading that is suggested by the text as well (268a) and
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figures informed mimesis as potentially adaptable to what the West has come to know
as the Socratic method.
Plato’s visitor does not elucidate informed mimicry to the extent that he
dissects the “foolish” belief mimicry of Sophists. It is intriguing to entertain the
proposition that Plato didn’t delve into the informed mimicry because that designates
the actual role he plays as creator of the dialogues. After all, is not every single line
composed by Plato a manifestation of mimesis? The philosopher Philippe LacoueLabarthe thinks so. The “height of the paradox” he sees in Plato’s critique of mimesis
is that “Plato does not respect the laws he decrees” – “he,” of course, being primarily
Socrates, “his” mimos, the mimetic part of “himself,” who speaks philosophically
while the actual author, Plato, “does not speak one word of the philosophical
discourse itself” (134-4; italics in original). In a footnote, Lacoue-Labarthe goes so far
as to compare Plato’s “manipulation” of the character Socrates to the
thaumatopoiikos, the puppet master that Plato frequently alludes to when the
question of mimesis is brought up (135). This irony was apparently not lost on Plato’s
wayward student Aristotle, who “bluntly” called the dialogues a form of mimos,
opening a reading whereby, as Johan Huizinga puts it, “even Socrates and Plato [are]
reckoned among the jugglers and thaumaturges just like the sophists” (149-50).
Decades later, the Athenian rhetor Demetrius of Phaleron would label as mimetic the
dialogue style of writing that Plato perfected since dialogue, a public discourse of
contest, “imitates a man speaking off the cuff” (qtd in Haskins, 479). Vivienne Gray
observes that Plato in his dialogues, with just a bit of a stretch, “can be said to mime
Socrates in the same way rhapsodes were imitating a Homer or an Achilles” (11). If
this sense, Plato would need to give himself a one-way ticket out of his own republic
had such a place come into existence during his lifetime.
We can see that even in Plato mimesis has a kind of dual aspect: even as his
representation of it (a mimetic act) says one thing, he ends up simultaneously
expressing another. It is also noteworthy that Plato’s extraordinary impact on Western
philosophy might itself be conceived as a kind of bewitching not unlike that of Helen
by Paris, son of the King of Troy, as represented in the Sophist Gorgias’ Encomium of
Helen. Gorgias argues that the infamous Helen should be absolved of her reputation as
an adulterous traitor to her husband and kingdom since blame should be located in the
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language her suitor Paris used – one which constructed a persuasive logos, or Truth –
that provoked her to follow the path he laid out for her. Similarly, Plato’s dialogues
simulate speech in the construction of an epistemology of Truth that has been
undeniably persuasive in its influence on the intellectual, aesthetic, pedagogical, and
theological traditions of the West. We seldom consider the impact of philosophers as a
contagious bewitching of our faculties and intellects. Maybe it’s time that we did.

The Slippery Slope of Rene Girard’s “Mimetic Desire”
Although in this dissertation I attempt to create a generally positive account of
mimesis, I do not want to ignore its negative accounts. Partly this is because attention
to its negative or stereotypical renditions allows me to highlight contradictions or gaps
in support of helpful and usable reconceptualization of this important concept. First,
though, it is important to represent the alternative versions as accurately as possible.
As a segue into Rene Girard’s largely negative account of mimesis, I want to briefly
consider research conducted on infant imitation by Andrew M. Meltzoff, the current
Co-Director of the University of Washington’s Institute for Learning & Brain Sciences.
In one experiment, Meltzoff tested how 18-month-old babies responded to a
mechanical device that mimicked the movement of a human in picking up a dumbbell.
The inanimate device did not look human – it had pincers rather than hands – but it did
move very similarly to how humans move when performing this action. The babies’
reactions to the device convinced Metlzoff that they did not attribute any kind of
intention or goal to the device, and hence they did not seek to imitate the action. This
observation led Meltzoff to conclude that infant imitation occurs within an
intersubjective framework where what is experienced visually is differentiated from a
deeper level of felt experience involving human intention. A human hand slipping off
the ends of the dumbbells suggests what an adult was “striving” or “trying” to do, but
a mechanical pincer slipping from it conveys no intentionality and does not inspire
imitation of the action (66, “Out of the Mouths”). Mimicry of an action therefore is
motivated by the child’s perception of intention. Such a perception, he concludes, is
the basis of cooperative learning and sociality, but it also serves as grounds for
competitive desire for inanimate things or, in the case of siblings, rivalry (70). When a
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child perceives the desire for something in another child, he or she adopts that
perspective, creating a rivalry that pits the intentions of one with those of the other.
This final observation can be employed to support the mimetic theory of Rene
Girard, a literary and cultural critic who argues that mimesis – specifically mimetic
desire – is not only the source of violence in humans and many animals, but that
“mimesis and violence are essential to account for human origins” and together
constitute the source of civilizations (Garrels, “Mimesis and Science: Interview,” 245).
As Gallese and Lakoff have argued, and as Meltzoff’s experiment suggests, humans are
intersubjectively attuned to one another’s intentions through their mutual
interactions. For Girard, such intentions are expressive of desire for certain people or
things. When one perceives the desire of another for something, he or she adopts that
desire, thereby endowing the object with value. This object-based desire then spreads
mimetically, through imitation and replication (or “appropriative mimicry”), among a
larger body of people. Unfortunately, because humans are, as Girard puts it, “an
animal of crisis” (244), we develop conflictual relationships such as jealousy with
respect to the desired object (which could be land, food, animals, humans, artifacts,
etc). Our mimetic desire often results in violence. To mitigate conflicts, humans
participate in sharing, as in the democratic model where everyone gets a piece of the
pie. But sharing seems to be just one form of “unconscious avoidance of the problem
of human conflict”; we do not so much share objects as we do desires, Girard argues,
and our “ability to share desires conceals conflict at every turn.” There is clearly a
dual-aspect at play in his theory of mimetic desire: “We desire the same thing and we
are friends; we desire the same thing and we are enemies” (236-7). Not only has
mimetic desire played “an important role” in leading us to the global environmental
problems we all face (251), but it is the underlying motivation for scapegoating
violence,14 particularly the kind that involves whole communities turning against a
minority of people scapegoated as other – a phenomenon that Girard believes is
“creative of human culture” (245). Girard does not hold back in his condemnation of
mimesis. Even Plato may hesitate before considering Girard’s claim that mimesis is
“obviously the greatest source of conflict in human life” (243).
While Girard’s mimetic theory has managed to thread its way across a number
of fields currently involved in studies of mimicry and imitation, his intensely negative
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construction of mimesis has been critiqued by several mimetic scholars, including
Gebauer and Wulf. Acknowledging that Girard has developed a powerful instrument of
interpretation, they are quick to point out the problematic nature of his “truth
claims,” namely the reduction of every society to an essential origin, the definition of
society as a mechanism for channeling violence, and the consistency of a chain of
events leading to the establishment of a monolithic cultural order: “[M]ust we assume
that there ever was an identifiable origin of the social?” (264-5). The authors also
note that Girard’s theory is based on texts (mostly literary and theological) that are
“characterized by a number of family resemblances . . . in that they represent their
characters’ problems in their relationships with Others and emphasize mimetic action,
desire, and violence” (265). In addition, Girard’s argument tends to occur at the
metalevel of narratives about social origins and crises, drawing conclusions from the
big picture while ignoring the many “empirical events” that constitute that picture but
which are “left in the dark” (264). This is especially the case with his work on antiromantic novels in which his depiction of mimesis “as a fundamental anthropological
mechanism is an oversimplification, the result of a reductionist procedure that leads
to the postulation of mimetic processes as independent of context and historical
situation” (238).
The deepest hole in Girard’s negative theory of mimesis, however, was dug by
Girard himself. In a 1992 interview with Rebecca Adams, Girard acknowledges that
“mimetic desire, even when bad, is intrinsically good, in the sense that being merely
imitative in a small sense, it’s the opening out of oneself” (Adams, 24). Because
mimetic desire affords people such an “extreme openness,” it cannot be isolated
solely to conflict but seen as the basis for devotion to others, even love. “Nothing is
more mimetic,” he says, “than the desire of a child, and yet it is good. Jesus himself
said it is good. Mimetic desire is also the desire for God” (24-5). Vittorio Gallese seizes
on this acknowledgement by Girard to argue for a view of mimesis as having two sides:
the “bad” or conflictual side that stems from mimetic desire and the “good” side that
can lead to ethics of empathy once we accept the fact that through cognitively
enacted intentional attunement we all inhabit an intercorporeal we-centric space
(“The Two Side of Mimesis,” 16). Girard, however, eschews as “meaningless” the
division of mimesis into good or bad and accuses the empirical sciences of downplaying
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the conflictual dimension of imitation and desire (Garrels, “Mimesis and Science: An
Interview,” 238, 236). He believes that his mimetic theory needs to be better
inscribed in evolutionary theory (“I am a Darwinist,” he tells Scott Garrells, “I believe
in natural selection” [ 243].) and complains that Richard Dawkin’s memetic theory
(which sees memes as units of culture that self-reproduce and operate similarly to
“selfish” genes) fails to account for the conflictual element in cultural evolution that
is mimesis (243).
We can see that even in Girard mimesis has a dual aspect: it gives rise to
conflict and hate as well as companionship and love. This dual-aspect emerges also
from Meltzoff’s experiment described above: mimetic identification with another’s
intentions can result in desire and rivalry as well as sociality and cooperation. While
he remains insistent that we must attend to the conflictual manifestation of mimesis
in human relations, he does occasionally acknowledge that mimesis seems to have a
positive side. In his 2008 book Evolution and Conversation, for instance, Girard writes
that the “deeper meaning” to an understanding of mimesis is that
[w]e will always be mimetic, but we don’t have to be so in a satanic 15 fashion.
That is, we don’t have to engage perpetually in mimetic rivalries. We don’t
have to accuse our neighbor; instead, we can learn to love him (225).
His claim that “we will always be mimetic” conveys his belief that beneath conscious
and representational forms of imitation there is an unconscious inclination to imitate
the desires and intentions of others. In other words, as Garrells puts it, “imitation
operates at a level that precedes representational thought” and serves as an “ongoing
function of our affective experience of desire” (14). We are reminded once again of
Merleau-Ponty’s assignation of mimesis to signify a structuring mechanism of the body
schema, one that is activated in response to intentions of desire – to learn how to use
a pencil, to imitate a mother’s smile – but which are not necessarily conflictual. Girard
is clearly cognizant of this dimension of human mimetic capacity, and it seems as if he
evokes this obliquely in the passage cited above. But his apparent reluctance to
explore this dimension at length should be acknowledged. There is, in fact, a
precedent for such an exploration that would not necessarily undermine his view of
mimetic desire. Theodor Adorno, along with his colleague Max Horkheimer, also offers
a compelling critique of the role played by mimesis in generating human conflicts,
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including those that evolve to the point of genocidal scapegoating. But in doing so, he
does not lose sight of the mimesis’s dual aspects; in fact, as I show in the next section,
that dimension of mimesis is what may save us from ourselves.

Adorno’s Mimesis as the Way In and Out of Rationalist Instrumentality
Of all the research I conducted for this dissertation, it is Adorno’s theory of mimesis
that I have found the most challenging to understand. Thankfully, I am not alone.
Miriam Bratu Hansen describes mimesis not only as “a central category in Adorno’s
thought [but] a notoriously difficult one at that” (90). In the anthropologicalphilosophical context of Dialectic of Enlightenment, mimesis derives from primordial
forms of mimicry and involves assimilation to an environment, a relation of reciprocal,
adaptive, and nonobjectifying interchange with the Other, and a fluid, pre-individual
form of subjectivity. As such, according to Hansen, it assumes “a critical and
corrective function” vis-à-vis instrumental rationality and the identifying logic of
conceptual language that distances subject from object. But because the historical
subjugation of nature “has sundered its relations with society,” mimesis is more or less
conceived as a utopian category prefiguring a reconciliation with nature, “which
includes the inner nature of human beings, the body and the unconscious” (90). Tom
Huhn observes how Adorno characterizes mimesis as “archaic,” an “impulse,” whose
origin precedes history – indeed, to trace its history would deposit us in the realm of
biology (9). Adorno’s claim in Aesthetic Theory that the first cave paintings “must
have been preceded by a mimetic component,” a comportment that is “the
assimilation of the self to the other” as well as “an immediate practice . . . [that] is
not knowledge” (qtd, 9), leads Huhn to conclude that, for Adorno, “[m]imesis
precedes image making, by extension all thing making (production), and is thereby
initially a praxis rather than a poiesis, a doing rather than a making” (9).
According to Adorno himself, the assimilation between self and other derives
from “an indelible mimetic element in all cognition and human practice”;
unfortunately, this innate proclivity to identification has been shaped by dialectical
rationality to serve the “false conclusion” of identity thinking, which “believes that it
knows the unlike by likening it to itself, while in so doing it really knows itself only”
(qtd in Whitebook, 64). In other words, the difference that distinguishes the other as
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other is erased. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and his collaborator Max
Horkheimer present mimesis as a natural or anthropological phenomenon that was
colonized early on and shaped to serve the purposes of the colonizing enterprise:
Civilization replaced the organic adaptation to otherness, mimetic behavior
proper, firstly, in the magical phase, with the organized manipulation of
mimesis, and finally, in the historical phase, with rational praxis, work.
Uncontrolled mimesis is proscribed. . . . The severity with which, over the
centuries, the rulers have prevented both their own successors and the
subjugated masses from relapsing into mimetic behavior . . . is the condition of
civilization. (146)
An unmolested, uncolonized mimesis – “mimetic behavior proper” – manifests itself as
a natural phenomenon (“organic adaptation to others”) that does not suit the purposes
and functions of a civilization that increasingly has sundered its relations with the
organic world from which it emerged but over which it seeks ultimate dominion. One
cannot be, after all, organically adapted to something that must be converted into a
standing reserve of usable resources. At the same time, one must be able to identify
those resources by name in order to ascertain their value and significance, which
requires a kind of identification. Therefore, mimesis must be controlled in order to
serve the colonizing force of civilization.
The historical roots of this control began in what the authors call the “magical
phase” of early Western culture. “Mimetic magic” prefigures the split between subject
and object by “taboo[ing] the knowledge which really apprehends the object” (11). A
language that no longer addresses a tree as simply a tree but as something else, a
location of significance that is more than the tree, like mana,16 “expresses the
contradiction that it is at the same time itself and something other than itself,
identical and not identical” (11). The kernel of dialectical logic opens and grows into
totemism in which the religious authority, the shaman for whom “equivalence is his
instrument,” wards off danger with its likeness (12). Mimetic magic is the first
instance of the “organized control of mimesis” or, more complexly, a “mimesis of
mimesis” that develops in late modernity to reproduce the ritualized discipline, the
uniforms, the barbaric drumming, the monotonous repetition of words and gestures,
and the elaborate symbols that fashion “the fascist cult of formulae” (152). This
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compulsion toward cruelty and destruction stems from “the organic repression of
proximity to the body” (193) that intensified with the development of civilization. The
witch trials confirmed “the victory of male domination over primeval matriarchal and
mimetic stages of development” (207), they tell us, and the European anti-Semitism
that even the holocaust failed to fully eradicate “is the reverse of genuine mimesis
and has deep affinities with the repressed” (155). And yet, “the reason that represses
mimesis is not merely its opposite,” Horkheimer and Adorno contend,
[i]t is mimesis itself: of death. The subjective mind which disintegrates the
spiritualization of nature masters spiritless nature only by imitating its rigidity,
disintegrating itself as animistic. (45)
Unfortunately, the dialectical logic inherent in the organized control of mimesis
remains a driving force of contemporary capitalism that manifests itself forthrightly in
the culture industry that is a hallmark of the whole enterprise. “Bourgeois society is
ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to
abstract qualities” (6). Those who have been “blinded by civilization” are rent by
mimesis’s dual aspect which bourgeois ideology has rendered wholly dialectical.
“[T]abooed mimetic traits” such as gestures of touching, nestling, soothing, and
coaxing act as shameful residues of primacy that has no place rationalized
environments: “What repels them as alien is all too familiar” (149).
In many ways, mimesis in Adorno bears resemblance Enframement (Gestell) in
Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology,” another concept that has a
dual function. The structural or “enframing” mechanism of our perceptual abilities is
colonized by an instrumentalizing technology, causing us to collectively order
experience in such a way that the essences of things are concealed by their ideological
transformation into a reserve of useable resources (bestand). And yet, paradoxically,
the Enframement that conceals the essential nature of the things we experience is
also the way out of this ordering mindset. Perhaps by virtue of the fact that enframing
is ultimately an embodied perceptual capacity that orders experience by connecting
and dividing also renders it the source of revealing. Mimesis operates similarly in
Adorno: it is the way into the mess it simultaneously offers a way out of. It is, in a
sense, the ultimate balancing act. It is therefore troubling that some Adorno scholars
do not themselves strike a balance between his account of “uncontrolled” mimesis as
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adaptive, pre-reflective, nonobjectifying, and intersubjective and his account of its
organized control that perverts these affective qualities in the service of civilization.
Part of the problem is that Adorno himself often uses the term “mimesis” and
“mimetic” (in passages such as the one indented above) as shorthand for the concept
he less frequently describes as a “mimesis of mimesis” and which he sees as a
perversion of an originary “mimesis proper.”
Still, as Michael Taussig points out, throughout the considerable body of his
work, Adorno gave greater emphasis to the notion that mimesis “provided the
immersion in the concrete necessary to break definitively from the fetishes and myths
of commodified practices and freedom” (254). Such an immersion may be experienced
in the “mimetic language” of art – a language that precedes the split between subject
and object that is implied in the signifying use of discursive language (Hohendahl, 81).
Gebauer and Wulf argue that when mimesis is considered across the bulk of Adorno’s
work, it is associated with “a decentering of the subject and a dissolution of
anthropocentrism,” providing the opportunity for a “vital experience,” “an intensive
mimetic relation to the world, to the Other, and to inner nature” (293). So vital is
this experience brought on by mimesis that D. Bruce Martin offers Adorno’s theory of
mimesis (prior to its controlled organization, of course) as a “more fertile ground for
developing radical ecological thought than do existing philosophies of deep ecology”
(130-1).
In this section, I have shown how the largely negative portrayals and critiques
of mimesis by Plato, Rene Girard, and Theodor Adorno never quite break free from the
concept’s dual aspect, its capacity to enact sameness along with difference, freedom
along with slavery, hate along with love. I have also shown how mimesis is more than
just an aesthetic category; in Girard and Adorno especially, mimesis is a key
characteristics of what is commonly referred to as “human nature,” a phrase that
semantically conjoins the human with larger ecological structures while creating a
distinction between them. It is from this conjunction that I will construct a model of
mimesis that will inform the following chapters of this book. I will begin this effort
now by reconsidering the classical definition of mimesis, provided by Aristotle, that
art is an imitation of nature.

76

Aristotlean Mimesis: Beyond Representing Naturata to Expressing Naturans
Aristotle’s complex account of mimesis has suffered serious reduction by way of the
popular translation of one short phrase he employs to describe what artists do when
they create a work of art: mimeitai ten phusin. Halliwell takes great exception to the
rendering of this phrase as “imitate nature,” which he describes as an inadequate
translation that became a “neoclassical slogan” (15). For Aristotle’s aesthetics, he
argues, the mimetic arts belong to the class of craft (techne) as a whole, but even
more specifically to a subdivision of making (poiesis) or “productive craft,” which in
principle should be analogous to processes perceived in nature. Hallowell argues that
mimeitai ten phusin and similar Greek locutions should be translated as follows the
process of nature rather than “imitates nature” (153) and spends considerable time
showing how there can be no straightforward equation between mimesis and “the
imitation of nature” as conceived by neoclassical and romantic thinkers, among many
others (351). Gebauer and Wulf interpret Aristotle’s mimeitai ten phusin as a call on
artists to “produce by means of the same force as nature” – a force that “nature and
human beings possess in common” (54, 56). The medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas
may have held a similar view when he described the act of imitation not as the
conscious copying of an object or thing, of natura naturata, but as a manifestation of
the formative force of natura naturans (Gebauer and Wulf, 71) – a view that puts his
take on mimesis in line with Merleau-Ponty’s take of phenomenology, which he tells us
“can be seen as a move from naturata to naturans, from constituted to constituting”
(PhP, 70).
Halliwell’s objection to this reductive translation stems in part from his
discomfort with the largely pejorative sense of the term imitation, the semantics of
which have been greatly narrowed and impoverished in modern usage (14). Rethinking
the significance of imitation will be a prominent project in my next chapter. For now,
I want to focus on the significance of the second term in this translation, nature,
which has received much less attention in mimetic history than the verb modifying it
despite its equally precarious translation. In The Social Creation of Nature, Neil
Evernden argues that when most people think of nature (with a small n) they do not
think of the “great amorphous mass of otherness that encloaks the planet” but,
rather, they think of Nature (with a capital N): “the system or model of nature that
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arose in the West several centuries ago” (xi) that conceives nature more as an object
or thing. The etymologically complex word phusis, Evernden claims, interestingly
enough, “originally referred to what a thing is like,” but in the hands of the preSocratics began to refer to what everything is like and eventually came to stand for
“everything” (19-20).
Martin Heidegger believed that employment of the Latin term natura to
translate phusis destroyed the authentic and original meaning of the term. In “The
Question Concerning Technology,” he tells us that phusis “is indeed poiesis in the
highest sense” (10) and that techne “belongs to the bringing-forth that is poiesis”
(13). He interprets Aristotle’s four causes as “co-responsible” operative modes in the
production of an artifact. The production process is enactive in that an artifact
(Heidegger’s example is a chalice) “emerges” from the interaction of different forces,
all of which share responsibility for the making – and only one of which is the human
silvermaker (6-8). Phusis as described by Heidegger goes way beyond the conventional
wilderness image evoked by “nature” and seems more in line with how the
composition theorist Byron Hawk describes life: “a complex combination of material,
biological, historical, social, linguistic, and ultimately technological processes that
produce emergence” (5). It is important to consider that Aristotle’s understanding of
phusis may have been closer to Hawk’s description of life than to the convention
images that arise when we use the term “nature.”
Interpreters of Aristotelean mimesis rarely take into consideration the vastly
different signification of the Greek phusis from the Latin-derived word nature. Hence
mimesis in Aristotle cannot be restricted to the iconic representation of “nature” that
is responsible for our visions of, say, painters copying what they see around them such
as rainbows or sunsets. Instead, Aristotelian mimesis seems expressive of a
conjunction between painter, painting, and the painted, more generally between the
world and the body that interacts with it while painting. Like the 20th century thinker
Walter Benjamin, Aristotle believed that the most formidable mimetic powers were
possessed by humans. Benjamin gave a name to this unique form of cognition: “the
mimetic faculty,” a concept that segues nicely to a consideration of the recent
resurgence of mimetic theory in scientific studies of sociality, psychology, cognition,
and neurology.
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The Role of Mimesis in Cognition
As I noted in Chapter 1, the German thinker Walter Benjamin believed, as did
Aristotle, that all creatures possess mimetic capabilities that are most fully developed
in humans. His famous term “mimetic faculty” signified how similarities between the
things we encounter in the world create familiar patterns which allow us to situate our
experiences in an intelligible way. Benjamin believed that language evolved along with
human culture. As human civilization became more complex, so too did language,
becoming more conceptual and hence divorced from the material world with which
human interaction helped produce language in the first place. Hence the “sensuous
similarities” from which language derives – captured in the phenomenon of
onomatopoeia – gives way to the “nonsensuous similarities” of which symbolic systems
like language and all written scripts are archives (“Mimetic Faculty,” 335). Our
formidable mimetic faculty described by Benjamin, Michael Taussig tells us, should be
thought of as a “sixth sense, the basis for judging similitude” that enables the “nature
that culture uses to create second nature” (213).
Translated into the language I am using in this dissertation, what Benjamin
calls “nonsensuous similarities” speaks to the operation of the mimetic faculty in the
virtual realm of the conceptual and “sensuous similarities” speaks to its operation in
the actual world of the experiential. In ordinary operations, our sensory-motor body
schemas, as Merleau-Ponty showed in his discussion of the brain-damaged WWI veteran
Schneider, automatically translates between these areas when we think and act. My
contention is that we have lost sight of this interplay because of our educational
emphasis on conceptual thinking, on symbolic significations and meanings shaped
primarily by culture. Benjamin would likely agree. Gebauer and Wulf see as one of his
central ambitions the reconstruction of mimetic sensuous experience that was nearly
destroyed by Descartes’ dualism and scientific order (271). Susan Buck-Morss similarly
identifies Benjamin’s project as trying to retrieve and revitalize “what was lost along
the way” in the sequential development of stages of abstract formal reason specifically an “active, creative form of mimesis” that stemmed from our “unsensed
connection between perception and action” and which, once reconstituted, could
possible incite revolutionary consciousness in people (263). Benjamin seemed to
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believe that the expressive opportunities afforded by a more fully developed mimetic
faculty should not be divorced from the (sensuous) material world in which our bodies
and minds are ultimately rooted. Such a development might instead strike a balance
between the two; nonsensuous similarities would not replace sensuous ones so much
as complement them. Cultivating our mimetic faculty would hence not be a movement
away from something old but a movement toward something new based on the old.
For Benjamin, the epistemological shift to the nonsensuous similarities of the of what
he called the signworld (Merkwelt) does not necessarily lead to a dead end, BuckMorss tells us, since it creates the conditions for a “future of development of mimetic
expression, the potentialities for which are far from exhausted” (267).
Benjamin’s mimetic theory has in recent years been resuscitated and given
renewed vigor by the cultural theorist Mark Hansen. In his 2000 book Embodying
Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing, Hansen identifies “two divergent concepts of
embodiment that are too often either conflated during analysis or simply collapsed
from the beginning” (27). The first and most privileged view, epistemological
embodiment, is an “artifactual” exteriorization of some process of inscription which
is, in his opinion, ultimately concerned with stabilizing something that is “by nature
amorphous or highly tenuous – for example, meaning (for Derrida) or intention (for
Latour)” (26). The second and marginalized view, phenomenological embodiment,
insists on the corporeality of the body as a site of experiential excess and attends to
the nondiscursive, nonrepresentational, affective dimensions of lived experience.
Phenomenological embodiment, he contends, “asserts the impossibility of ever
completely clarifying - bringing to discursive articulation - the embodied background
underlying human practices” (27). Seeing in philosophy an end to what he terms the
“semiotic-systemic perspective” of the epistemological account of embodiment,
Hansen offers in its place a model he calls “corporeal mimesis” – a concept based on
Walter Benjamin’s “mimetic faculty.” According to Hansen, a cultivated corporeal
mimetic faculty would allow humans to better negotiate radical changes (specifically
industrial and technological changes) to “the material domain” of our material
environments. Refining our mimetic faculty in these times of technologically mediated
change, claims Hansen, “leaves room for the introduction of a distinct postlinguistic
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form of mimesis that would restore a crucial dimension of sensuosity—a practical,
embodied basis—to our contact with the material world” (232, emphasis in original).
Hansen’s reconceptualization of Benjamin’s mimetic faculty as corporeal
parallels Merleau-Ponty’s recovery of the bodily experience through phenomenology,
which similarly seeks to return philosophy to the world of actual experience by
“rediscovering phenomena” as the “layer of living experience through which other
people and things are first given to us, the system of ‘self-other-things’ as it comes
into being” that is prior to objective reflection (PhP, 65). In his 1981 book The
Reenchantment of the World, the cultural historian Morris Berman strives for a similar
rediscovery to a way of being in the world that has been buried under layers of
cultural conventions. He promotes the development of “self-conscious mimesis” as the
vital next phase in the cultivation of a “participating consciousness” through which
people become attuned to the web of relations that threads its way across all beings
and things but from which human “ego-consciousness” has disentangled us (72, 296).
Berman argues that mimesis is a form of knowledge (173) and that identification of the
sensuous with the intellectual is the “crux of the mimetic tradition” in Western
culture (157). He claims that the beginning of wisdom is not in analytic dissection but
through mimetic immersion in the world and compares mimetic knowledge to Henri
Bergson’s ecological view of mind/body as a “field” in which our leaning – as
demonstrated in the work of Michael Polanyi – is achieved mimetically through bodily
engagement with our situations (147-8).
Here we should recall Scott Marratto’s description of intercorporeity in
Merleau-Ponty as a “field” in which “my body is already bound up with the other’s
body before there can be any relation between conscious subjects” (144). I have
touched on the relationship between intercorporeity and mimesis and here will return
to that subject. I believe that the empirical studies that have informed the thinking of
the neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese (who has written about mimesis within the context
of intercorporeity, a term he apparently borrowed from Merleau-Ponty)17 is key to the
mimetic approach I take toward rhetoric and multimodal pedagogy in the chapters
ahead. As I noted earlier, Gallese – one of the discoverers of the mirror neuron
systems in humans and other primates – argues that there are “two sides of mimesis”
and promotes the “good” side that Rene Girard has played down in his advancing of
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mimetic desire as the source of conflict. By putting into conversation key aspects of
work by Alexandre Kojeve, Martin Heidegger, and Halmuth Plessner with empirical
neuroscientific research conducted internationally over the past two decades, Gallese
offers a “different, complementary, not mutually exclusive account of mimesis as one
of the driving forces leading to social identification, hence to human sociality and
intersubjectivity” – but intersubjectivity viewed “first and foremost” as
intercorporeity, “the mutual resonance of intentionally meaningful sensory-motor
behaviours” (“Two Sides of Mimesis,” 3). Intercorporeity, as Gallese explains it,
describes a crucial aspect of intersubjectivity because humans share the same
intentional objects and their situated motor systems are similarly wired to
accomplish similar basic goals. Before and below our theoretical take on the
world is the pragmatic character of our openness to the world. (4)
In our situated interactions with other people and things, we automatically engage in
what he and his colleagues call “intentional attunement,” a specific, shared,
phenomenal state generated in part by the mirror neuron system. This system allows
for embodied simulation that is “automatic, unconscious, and noninferential in the
observer of actions, emotions, and sensations carried out and experienced by the
observed” (131). This mandatory, prereflexive mechanism “is not the result of a
deliberate and conscious cognitive effort” but instead “generates a peculiar quality of
familiarity with other individuals” (143-4). From the moment of birth “humans are
engaged in interpersonal mimetic relations” that occur in a shared “we-centric” space
(“Two Sides”11). He suggests that these bodily “instantiations of unconscious mimesis”
(9) emerge simultaneously with intersubjective relations from the ground of
intercorporeity (13). Therefore, he argues, humans have an innate capacity for
empathy that does not solely manifest itself as rivalry but also, as Girard himself has
noted, as compassion and love – an observation that Meltzoff’s experiment referenced
above also supports. An ethics that takes serious account of this “good” side of a
clearly dual-aspect mimesis should look to neuroscientific studies of cognition in
promoting empathy, cooperation, and cohabitation as correctives to the violence,
scapegoating, and war that results from its “bad” side.
As I noted earlier, intercorporeal mimetic relations in Gallese are based
primarily in human-to-human interactions. In an attempt to move beyond human
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sociality, I show in the previous chapter how Merleau-Ponty describes typists and
organists as “incorporating” the space of keyboards into their own body schemas
through habitation, a process he discusses within the broad framework of imitation.
The affect theorist Anna Gibbs, however, provides an even better nonanthropocentric
account of intercorporeal mimetic relations that I would like to look at here. In her
2010 essay “After Affect: Sympathy, Synchrony, and Mimetic Communication,” Gibbs
argues that mimesis, like affect, is not necessarily best thought of as occurring at the
level of the individual or the organism; rather it might be seen as a “trajectory” that
both organism and environment are mutually caught up in (195). Interpreting mimesis
not as direct imitation or “copying” but as reciprocity, entrainment, and synchrony,
she aligns it with an emerging “nonhumanist” movement of thought “for whom
thinking is a practice that should extend us beyond the known forms of the subject”
(187). She herself cuts a path in this direction by offering a mimetic reading of Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s discussion of asymmetrical coevolution that they call
“becoming.” While the orchid and the wasp may exist separately in different “worlds”
or Umwelts, a form of symmetrical reciprocity nonetheless emerges in the structural
coupling of these two worlds.18 Gibbs adds empirical weight to this theory by
referencing observations made by the behavioral ecologist Anne C. Gaskett on how
orchids evolved complex mimicry patterns to deceive, if only temporarily, pollinating
wasps (194). Gibbs describes as “communication” the structural alignment between
the wasp’s alimentary system and the orchid’s reproductive system (195). Mimesis,
hence, is not just a human function but a complex process of what Aristotle said the
work of artists, painters, rhetors, and musicians ought to “imitate”: phusis, nature.
Indeed, there seems to be a strong mimetic dimension to Aristotle’s notion of
“function,” which, according to Gilbert Simondon, aligns parallels between beings
whose modes of existence and structure are different but who are linked through a
chain of functioning that gives continuity and permanence of life from one species to
another (Two Lessons, 50-2). In imitating phusis, human artists and performers are
basically linking themselves to this chain of functioning that, like Gibbs’ mimetic
communication, cuts across all living things.
At the level of human interaction, Gibbs argues that mimesis reveals itself
through our “capacity for synchrony” as a form of “affective attunement,” as revealed
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in how a baby’s squeal of delight is “translated” into a mother’s dancing shimmy as a
form of response – a “correspondence” between perception and motility that operates
“cross-modally,” enacting a space “where two subjective worlds come into momentary
contact” (195). The mother responds to her baby’s needs, Gibbs says, because “she is
attuned to the level of the baby’s distress”; she and the child are synchronized (196).
This synchronic attunement is what Gibbs calls mimetic communication and, like the
other examples provided above, works against the conventional understanding of
mimesis as the reproduction of sameness since the mother’s shimmy is an appropriate
response to her baby’s squeal and not a replication of it. This “cross-modal” process
that operates “both intra- and inter-corporeally” (196), Gibbs asserts, is productive of
difference, organizing experience so that one’s identification with others reversibly
becomes one’s distinction from them. This is not just a phenomenon of infants. Adults
similarly become “entrained” with the gestural manners and speech rhythms of others
they observe or interact with, almost always at an unconscious level (196). But never
do we entirely “lose ourselves,” as Plato believed, in the process. Mimetic
communication is not about sacrifice but attunement; difference is not eliminated or
marginalized but enacted simultaneously with similarity. One cannot determine what
constitutes difference without attending to similarity; they are co-constitutive of each
other. The wasp and the orchid exist in different phylums, different “worlds,” but the
agon of their encounters enacts just enough similarity to allow for symbiotic relations.
As noted previously, Merleau-Ponty believes that we share with our situations a
style, “a ‘manner’ that I apprehend and then imitate, even if I am unable to define it”
(CAL, 43; italics in original). Even when one partially imitates the behavior of others,
one takes on the “total attitude” corresponding to that behavior. The acquisition of a
total attitude reveals that cognition is not the product of some mental apparatus but
rather emerges from the intercorporeal nexus between the body of the imitator with
the body of the one being imitated:
When I witness the setting in of the behavior of others, my body becomes a
means of understanding them, my corporeality becomes a comprehending
power of their corporeality – I regain the final meaning … of other people’s
behavior, because my body is capable of achieving the same goals. (CAL, 42)
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This is precisely the process of mimesis as described by Gallese through which one
becomes intentionally attuned to another so that one’s bodily state “becomes in some
way congruent with” that of another (Gallese et al, 151). But style is not enacted
solely through our bodies’ relations with other human bodies. Merleau-Ponty describes
how style arises in language use – his example is the word “sleet” – as a “meeting of
the human and the nonhuman, as it were, a piece of the world’s behavior” (PhP, 469).
Here we have a meeting place of systems, not of subjects, reminiscent of Gibbs’
description of the coupling that occurs not so much between the wasp and the orchid
but between the wasp’s alimentary system and the orchid’s reproductive system. To
engage mimetically with the people and things of this world, then, is to engage with
the style of all styles that the Greeks called phusis. Our engagement is expressive –
not just representative – of many things that constitute “life,” including how we learn
and communicate by intentionally attuning to others. In the next chapter, I will look
more closely at what Merleau-Ponty calls the “almost imitative way” we attune
ourselves to the style of situations, a dimension central to ancient rhetorical pedagogy
that was retained through certain skill sets associated with imitatio. But before
proceeding I want to contend briefly with the anti-mimetic, anti-phenomenological,
anti-ambient ideology of Timothy Morton’s so-called “dark ecology,” to which I now
turn.

A Brief Deconstruction of Timothy Morton’s “Dark Ecology”
In his 2007 Ecology Without Nature, Timothy Morton argues that contemporary “nature
writing” like that of David Abram – who draws heavily on Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology in offering an ecological philosophy that attends to the more-thanhuman dimensions of perception – suffers from a romantic ideality he calls
“ecomimesis,” a “device” that “wants to go beyond the aesthetic dimension” of
mimesis and “involves a poetics of ambience . . . [that] denotes a sense of a
circumambient, or surrounding, world” (31-3, 132). By trying to erase the trace of
writing in his text and in other texts, Abram and other writers he perceives as given to
romanticism indulge in “ecomimetic ekphrasis,” an ambient rhetorical device that
seeks to absorb readers into the reading itself, evoking thereby a “fantasy
environment” that stands in for the world in which we are supposedly immersed or
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embedded (129). He categorically attacks the ideas of complex systems as “holism
without the sticky wetness, a cybernetic version of the ecological imaginary” (103);
intersubjective fields of perception as a manifestation of the “rich, spatial quality of
field in phenomenology [that] is simply the holographic hallucination,” one that wants
to conjure a surrounding world that “jumps off the page” (105); and the body as “a
phenomenological product of intersubjectivity, which seek[s] to do away with the
dilemma of specifying the boundary between inside and outside” (105). Ecomimesis
draws on these and other concepts to “carve out a radical embeddedness in the
landscape” by conjuring “an ambient dimension incarnated like Merleau-Ponty’s
‘Flesh,’ surrounding and sustaining the narrator and the reader” (132-3). Because
ecomimesis aims for immediacy, “it wants us to forget or lay aside the subject-object
dualism” (151) and draws on ambient rhetoric to create a sense of in-between: “The
brilliance of ambient rhetoric is to make it appear as if, for a fleeting second, there is
something in between” (50). According to Morton, the notion of there being an inbetween is “sheer nihilism” (54) perpetuated by the “trope” of Merleau-Ponty’s
chiasm, which intertwines “what is sensed with the one who is sensing” (69) and hence
contributes to what Morton calls the “beautiful soul syndrome,” a “subjective form of
ambience” that results from “the collapse of aesthetic distance” (164).
Morton’s forthright attack on “ecomimesis” is not without significant
shortcomings. It should be noted that Morton’s criticism of nature writing is part of a
larger commitment to an ideological dis-ease with contemporary theories of
relationality. His suggestion that the term intersubjectivity, popularized by
“phenomenological rhetoric,” should be replaced by the word “interobjectivity” (106)
resulted in comparisons between his book the then emerging philosophy of Object
Oriented Ontology, which Morton has since associated himself with. “OOO” has
adopted a critical – and sometimes openly hostile – theoretical position with respect to
the relational theories that inform much contemporary critical theory, 19 including
those I draw heavily from in this dissertation. Morton’s provocative, often humorous,
and sardonic treatise barely disguises his visceral animosity toward major tenets of
phenomenology, complex systems theories, autopoiesis, and other philosophies that do
not draw clear distinctions between subjects and objects. Morton piles these together
into a single monolithic ecophilosophy that, in the later chapters, turns out to be deep
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ecology. But what does he offer in its place? This is where Morton’s entire project
deconstructs itself – with much help from the author himself.
In contrast to deep ecology, Morton proffers what he calls “dark ecology,” “a
perverse, melancholy ethics that refuses to digest the object into an ideal form”
(195). In his words:
We should be finding ways to stick around with the sticky mess that we’re in
and that we are, making thinking dirtier, identifying with ugliness, practicing
“hauntology” (Derrida’s phrase) rather than ontology. So out with the black
clothes, eyeliner, and white makeup, on with the spangly music: dark ecology.
(188)
In the pages that conclude his book, Morton hardly develops his theory of dark
ecology. Instead, he simply opposes the term to the “new organicism” of relational
philosophy (191). Dark ecology is trumpeted as a “halting” of the ambient sounds of
ecomimesis by “the screeching of the emergency brake” (196). It also helps us all get
“over the dilemma of the beautiful soul, not by turning the other into the self, but
perversely, by leaving things the way they are” (196). Most remarkably, in the very
last two paragraphs of Ecology Without Nature, Morton suddenly admits that “I long to
characterize what I am aiming for as ‘really deep ecology’,” which, simply put, means
“hang[ing] out in what feels like dualism” since taking “a more nondual approach” to
questions about our ecological relationship with the world would be metaphorically
equivalent to jumping down into the mud rather than trying to pull the world out of it
(204-5).
How do we do this exactly? “In a truly deep green world, the idea of Nature
will have disappeared in a puff of smoke, as nonhuman beings swim into view” (204).
The problem with this conclusion, of course, is Morton’s assumption that all the
theoretical perspectives he attacks buy into the same monolithic view of Nature. I
contend that they do not. Even constructed views of Nature differ widely, with selfidentified deep ecologists conceiving of it in ways very different from wildlife
management experts or evolutionary biologists. As I discussed earlier, Aristotle’s term
phusis is inadequately translated as “Nature” just as mimesis is inadequately
translated as “copying” or “imitation.” Morton ignores how theories of relationality
like those of Merleau-Ponty enabled “nonhuman beings to swim into view,” that
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objects were perceived as having an ontology long before OOO entered the
philosophical agon.20 Morton way too quickly seizes upon the conventional definitions
and stereotypes of the concepts he rails against in his book while mimicking popular
styles (dark eyeliner, spangly music) seen as “dark” or provocatively punk. His desire
to provoke in this book, I submit, exceeds his commitment to critical analysis and
consideration. As I hope I have shown, there is much more to the concept of mimesis
than the reductive definitions that come together to inform Morton’s straw man
“ecomimesis.” In the next chapter, I will delve more deeply into the widespread
cultural prejudice against one of these definitions – mimesis as imitation – in an
attempt to reveal how the denigration of what is an essential manner of learning
about ourselves and the world we inhabit has done much more harm than good.

1

I would also like to add that I don’t believe her interpretation of Plato and Aristotle delves much at all
into their actual dealings with mimesis. What Sun seems to be doing here is taking a very reduced version
of mimesis and using it to reflect their general philosophies. This is especially true in the case of Plato,
where mimesis reflects his privileging of eidos over matter. What she doesn’t attend to, surprisingly, is
that he actually used that hierarchy to diminish mimesis. In the case of Aristotle: I suppose by securing
mimesis so steadfastly in the realm of human aesthetics did in a sense anthropocentrize it in ways that, as
I will show, much earlier understandings of the concept did not. However, reducing Aristotle’s extensive
treatment of mimesis solely to anthropocentrism, in my view, is an example of extremely selective
reductionism. It’s not that I disagree with Sun’s very generalized reading of a conventionalized version of
mimesis here. It’s just that her reading does not directly attend to Plato and Aristotle’s actual discussions
of the concept.
2
Stephen Halliwell uses this term to describe the enactive conception of mimesis he believes Aristotle
was strongly inclined to, and which I will discuss in the following section. My use of the term dual aspect,
however, will not be confined solely to the aesthetic context of Aristotles’ discussion.
3
We should recall here that Merleau-Ponty describes the “fundamental and irreducible form” of mimesis
as a “correspondence” between dual modalities – perception and motility – which translates itself into
“an original” motor organization (CRO 146). As a function of the body schema “appropriate to the needs
of expression,” mimesis is what allows us to automatically regulate our bodily equilibrium in part by
realizing that our body gestures are “analogous” to those of the people and other living beings around us
(154). The motor organization enacted through this correspondence is, however, original – not a direct
copy of an act, but more like a simulation of an act’s intention. In other words, what is imitated here is
not so much the action itself but the expression of that action, its total significance. The picture
emerging here suggests that mimesis is the cognitive operation that enables our attunement to style
through an “affective interplay between the ‘mind’ and the ‘object’” that Sun ascribes to the allegedly
anti-mimetic concept of xing (335). It is also clearly an intercorporeal operation in that it cannot occur in
the absence of material bodies, both human and nonhuman.
4
For example, causal dependence, visual similarity, analogy, and behaviorial imitation or mimicry. See
Halliwell, 153.
5
The term cited by Halliwell is suntheorein, whose two other uses in Aristotle confirm the force of the
prefix for him: “to contemplate or observe at the same time.” (181)
6
The current artistic trend of bioart similarly tries to evoke a more complex state of awareness by
encouraging viewers to embody dual aspects of bioartistic exhibits. In some pieces, they become
simultaneously viewers and participants, in others they experience an experiment by being both subjectas-experimenter and the object-as-experimented-on. This dual aspect evolves, according to Robert
Mitchell, from bioart’s ability to bring two media together: media-as-communication and media-as-
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transformation. (See Introduction for Mitchell’s Bioart and the Vitality of Media, U of Washington Press,
2010.)
7
They speculate that the original mimoses participated in Dionysian cult dramas and later became
performers at banquets thrown by wealthy aristocrats at which they depicted scenes of life “as it is” –
that is, from the allegedly more realistic point of view of commoners (28-9).
8
See Halliwell, 17. Gebauer and Wulf tell us that mimos were actors who represented lift “as it was” –
that is, the everyday life of commoners – and the banquets of rich men (29)
9
In their book Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Harvester Press, 1978), Marcel Detienne
and Jean-Pierre Vernant argue that stochastic knowledges like metis, a concept that parallels mimesis in
many ways, were ignored for centuries by ancient Greek historians and scholars due to the combined
influence of Christianity and Platonic metaphysics, both of which promoted a view in which “human
reason should appear even more clearly separated from animal behaviour than it was for the ancient
Greeks” (317-18).
10
I draw here on Matthew Potolsky’s description of this section of Plato’s Sophist (22-26).
11
As we will see in the next chapter, prior to Plato mimesis was a term used in relation to a performative
practice and pedagogy. Plato basically philosophized it. Halliwell therefore refers to him (seemingly
following others) as the founding father of mimeticism – of the theoretical and aesthetic tradition. But
this tradition clearly has roots in history long predating Plato’s dialogues. As a coarse analogue, it would
be possible to call Plato the founding father of rhetoric in that he was the first to record the word
(rhetorike). But, of course, rhetoric as a practice in ancient Greece pre-dated Plato by many centuries.
12
Havlock argues that Plato’s rejection of mimesis and banning of the poets in the Republic stemmed from
the philosopher’s understanding of a shift in Greek literacy from oral to written traditions.
13
Quoted in Bjornar Grande, 8
14
Scapegoating violence is a central tenet to Girard’s mimetic theory. He believes that proto-humans
established culture and religion through ritual sacrifice, which deflected escalating in-community
violence to a surrogate. For a good overview of Girard’s theory see Garrells (1-2, 11-19). For an account
of the literary, mythic, and religious framework that informs Girard’s theory, see Gebauer and Wulf
(Chapt 20, 255-266).
15
Girard tells us that “satanic” means “the power of accusation. ‘Satan,’ in the Bible, means first and
foremost the accuser…” (Adams, 33).
16
Mana is a proto-Oceanic term that worked its way into multiple languages associated with the
Austronesian language family. It originally was associated with the forces of nature – thunder, wind,
storms – but in time came to represent a great supra-natural force. Horkheimer and Adorno use it as an
equivalent for magic. When the magician claims that the tree is a site of magical mana, the tree becomes
something more than itself, even other than itself. In this way do humans gain control of “nature”: they
who understand magic can control that in which it is invested.
17
As I noted in Chapter 1, in his 2009 article “Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis
of Social Identification,” Gallese cites Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the “comprehension of gestures come
about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others. . . . as if the other person’s
intention inhabited my body and mind his” – a comprehension that is communicated, according to
Gallese, “first and foremost” (523) through intercorporeity, the intentional attunement between bodies,
which he argues subtends intersubjectivity. Of Merleau-Ponty’s passage, which I only quote a part of
here, Gallese writes: “These words fully maintain their illuminating power in the present century, even
more so as they can now be grounded on solid empirical evidence” (526).
18
This example is drawn and elaborated on by Deleuze and Guattari from the German Baltic biologist
Jacob Von Uexkull.
19
In his 2012 Alien Phenomenology, or, What it’s Like to Be A Thing (U of Minnesota Press), the OOO
rhetorician Ian Bogost adopts a similar tone in his attack of correlationism and other features of relational
philosophies he conceives as obliterating objects.
20
For one of many examples, Bernard Stiegler argues for an ontology of “technical beings” in his three
volume work Technics and Time, the first book of which was published in 1994.
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Chapter 3: Cultivating Experiential Knowledge: The Mimetic
Dimension in Rhetoric
The Dual Denigration of Mimesis and Rhetoric
In the last chapter I explored the complex meaning of the term mimesis. In this
chapter I look more closely at how mimesis - as both conventional representation and
enactive expression – impacted the Western rhetorical tradition and still does. To do
this requires us to consider in much greater depth a central significance of mimesis,
namely the interrelated activities of repetition, simulation, and repurposing that are
lumped altogether in its translation as “imitation.” This term is one that must be
carefully contextualized when used; otherwise, one risks conjuring the historical
anathema against the allegedly lazy, rote, mindless monkey-see-monkey-do
reproduction of facsimiles in a culture that has been tutored to prize originality and
uniqueness and persecute plagiarism. The deeply entrenched prejudice against what is
an essential learning behavior in humans and many other species has in recent times
given way to more serious considerations of its biological and anthropological
dimensions. In his introduction to the 2011 Mimesis and Science: Empirical Theories on
Imitation and the Mimetic Theory of Culture and Religion, a collection of essays by
scholars in multiple disciplines who respond in various ways to Rene Girard’s theories
of appropriative mimetic desire, Scott R. Garrels observes how the work of mimetic
scholars in the humanities and social sciences have for long addressed “broad
concerns” that empirical imitation scholars are just now beginning to catch up with
(29). Fortunately, these scholars are now beginning to contribute to a “renewed view
of imitation as one of the most compelling and overlooked capacities of the human
species” (1). Increasingly, imitation is understood as a “complex, generative, and
multidimensional phenomena” that may very well be the basis for how we understand
ourselves and others, but for how we learn as well (1).
These complex and multidimensional phenomena have been ignored, Garrels
tells us, because of “many enduring and deeply ingrained philosophical and conceptual
biases concerning imitation, some dating back thousands of years (2). These biases
have been well documented and often accepted as innovative steps in the forwardmoving direction of progress. “All forms of imitation are to be despised!” proclaimed
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one of the many futurist manifestos1 published in the early 20th century as iconoclastic
movements in art began to spread across the Europe and America, promoting an
ideology lionized by the modernist poet Ezra Pound’s statement “Make It New.”2
Pound may not have realized it, but he was in fact simply reproducing an old ideology.
The Renaissance figure Leonardo da Vinci’s forthright disapproval of all forms of
imitation contributed to a burgeoning disregard for formal aesthetic practices
associated with what the Romans called, in both art and rhetoric, imitatio (Garrels,
7). Conditions were created long ago for a tradition in which, as Stephen Halliwell
complains, “the semantics of ‘imitation’ have been considerably narrowed and
impoverished” so that its modern significance “tends almost inevitably to imply, often
with pejorative force, a limited exercise in copying, superficial replication, or
counterfeiting of an externally ‘given’ model” (14; emphasis in original).
While in other cultures overt imitation is considered a sign of respect, rigor,
and even flattery, Western intellectual traditions have followed in the footsteps of
Plato, whose attack on mimesis Garrels targets as “a primary source of our modern
tendency to devalue imitation” (5). As mentioned earlier, Plato associated imitation
with the making of images that were thrice removed from the epistemic eidos of
which they were unreliable representations – shadows cast on the wall of the cave that
passed themselves of as reality and confined people to mental slavery. His antimimetic position therefore went hand in hand with an anti-imagistic one. Eric A.
Havelock, in fact, describes the general thrust of Platonism as “an appeal to substitute
a conceptual discourse for an imagistic one.”3 This conceptual orientation would have
serious consequences for what Plato himself called rhetorike, specifically the
“imitative kind … of image-making art” practiced by the Sophists (qtd in Covino 34). In
Plato’s eyes, according to Gebauer and Wulf, “Sophistic thinking aims to produce
images that the listener will regard as real, all of which takes place in the world of
phenomena” and, like mimesis, belongs to a an increasingly obsolete oral culture
(Gebauer and Wulf, 43, 45). In his Sophist, Plato labels the “production of images” by
Sophists as acquisitive and compares it to hunting (265a-c), a metaphor which Per
Bjonar Grande reads as a “manipulative way of learning and taking possession of other
people” (12). Plato then immediately extends the metaphor to include commerce and
contest (265b), that realm of persuasive communication practices that in Gorgias he
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labeled “rhetoric.” Tainted as it was by the execrable influence of Sophists, rhetoric
would join mimesis and all other “imitative arts” as a cultural force against which
philosophy must pit itself.
Aristotle, fortunately, did not follow suit. However, his reconceptualization of
mimesis and rhetoric narrowed the scope of practice with which both were associated.
Susan Jarratt argues that Aristotle mapped out “quite a different epistemic field”
from the Sophists, placing rhetoric along with ethics and politics “against the
background of his fixed vision of episteme” and thereby created a system that
suppressed the positions the Sophists advocated, namely the primacy of human
knowledge, possibilities of non-rational and emotional responses to the whole range of
discourse types, and the integral relationship between theory and practice (xviii-xix).
Ekaterina V. Haskins comes to a similar conclusion with respect to mimesis, seeing
Aristotle’s privileging of representational mimesis over the performative kind that so
vexed Plato as a “disciplining” of rhetoric which curtailed the influence of
“performance culture” upon public institutions, including civic education (31).
The experientially performative Sophistic dimensions that were excised in
Aristotle’s revamping of rhetoric along more conceptual lines did not, however,
disappear from the rhetorical tradition.4 They lived on through imitatio,5 a practice
developed in Roman rhetoric and historiography whose roots stem from ancient
Sophistic training that did not encourage a separation of mind from body or rhetor
from situation. In the last chapter, I showed how mimesis – even in the hands of its
harshest critics – persists in revealing a dual-aspect dimension that opens it to
multiplicity rather than narrows it to the singularity as expressed by the words
“imitation,” “copying,” and “rote learning.” In this chapter, I will ally this broadened
understanding of mimesis with an equally broadened account of key aspects of
imitation – repetition, simulation, and repurposing – and reveal how these basic
behavioral capacities help situate rhetors and composers in the material contexts of
their situations. By continuing to draw on key components of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
perceptual phenomenology, I will show how imitative mimesis fits with propositions
made recently by some materialist rhetoricians who conceive an originary rhetoricity
subtending the symbolic orders upon which so much of the traditional canon draws. I
will then offer an account of imitatio that shows how from the start it has subscribed
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to experiential modes of learning and communicating overlooked by scholars and
critics alike. In this sense, imitatio – which is the formal rhetorical and aesthetic
rendering of the Greek word mimesis in Latin – has its philosophical roots in perhaps
the first formalized account of experiential learning in Western Culture.6 This will be
followed by an elaboration of embodied repetitio – a concept I construct that aligns
repetition in rhetoric and general language use with mimesis conceived
phenomenologically – that is, as expressive of enaction. I will then turn toward
contemporary rhetorical pedagogy by drawing on the work of Robert Terrill, a
communication scholar who revived imitatio for a 2011 article published in Rhetoric
Society Quarterly. Terrill’s article will help me to sum up this chapter’s focus on
mimesis in rhetorical pedagogy and segue to the next chapter in which I explore that
pedagogy in the context of multimodality.

Imitating Phusis: Mimesis and Material Rhetorics
The rhetorical scholar Jay Dolmage claims that Western rhetoric has for long
participated in a tradition that “lifts discourse from its corporeal hinges” by
overlooking its embodied and thoroughly “phenomenological importance” (“Metis,” 1).
Where Dolmage draws on the Greek concept of metis to restore to rhetoric its
phenomenological importance, I draw on mimesis as read through the phenomenology
of Merleau-Ponty.7 I am not the first, though, to use phenomenology as a way to reenvision rhetoric. In her 1998 Toward A Phenomenological Rhetoric, Barbara Couture
ambitiously promotes what she terms as phenomenological rhetoric as a “sea change”
to the “valued rhetorical practices” of argumentation (6, 182) that have, in her view,
incorporated narcissistic and fetishistic behavior that stem from the belief in a
separate, coherent, unified self (58). Arguing that “we need to return to the
possibility of universal meaning,” Couture offers phenomenology as a way to transcend
the “dichotomous thinking” and “polar tensions” brought on by deconstruction,
poststructuralism, and other relativisitic philosophies that she, along with Ann E.
Berthoff and others, claim have worked its way into rhetoric (28). She argues that the
idea of shared universal truth is manifested in how “phenomenology accounts for
consciousness as it is constitutive of both meaning and the implicit object of meaning”
(64). Since all of humanity is concerned with making meaning, truth exists
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phenomenologically – that is, not in ourselves or in the world but “in the dynamic of
our engagement with the world,” which is itself, as Merleau-Ponty has said, “meaning”
(62, 65).
Although Couture draws heavily on Merleau-Ponty, her overriding commitment
to rescuing truth from relativizing poststructuralists tends to prevent her from
attending to the material role of the body in his phenomenology. This dissertation
therefore seeks to fill the gaps I see in Couture’s phenomenological rhetoric. While I
am not concerned with resuscitating universal truth, I do believe that we need to
attend to materially enacted meaning in our composing and communication practices.
My phenomenological approach to rhetoric actually has less in common with Couture’s
than it does with what has become known in recent times as material rhetoric. There
are echoes of Merleau-Ponty, I feel, in Nathan Stormer’s description of rhetoric as
“express[ing] materiality: it is a way of incarnating ourselves in the world . . .
(“Recursivity, 29).8 Similarly, Thomas Rickert argues for “a richer, more dynamic, and
materialist understanding of rhetoric that declines to zone rhetoric within
symbolicity,” one whose persuasive aim is not to conduct “a shift in the mental states
of subjects but something world-transforming for individuals and groups immersed in
vibrant, ecologically attuned environments” (xv). “The big story,” though, as Rickert
puts it, “is that rhetoric is not solely human doing, that it is worldly, and that world is
simultaneously one of meaning and of meaning’s withdrawal” (163). While Rickert
conceives meaning primarily through a Heideggerian lens (as seen here with the
reference to its withdrawal), I approach it through one crafted by my reading of
Merleau-Ponty: meaning arises through our bodily interactions with situations,9 one
important dimension of which is, for humans at least, fundamentally mimetic and
hence rhetorical.
In Chapter 1, I looked at how certain aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of adult
imitation were demonstrated in his study of the brain-damaged World War I veteran
Schneider. In what he calls “normal imitation,” human beings are so attuned to the
situations they are enmeshed in that they automatically shift from actual (perceptual;
affective) experience to the virtual (conceptual; symbolic) manifestation of that
experience, over and over – a capacity lost to Schneider. I see this capacity as being
akin to what Rickert calls ambient attunement: a recognition that “even if symbolicity
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remains ascendant, it stays receptive to its material dimension, and not just receptive
but engaged, and not just engaged but enmeshed” (165). I believe that, in practice,
ambient attunement is enabled by what Merleau-Ponty describes as “mimesis in its
most fundamental form”: the correspondence between perception and motility that
enables action. Gebauer and Wulf offer a similar (materialist) account of mimetic
representation not as an “act of an autonomous mind but a product of practice in the
formation of materials, painting or writing” (21) which Aristotle and others believe are
impelled by the productive “force” of phusis that, though mimesis, speaks to an
underlying “similarity in the processes of creation” (55). As I noted in the previous
chapter, what is being “imitated” is not an object or thing (natura naturata) but the
poietic process which enacts it (natura naturnas) (Gebauer and Wulf, 71).
When we put mimesis and rhetoric back into contact with their material base,
we discover that both are intimately linked as processes of natura naturans, the
“naturing”10 of phusis. The hermeneutical philosopher Hans Gadamer, writing in 1969,
described rhetoric as a dimension of “the universal phenomenon of human
linguisticality” that builds “on a natural power that everyone possesses to some
degree” (20). Far from being a “theory of forms or speech and persuasion,” rhetoric
according to Gadamer develops from “a native talent for practical mastery, without
any theoretical reflection about ways and means.” Theory, hence, is “subsequent to
that out of which it is abstracted; that is, to practice” (20-1). In 1980, the classical
rhetorician George Kennedy argued that rhetoric did not “begin” with Plato’s Gorgias
and or even with Aristotle’s Rhetoric; rather, it extends back further than even its
earliest instantiations (observed by Aristotle) in Homeric poems, Greek drama, and
other prose writing (3). Kennedy, in fact, goes even further than Gadamer in pushing
the definition of rhetoric beyond the concept of skill, technique, and the “art of
persuasion” by describing it as “a natural phenomenon: the potential for it exists in all
life forms that can give signals” (4). As a “phenomenon of nature, rhetoric is prior
logically and historically to human speech,” which Kennedy argues developed from
animal communication, specifically that of primates (216).11
Gadamer’s and Kennedy’s postulations that rhetoric is a phenomenon of
“nature” were novel at their time. Recent developments in material rhetoric12
basically pick up where they left off. In her 2010 book Inessential Solidarity, Diane
95

Davis seeks “to expose an originary (or preoriginary) rhetoricity – an affectability or
persuadability – that is the condition for symbolic action” and is irreducible to
“epistemological frame-ups” (2; emphasis hers). What is interesting for our purposes is
that Davis compares the “constitutive persuadability and responsivity” of this originary
rhetoricity to “constitutive mimesis” as described by the philosopher Phillippe LacoueLabarthe, an engaged entrainment with others – a “mimetic rapport” achieved through
“mimetic identification” – which, in humans, “precedes understanding” and manifests
itself (as Merleau-Ponty noted) in infant imitation of their mothers and other adults
(24-5). In describing the “suggestive influence” of an orginary persuadability, Davis
draws on parts of Sigmund Freud’s work which seems to offer a “new version of ‘the
pathic’ part of ancient rhetoric,” one that does not involve an emotional appeal but
rather – and here she borrows a term by Borche-Jacobsen – a kind of “mimeticoaffective contagion” indicative of the absence of any proper subject – including the
subject of representation (33).
I want to explore Davis’s comparison of an originary rhetoric to what seems to
be a closely related originary mimesis. To begin, it is important to note Aristotle’s
belief that imitation is not just a skill but an actual “instinct of our nature”: “The
instinct of imitation [dia mimesos] is implanted in man from childhood” he tells us in
his Poetics. “He is the most imitative of all living creatures, and through imitation
learns his earliest lessons” (IV, 2-6). It is important to note how Aristotle in this
passage equates imitation with an incipient pedagogy (“learns his earliest lessons”). I
will return to this equation in the next section. For now, though, I want to suggest,
following Halliwell, that for Aristotle mimesis is not necessarily confined to or
determined by human intention. Mimetic likeness, rather, “entails an intentionality
that is ultimately natural in origin but becomes embodied in culturally evolved and
institutionalized forms” (156). It seems that for Aristotle the creative impulses that
give rise to art and other forms of creativity are – like the body is for Merleau-Ponty –
very much rooted in worldly processes (phusis) which we intentionally attune ourselves
to through imitation. I believe that Merleau-Ponty provides a framework through which
this “instinct” might be better understood. As the fundamental correspondence
between perception and motility that enables a motor organization (CRO 145), the
ability to imitate “is built into my bodily structure and is its inseparable correlative”
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(PP 164). Even when imitation becomes free of motility and allows us to experience
objects “in themselves,” as in the conscious production of art, the “primary sphere in
which meaning is engendered . . . is motility itself” (PhP 164). Merleau-Ponty’s
observation that because the body schema is an “open system” whereby different
motor tasks are instantly transferable in the act of imitating, a subject can lose “his
separate reality in the other” with whom he becomes identified (164).
Merleau-Ponty’s carefully considered theories of imitation – informed as they
were by studies of neonate imitation and childhood development – are bolstered by
recent studies in cognitive neuroscience. These studies, I believe, also lend support to
Gadamer’s, Kennedy’s, Rickert’s, Davis’s, and most recently Marilyn Cooper’s
proposition that, as she puts it, “persuasion is the fundamental mode of our
interactions with all kinds of others and thus that being is inescapably rhetorical”
(“Rhetorical Being,” 1). The discovery of the Mirror Neuron System in the 1990s sheds
light on how identification is enabled by this “open system” that Merleau-Ponty calls
the body schema. The same neurons in the pre-motor cortex are activated when a
subject both observes a goal-directed motor act and performs a similar act, meaning
that the observed behavior is pre-reflexively understood (Gallese, “Two Sides,” 8).
This claim is substantiated by studies conducted on infants, many of whom can imitate
adults within an hour of being born (57) and replicate their mother’s gazes in a
mother-baby-object triangle (Meltzoff, 60). These studies tell us that “imitation
operates prior to language and is a primary precondition for the genesis of language
and symbolic skills” (69). To imitate a facial gesture that she sees, an infant does not
simulate the gesture internally as if there existed an internal model or blueprint of
“smile” that is then rendered on the surface of the infant’s face. Rather, “[t]he
required model is the action of the other”; thanks to the activation mirror neurons and
other structures of the body schema, the infant’s body “is already in communication
with the other’s body at prenoetic and perceptual levels that are sufficient for
intersubjective interaction” (Gallagher, 223). Neonate imitation is perhaps the first
instance of experiential learning in our lives by virtue of its being the first social
action we engage in. Indeed, as the biological neuroscientist Francisco Varela asserts,
at this stage “the mind” is fundamentally intersubjective and infants’ actions are not
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intended to strengthen individual personality but to build relationships with other
people (Poerkson, 47).
It is in the process of building these relationships intersubjectively that we see
how imitative behavior reflects an underlying rhetoricity or persuadability to
intentional actions. The “mimetico-affective contagion” to which Davis compares
originary rhetoricity seems to be the basis of what cognitive psychologists call
entrainment or what is known more popularly as the “chameleon effect.” Often
referred to as “unconscious mimicry,” entrainment might be thought of as our
intentional attunement to others and to situations. In the last chapter, I referenced
Anna Gibbs’s example of a how a baby’s squeal of delight is “translated” into her
mother’s dancing shimmy (195). Although the neuronal mirror systems of both subjects
are activated in similar ways, the mother’s reaction does not “mirror” the baby’s
action – since she does not herself squeal – but instead is in some way congruent with
the action, including complementary or modulating responses that Vittorio Gallese
argues are better thought of as empathic attunement instead of “contagion”
(“Intentional Attunement,” 151). There is clearly a rhetorical dimension to this
interaction in that the infant increasingly “knows how to solicit the mother’s
attention” while the mother’s expressive, patterned, repetitive way of speaking (or
“motherese”) “seems to be designed to capture the babies’ attention and to meet and
match [the baby’s] preferred sounds and movements” (Gibbs, 197). This imitative
correspondence reveals an underlying, very reflexive persuadability: both subjects
seek to influence while simultaneously being influenced by the other.
What Gibbs calls “mimetic communication,” Gallese calls “embodied
simulation” that results from “intentional attunement,” what Merleau-Ponty calls
“they system ‘me-and-other’” that is emerges from the “foundation of mimesis” in our
sensory-motor apparatus (CRO, 124) - these are all correlates to mimetico-affectivity
that Davis draws on in describing originary rhetoricity. This phenomenon is at play in
all of our social – that is, rhetorical – situations. It is what is operative in Thomas
Rickert’s example of how symbolicity remains always receptive to its material
dimensions when he asks readers to imagine a group of people joining in a circle. The
act of doing this “works on two levels”: the level of conceptual symbolicity and at the
level of the “material movement of bodies that invites the people to share [entrain,
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“imitate”] a rhythm and complete the form” that has emerged in this particular social
situation. There is in this formation an “affective pressure [that] is not solely
symbolic” and for which people who “fall out” with the group dynamic “can pay high
prices.” In entraining with others, there is a “fittingness” that operates congruently
with symbolicity that “is of itself persuasive here” (165).
This fittingness is akin to what Merleau-Ponty calls the style that we tap into
“in an almost imitative way” when attuning ourselves to the intentional dynamics of
certain situations. This is accomplished affectively and intercorporeally. “When I
witness the setting in of the behavior of others,” he tells us, “my corporeality
becomes a comprehending power of their corporeality . . . because my body is
capable of achieving the same goals” of those sharing the same space (CAL 42). When
we integrate ourselves into a social situation, our bodies in a sense persuade others to
accept us as we attempt to assimilate to the group dynamic. We automatically tap
into what is familiar in the situation – its style – and in doing so the group dynamic is
transformed. This transformation is what Merleau-Ponty calls expression. What is
expressed is the group transforming and transformed through our integration with it. It
is fundamentally mimetic in that we “mimic” its style and rhetorical in that our
mimicry influences others to conform or not to the transformation we bring to the
collectivity.

Rethinking Imitation in Rhetorical Pedagogy
Although nearly every composition and technical communication textbook currently on
the market provide sample academic essays with the hope that students will model
them in their own writing, the term “imitation” – still associated with rote repetition
and mindless regurgitation in the service of acquiring skills – is generally avoided.
When it does appear in scholarship, it is treated with no small degree or skepticism.
One example would be Richard Boyd’s 1991 critique of David Bartholomae’s suggestion
that students should “mimic” the distinctive registers (the styles and conventions) of
academic discourse communities to which they acclimatizing themselves. In his essay
“Imitate me; Don’t Imitate Me: Mimeticism in David Bartholomae’s ‘Inventing the
University,” Boyd identifies Bartholomae as a pioneer of a group he calls “advocates of
mimeticism” who outwardly promote empowering students by immersing them in “a
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privileged discourse” (336) while invisibly denying students entry into this so-called
privileged academic community. Boyd perceives a double-bind in this approach
because the teacher “does not ultimately wish for a perfect act of emulation” by
students since it would introduce “interchangeability” between model and subject
that would undermine the teacher’s “oposition of superiority” (341). Hence there is a
double-bind in this mimetic pedagogy which manifests itself in the instructor who
“demands and forbids imitation since he or she can never allow the student to become
a perfect mirror image and thus the perfect equal of the teacher” (341). Boyd also
includes among the advocates of imitation one of Bartholomae’s most adamant critics,
the expressivist theorist Peter Elbow, for his defense of an “emulation or participation
model of teaching and learning” in which students’ identification with the teacher can
result in a “love” by what is being taught (qtd page 338). In order to counter the
double-bind of this imitate me/don’t imitate me pedagogy that ultimately seeks to
preserve the teacher’s position of privilege, Boyd argues for – but does not develop –
“an instructional context that facilitates [students’] understanding of the working of
mimeticism in the educational process” and therefore preserves “the social and
political pasts that they bring to the university” which mimeticism seeks to replace
(343).
While Boyd touches on some problematic dimensions of Bartholomae’s own
discourse – certainly the former’s use of the word “privileged” might be contested –
his critique is not immune to interrogation. His belief that all instructors of
composition do not want students to share the “power” that endows them with
privilege (I suppose this applies as well to the legions of contingent faculty teaching
without entitlements) is a sweeping generalization and overblown assumption. It also
should be noted that his critique is informed entirely by Rene Girard’s theory of
mimetic desire in which a neophyte subject is ensnared with such force that he or she
“sees through the eyes of a mesmerizing other who directs all the desires and opinions
of the subject” (339). In the process, the subject “is also learning to disdain his or her
old self” by surrendering and replacing it with those believed to be possessed by the
model (339). It should be noted, however, that Boyd himself is imitating a model here
– Girard’s – and is certainly reading Bartholomae’s alleged advocacy of imitation
through the lens provided of that largely anti-mimetic theorist. In doing so, he
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subscribes to assumptions built into Girard’s theory – including positing of a self-aware
and self-preserving subject or “self”13 which, when asserted with force, will almost
certainly marginalize and brand as negative the intersubjective/intercorporeal
dimensions of communication that I associate with mimesis.
Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will offer an alternative pedagogy of
imitation, one which is not constrained by an abiding investment in the nebulous
concept of power. I do not wish to suggest that Boyd (or Girard for that matter) is
missing the mark in his critique of imitation; indeed, as I pointed out in the last
chapter, there is indeed “bad” side to mimesis that we need to acknowledge and
contend with. But we also must attend to what is lost in the wholescale dismissal of
mimetic behavior since that, too, can be “bad.” I will begin by looking at educational
practices popular in Athens prior to Plato, focusing especially on ancient Sophistic
rhetorical training described by Debra Hawhee in her 2004 book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric
and Athletics in Ancient Greece. As Hawhee and others note, Sophistic pedagogy was
highly mimetic in its emphasis on exercises based on imitation and repetition, which
derived from athletic training regimens with which it shared pedagogical space.
Mimetic education in these ancient gynmasia did not stem from a desire to reproduce
models; rather, it shaped the process by which young learners bodily absorbed
knowledge which would help them develop skills necessary for active citizenship in
Greek society. As we will see, such knowledge was acquired through multiple
perceptual modalities in ambient, multimodal environments.
In the previous section, I made a case for conceiving a relationship between
mimesis and rhetoric at the mostly unconscious “mimetico-affective” level of
communication. I now want to show how that relationship manifested itself in ancient
Greek pedagogy, a significant dimension of which was invested in the intersections
between athletics, rhetoric, and musico-poetic practices known as mousike. Although
the word “rhetoric” first appeared in Plato’s Gorgias, Aristotle traces the beginning of
the study of rhetoric back a century earlier, and frequently cites examples of
rhetorical usages in orally performed Homeric poems and in Greek drama (Kennedy,
3). Gebauer and Wulf argue that a key characteristic of the oral poetry of ancient
Greece was a two-sided mimetic process – psychological and physical – which
combined “indicative behavior” (physical representation) with “emotional imitation”
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(emotional expression). This intense form of identification, being both emotional and
physical, was not the result of one-way transmission but, rather, emerged through
“the mutual interaction of the singer with the public” (51). Rhetoric conceived in this
mimetic manner is reflexive or – as Merleau-Ponty would say – reversible in that the
poet/rhetor simultaneously touches the audience and is touched back by the
audience, and the performance/rhetorical situation is enacted through this mutual
reflexivity.14 They note that this identificatory “contagion” that “grips and involves
those present” involved a (clearly multimodal) smorgasbord of “[s]poken and heard
sounds, rhythm, schema, melody, bodily movements, and shared participation” that
was not unlike the choreographed gymnastic exercises whose origins “presumably lie
in the teaching of rhythms designed to support speech” (47).
Hawhee reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that the “decidedly corporeal
style” of ancient Sophistic rhetorical training “derived from athletics and early
education a style of training grounded in imitation and based on . . . the three Rs of
sophistic pedagogy – rhythm, repetition, and response” (135). Because it was a
“primary mode of learning” for the ancient Greeks, mimesis, which Hawhee
understands as imitation, was an “element critical to sophistic pedagogy” (148) that
took place largely in the gymnasia where young men and boys were simultaneously
instructed in both rhetoric and athletics – specifically wrestling and grappling, with
which rhetoric was closely identified.15 Students learned in an environment that might
be described as multimodal – a “network of objects, people, and practices and their
attendant sounds and smells [that] comprised a distinctive material setting for a highly
textured, bodily pedagogy” (128) – through three mimetic “modes of learning . . . .
that comprise[d] the sophistic method of rhetorical training” (141). The first, rhythm
(rhythmos), Hawhee interprets as a specific type of movement, one that “combines
fixity with variability” by producing “distinctive movements within a generalizable
direction” (142). The second, repetition, allowed the body to acquire rhythms so that
“knowledge of fundamentals becomes bodily rather than conscious, and habituation
ensues” (142). Third, responsiveness, shaped exercises that took on a sort of
competitive collaboration since learning did not occur in a vacuum but required
another, an opponent, with whom one’s engagement demanded that new moves –
variations on the rhythmic themes to which one’s body is attuned – be generated in
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relation to those of the other (143).16 This mimetic pedagogy applied to rhetorical
debates just as much as to grappling, wrestling, and other artistic and athletic
practices that took place within the walls of these gymnasia. As Hawhee describes it:
From this spatial intermingling of practices there emerged a specific syncretism
between athletics and rhetoric, a particular crossover in pedagogical practices
and learning styles, a crossover that contributed to the development of
rhetoric as a bodily art: an art learned, practiced, and performed by and with
the body as well as the mind. (111)
I see mimesis as a foundational force in this “crossover.” Hawhee discusses a passage
by the pedagogue Isocrates in which a teacher is expected to “provide such an
example of oratory that the students who have taken shape under his instruction and
are able to imitate (mimesasthai dunanemenous) him will, at once, show in their
speaking an unsurpassed degree of grace and charm” (150). She points out that the
passive form of “taken shape” (ektupothentas) in this sentence – a Greek verb
associated with sculpting – “thwarts the notion of a ‘sculptor’” by insinuating that the
shape “emerges under the teacher’s instruction, or in a particular milieu – that is, out
of a relational, associative dynamic” (151).17
Where Boyd turns to Girard in offering a stinging critique of “mimeticism” in
composition pedagogy, I turn toward the ancient Sophists to find one that I find of
great potential benefit and which I will continue to develop by turning now to the
second historical instantiation of this pedagogical praxis: the rhetorical theories and
methods associated with imitatio. I will begin by showing how conventional
stereotypes of imitatio not only fails to capture but actually conceals the welldocumented history of clearly embodied practices. After reviewing this history, I will
consider imitatio in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, specifically his
concepts of style and expression. I will then, in the last section, take a cue from the
rhetorical scholar Robert Terrill in describing how a revamped version of this tradition
can be of benefit to current composition and rhetorical pedagogy.

Undoing the Stereotype of Imitatio
Imitatio, broadly defined, may be thought of as the Latin formalization of the Greek
mimesis into a specific practice associated with the arts – painting, literature, drama –
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but also with rhetoric. Although imitatio and mimesis are frequently used
interchangeably, in this dissertation the former will be denote a formal praxis that
involved the emulation of rhetors and the repurposing of rhetorical forms, especially
those that were held to be of great effect. From the height of the Roman Empire
(where this Latin translation of mimesis first took hold) up through the High
Renaissance, imitatio stood for a tradition that advocated the imitation of role models
and the ability to make something new out of them (Potolsky, 50). Although Aristotle’s
dictum that artists should follow the processes of “nature” were adhered to in a
general way, there was a sense that “raw nature is too wild and unruly for proper
imitation” (50). In his 1711 “An Essay on Criticism,” for example, Alexander Pope
suggested that the way to nature was through established artistic traditions and
conventions: “Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem; / To copy nature is to copy
them” (qtd p. 51).
The established “ancient rules,” of course, were those of Classical Greece and
Rome. The Romans began the tradition by imitating Greek art. Virgil imitated the
pastoral poetry of Theocritus; Horace imitated the odes of Pindar; Ovid rewrote the
Greek myths; Seneca retold the tragedies of Sophocles (52). In the Middle Ages,
imitatio seems to have been played a central role in what Mary Carruthers identifies
as the cognitive craft of “monastic rhetoric.” Although she associates this craft with
mneme, the art of “memory,” which she distinguishes from an aspect of mimesis
narrowly interpreted in terms of “realism,” her description of creative thinking
“learned by a method of apprenticeship based upon imitating examples, [with mastery
coming] only to a few and only after long discipline and continual practice” (2-3),
clearly corresponds to the practice long associated with imitatio. It is wrong though,
as Michael Potolsky argues, to adopt the stereotype that emerged from this tradition
of imitatio as a “mere defense of rigid conformity or deference to the past” (53). In
fact, as many of us know from exposure to political satire and parody, imitation can
be used to subvert rules and mock established role models. Indeed, there emerged in
Roman dramaturgy a behavioral aspect of imitatio that was reflected in Cicero’s
association of mimesis with comedy, a representation of “life” that may in some ways
be accurate but not necessarily in a realistic manner (Hallowell, 287).
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The most explicit discussions of imitatio in Roman discourse can be found in
rhetorical manuals. Nearly all the major orators of this period discuss imitation, but
rarely in the narrow sense of repetition; rather they adopt a position advocated
explicitly by Horace, that imitatio is a critical practice that demands the refinement
of skill and careful judgment (Potolsky, 56). The 5th century Greek orator Dionysius of
Halicarnarssus argued for a practice of imitation that was closer to emulation than to
copying since copying ran the risk of having something seem “labored or unnatural”
(qtd, 56). A century later the rhetorician Quintilian argued that rhetors need to be
aware of the “things that are not imitable” in speeches deemed worthy of imitation,
namely “talent, facility of discovery, force, fluency, everything that art cannot
supply,” and therefore should think of themselves not as followers but as rivals of
those emulated (qtd, 57).18 One of the most important discussions of Roman imitatio is
to be found in Seneca. In Epistle 84, he tells aspiring orators that good imitation both
resembles and differs from its sources, as a child does a parent: “I would have you
resemble [the orator being emulated] as a child resembles his father, and not as a
picture resembles its original; for a picture is a lifeless thing” (qtd 58).
The picture emerging of imitatio here is hardly reflects the intention to
reincarnate that which is being emulated. A boy can physically resemble his father
because of genetic similarity, but he can resemble his father in attitude, accent,
disposition, and other ways cultivated by their having shared similar experiences. In
Chapter 1 I referred to an example recounted by Merleau-Ponty in which a boy learns
how to use a pencil not by copying his father’s actions but by attuning himself to a
certain intentional style that emerged from an ensemble of the father’s skilled hand,
the pencil, paper, table top, gripping, holding, moving, making, and so on. The boy’s
process of accomplishing the same result of his father is in a sense a fundamental form
of imitatio as described by Seneca: he “resembles” the father by learning how the
action he perceives expresses an intention, and it is that which is imitated in this
situation as in all situations. This example also aligns with Vitorio Gallese’s description
of mimesis as intentional attunement enacted through the embodied simulation of
another’s actions and mimetico-affective entrainment that Diane Davis likens to
originary rhetoricity.
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The ancient rhetoricians were well aware of the affective dimensions of
rhetorical situations and the practice of imitatio was guided by formal techniques
designed to exploit affectivity. We see these at play in the so-called “rule of
propriety,” the imperative to make a speech “fit the occasion” (what the Greeks
called to prepon), advocated by the tradition’s pioneering figures including Dionysius
of Halicarnassus. An important rhetorical convention at these times was a speaker’s
ability to “appropriately” recount an historical event in such a way that it moved
audiences toward adopting the speaker’s viewpoint. Vivienne Gray tells us that in
Dionysius’s hands, mimesis becomes a “technical term” in historical theory and is
achieved by observing the “rule of propriety of argument in composing speeches” of a
historical nature (469). It is vital to understand the very different approach to his
history Dionysius and other ancients took to history than we do. The law of propriety
required public speakers to recreate historical events based not on the collection of
facts or empirical data – on accuracy - but through the expression of their physical and
emotional tenor as imagined by the rhetor/historian (469). Skillful adherence to this
rule required speakers to carefully cultivate “observation of what men do in real life”
(470). Dionysius believed that rhetors should “imitate” the speech of men as shaped
by the historical experience by recounted. For example, since men in real life,
according to Dionysius, do not employ “the same order of words” for different kinds of
emotional events – tragic, celebratory, sedate, and so on – it is expected that the
rhetor “not employ the same order of words for all events” (qtd p 470). The rule of
propriety ensures that the rhetor/historian adapts the argument and style to the
occasion being described. The style of the composed speech enacts the style of the
experience.
What emerges in imitatio is a rhetoric that situates itself in the experience the
rhetor seeks to recreate on the spot, blending the re-enacted occasion with the actual
one at which he is speaking. One Greek rhetorician associated with imitatio,
Longinus,19 praised the speeches of Lysias because they captured (again, “imitated”)
the natural way of speaking employed by the ordinary man. Lysias in one speech
produces “the original type of young, ordinary, retiring citizen, differing in no way
from the well known reality” (qtd in Gray, 472). The key phrase here is “well known
reality.” What is significant is not so much the “type” of character being represented
106

but the situation being expressed, for it is the shared experience of this reality that
allows for identification. After all, as Merleau-Ponty has shown, people identify with
situations just as much as they do with other people. Hence “the good poet and
orator,” according to Longinus, “must be an imitator of the events he describes” (qtd
472; emphasis mine) and points to the technical use of mimesis in a speech by Meidias
Demosthenes, which relies on stylistic features like asyndeta and repetition to mimic
the repeated, abrupt, and sharp violence of the blows by an aggressor. This mimicry is
captured even in the English translation:
. . . by his gesture, his looks, his voice, when he strikes to insult, when he
strikes like an enemy, when he strikes with his fists, when he strikes you like a
slave. (qtd. 474)
The rhetorical style here does not just represent the tumultuous person “he” is but
how he is in this violent situation. The tumult of the moment, the event, is expressed
through the language used to describe the actions of the person. What is virtually
rendered is made materially palpable, an embodied simulation of an event felt by
rhetor and audience alike. A similar use of mimesis is noted by Duris of Samos in the
writing of Homer. Writing several centuries before Dionysius, Duris describes as
mimetic Homer’s use of long syllables, one or two syllable words, and other rhythmical
devices to “imitate” the laborious efforts of Sisyphus. While these devices contribute
to a representation of the character’s presumed emotional state, they also express the
material context – including the weight of the ponderous boulder – in which Sisyphus is
situated. The role played by the nonhuman components of these events were
preserved by the dictum that rhetors “appropriately” recount events. Dionysius used
the word mimesis to describe how Homer’s language simulated an act of releasing
water from a clog. Not only is the swinging of the hammer “imitated” (by balanced
phrases and near rhymes), but so are the large rocks blocking the water’s path, the
running-over flow, and finally – thanks to a series of dactyls and short words – the
release and gradual acceleration of the flow once the obstruction has been cleared
(Gray, 475-6).
Like Aristotle, Dionysius believed that human beings were mimetic by nature
and that language was rooted in a mimetic instinct. He observed how eyewitnesses
literally “become mimetic of the things being narrated” (mimetikoi ginontai ton
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apangellomenon), and that good speakers naturally shape discourse to express the
qualities of the event (Halliwell, 294). Recent empirical studies indeed suggest that
people “become mimetic” of the situations they encounter through both spoken and
written discourse. These studies reveal how neural structures that preside over action
execution are similarly activated when reading or listening to action-related
sentences. Brain-imaging and fMRI studies show that when listening to sentences
describing actions performed with the mouth, hand, and foot, different sectors of the
premotor cortex in listeners’ brains are activated in ways that “correspond, though
only coarsely, with those active during the observation of hand, mouth, and foot
actions” (Gallese, “Intentional,” 139). In the recognition of emotions displayed by
others, “the sensorimotor system appears to support the reconstruction of what it
would feel like to be in a particular emotion, by means of simulation of the related
body state” (141). Intriguingly, this is accomplished to varying degrees not only by
seeing a physical performance but by hearing and reading language that conveys
action and emotion. The rule of propriety in rhetorical imitatio was meant to
maximize the effects of those features of communication that allowed for greater
audience identification.
This mimetico-affective “contagion,” which can now be mapped neurologically,
does not just allow for persuasion to occur; it is persuasion itself if you believe, as
Marilyn Cooper does, that “persuadability is not just the condition for rhetoric . . . it
is the condition for the existence of all actual entities, and thus that being is
rhetorical” (“Rhetorical Being,” 6). When mimesis is conceived in terms of expression,
not just representation, the role played by affectivity in communication links that
communication with our being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty tells us that the
“disclosure of an immanent or incipient significance in the living body extends . . . to
the whole sensible world, and our gaze, prompted by the experience of our own body,
will discover in all other ‘objects’ the miracle of expression” (PP 230). The cultural
ecologist David Abram, drawing on this intercorporeal dimension of expression in
Merleau-Point, points out how the actual sounds of words betray how language is “not
a purely mental phenomenon but a sensuous, bodily activity born of carnal reciprocity
and participation” with the surrounding landscape (82). The English words that
describe surging water – rush, splash, gush, wash – show how “our discourse has surely
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been influenced by many gestures, sounds, and rhythms” and suggest that language
“arises from the perceptual interplay between the body and the world” (82). In short,
its mimicry of the world, language expresses that world’s being along with our beingin-it.
The emphasis on rhetorical appropriateness as a means to enacting a felt
experience by re-enacting an “event” was one way the ancient rhetoricians sought to
harness this natural perceptual interplay for persuasive purposes. But imitatio’s rule
of propriety was also, as is the case with anything mimetic, a double-edged sword.
Because it sought to express events so that they came alive, so to speak, through
language, the school became increasingly associated with realism, an association we
see in the distinction Carruthers makes between mimesis and mneme (4). Although we
can appreciate how the law of propriety was often enforced to combat the stylistic
excesses and “artificiality” of that was encroaching on discourse through the increased
use of “written language” (479), we cannot ignore its resemblance to a sentiment
expressed centuries later by Thomas Sprat who, writing on behalf of the Royal Society,
longed for a scientific language that opposed the “[o]rnaments of speaking [that] . . .
Poets began of old to impose the deceit” and which would separate “the knowledge of
Nature, from the colours of Rhetoric” among other influences (qtd in Covino, 6, 63).
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Indeed, the ideologizing of “appropriateness” in language use can result in a narrowing
of the scope of its mimetic dimensions even when, paradoxically, it is in the service of
mimesis.
Still, we should not let our opinion of the formal “rules” exacted by ancient
rhetoricians obscure our awareness of that which the rules were meant to elicit.
Conceiving of imitatio in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is helpful in
recovering the enactive and embodies dimensions of mimetic expression in rhetoric.
Expression in language and literature, he tells us, brings “to life in an organism of
words . . . opening a new field or new dimension to our experience” (PhP, 212). This
meaning is only partly conceptual since it derives from a more “immanent” gestural
one which “presents thought as style, an affective value, a piece of existential
mimicry” (9). What he describes is an intentional feel, an embodied attunement to
situations whose significance or “meaning” is enacted in rhetoric in the moment of its
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recounting. At the heart of imitatio’s rhetorical project lies an awareness that
meaning is immanent in experience itself.

Embodied Repetitio: Binding the Body with the Mind
Although in rhetoric the Latin repetitio signifies a figure of speech that uses a certain
form of phrasal repetition (specifically anaphora and epanalepsis) to help make a
point compelling, repetition itself manifests itself in a variety of ways across the
rhetorical spectrum.21 As noted earlier, it is one of the three R’s that Debra Hawhee
identifies as the core of Sophistic rhetorical training. Like its sibling “imitation,” the
word “repetition” also has pejorative connotations because of its association with
mechanized rote performance. As we all know, so-called “rote learning” has been
largely criticized in educational fields as productive of mindless automatons who will
conform to and hence perpetuate the dominant status quo. But does repetition
deserve this reputation? It is notable that one of the first proponents of early
education, the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, taking a cue from Dionysius, stressed
that repetition sharpened memory but opposed this practice to rote imitation, which
he believed made people lazy.22 Perhaps we should have a phenomenological theory of
repetition to accompany the version of imitatio I present above, one that attends to
its embodied dimensions that hence might be called embodied repetitio. The Chilean
biologist Humberto Maturana picks up on these dimensions when warning educators
against devaluing the practice of repetition to an “avoidably boring routine behavior”
and thereby giving it “an additional significance that it does not deserve” (Poerksen,
27). Maturana recognizes that “even simple repetition” can improve understanding,
sharpen the vision, and produce new insight:
All of a sudden we find it easier to solve the equations before us; all at once
our muscles change after we have dropped the ball into the net a few hundred
times; our shots have become more precise. (27).
“Intelligence,” according to Maturana, “manifests itself in the possibility of varying
one’s behavior in a changing world” (31). The extent to which this intelligence is
bodily is revealed by his example of dropping a basketball into a net: the repeating of
an action changes the muscular exertion required to perform it, refining our
conceptual ability to tackle the equations we are faced with. Repetition builds up our
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experiential knowledge base and yokes it with conceptual thinking. Body and mind,
the physical and the mental, are one – an understanding not lost on ancient educators
of athletics, rhetoric, and other arts.
As an aspect of mimesis, what I am calling embodied repetitio was also not lost
of the rhetorician Kenneth Burke. For Burke, mimesis describes the “two way
relationship between the mental and the physical” that manifested itself in what he
called prayers – the “substantiation of an attitude in a bodily act” (Attitudes, 322).
“Any mimetic act,” he wrote, “is a prayer” and “all mimetic procedures, in the dance,
the plastic or graphic arts, music, and verbalization are aspects of ‘prayer’ . . . and
have a great deal to do with the building of character.” This is as much bodily as it is
mental in that “mimetic expression” is, in Burke’s view, a correspondence between
“visceral expression (in glandular and nervous actions)” and the “state of mind” in a
particular situation; one’s “attitude,” hence, emerges from this mental/bodily
correspondence (322). Recent studies by Harvard psychologist Amy Cuddy and her
associates23 provides some empirical support for Burke’s mimetic theory here. Cuddy
et al., reveal that the bodily adoption of nonverbal poses associated with social power
(or the lack thereof) triggers the hormonal release of testosterone and cortisol in both
men and women, impacting the endocrine system within just two minutes of making
such poses. In a widely popular TED Talk, Cuddy describes how the physiological
effects of adopting conventional “power poses” can help transform a person’s attitude
toward themselves and their immediate situations within minutes, and by repeating
such poses on a regular basis can alter their body chemistry in such a way that they
are able to adapt more easily to complex social situations. By imitating body language
associated with a culturally dominant or powerful stature and repeating those
imitations over and over, Cuddy says, one can “fake it until they become it.”
Consciously24 and quite simulating the bodily attitude (“praying”) that one wishes to
adopt dramatically transforms her mental self-conceptions and social behavior.
One might argue that “becoming” the kind of person whose postures and
attitudes are simulated is akin copying a predetermined formation. But, again, we
need to attend to the dual nature of mimesis: its familiar style ultimately expresses
something new, variations of a theme that can be transformative. Jane Bennett’s
reading of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notion of “mimicking the strata” of the
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Body without Organs (BwO) helps us here. Bennett describes the BwO as a
“multispecied and ongoing project of becoming in which new links are forged among
‘things, plants, animals, tools, people, power, and fragments of all of
these’”(Enchantment, 24). In its attempt to deterritorialize the space of the
“organism” – the dominant form of organization of bodily experience – BwO manifests
itself through disruption of its usual habits of posture, movement, facial expression,
voice, etc. These habits form the “strata” that organizes your body. To play the game
of becoming a body-without-organs is to twist and tweak those usual habits. (25)
One way to enact such a disruption, Bennett tells us, is to “mimic” the strata
by using “the organism as a model, but a model stretched by means of parody.” She
describes the method of this mimicry as placing “organism-strata alongside slightly
altered copies of them,” and then composing yourself in a way “that’s almost like your
usual way, but with a twist” that involves “repeat[ing] yourself but with a difference”
(26). Such a “meticulous relation” with the strata allows for “a temporary escape from
it,” resulting in a flight of the “very forces that form the body as organism” in the first
place (26). Transposed to real-world experience, this is not far from the conscious
method advocated by Cuddy in which a person “fakes” – in a sense, parodies – an
organizing model of power to the point of becoming it, but not necessarily to the point
of complete replication: “To become is not to achieve a final state of being,” Bennett
says of this practice, “it is to give more of a chance to that which rumbles in you, but
[which] you are not” (26). This which rumbles expresses itself through the conscious
imitation of organizing models and conscious repetition of habits.
In language evocative of the sound effect that were so important in the
practice of imitatio, Bennett places a high premium on the onomatopoeic words that
harbor “cries, moos, meows, buzzes, mutterances, laughter, etc,” since they
contribute to what she calls language’s sonority, the “spell-binding effects of stories
told aloud, the enchanting power of chants” which Bennett associates with mouth,
tongue, and body and reads as disruptive of the hegemony of meaning (155-6). Even
words whose sounds do not directly correspond to active occurrences in nature can,
through repetition, bring forth sonority. She cites Deleuze and Guattari’s observation
that children’s “well-skilled” repetition of words, even the phrase “end of the month”
which Kafka repeated incessantly as a child, releases languages sonorous dimension
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and distracts people from the meaning of what is being said by propelling them toward
other meanings, including “idiosyncratic associations and thoughts” (154).
Correspondingly, Merleau-Ponty claims that when a text is read to us, “provided it is
read with expression, the words fully occupy our minds,” fulfilling our expectations
and possessing us to such an extent that the “end of the speech or text will be the
lifting of a spell” (PhP, 208). It is not because of the representational quality of words
but, rather, the style – the sonority, the resonance – evoked by their articulation to
which readers and listeners are so attuned that they “reach back for the word as
[their] hand reaches toward the part of my body which is being pricked” (PhP, 210).
I have claimed more than once in this dissertation that mimesis is productive of
difference. I believe that repetition conceived mimetically as embodied repetitio
helps to support that claim. For instance, Gebauer and Wulf assert that an actor’s
repetition of pre-existing motor schemata embedded in the language of a script allows
him to constitute “something of his own, which must by no means correspond to prior
realizations of the schemata.” Similarly, the repetition of a gesture in a certain
situation “gives prominence to qualities that originally played no special role in the
action being imitated, qualities of time and space, of rhythm, of the execution of the
movement” (316-17). When an actor, for example, points skyward during a
performance, the pointing may resemble all other pointing gestures experienced
previously by both him and his audience but that particular pointing is nonetheless
expressive of meaning in that particular situation. In other words, this gesture, despite
its resemblance to all other instances of pointing, is nonetheless unique in it both
significance and circumstance. Similarly, the multimodality theorist Gunther Kress
shows how the production of difference through repetition can enhance learning in a
traditional science classroom. The teacher has drawn a diagram on a blackboard that
illustrates how blood circulates among organs in the human body. The general
mapping of the process represented by the diagram – which is what students record in
their notebooks – does not tell the whole story here. That story is told most fully when
the teacher “overlays” the diagram with a sequence of gestures which serves as a
“tangibly, mimetically witnessed movement of the blood from organ to organ . . . .
[that is] physiological felt by the onlookers, mimetically experienced in their bodies,
and then gone . . .” (86). Gesturally “restating” what is being shown visually and
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explained verbally, there is “a kind of repetition” that intriguingly “is not experienced
as a repetition” but which nonetheless “allows different students to engage with ‘the
same’ issue via routes which may be affectively, sensorially, or culturally more
congenial to them. At the same time it affords a fuller exploration of the topic at
issue” (169).
Clearly, we as educators need reconsider whatever assumptions we hold about
repetition and imitation and rediscover what the Greek and Roman pedagogues knew
well: that both are essential ingredients in learning and rhetorical performance. From
their perspective, to strive to be completely original in the composition of a text or
performance would be a futile attempt, pitting the rhetor not just against the
traditions in which he or she is composing but against the natural world to which we
are all mimetically connected. It is therefore important for scholars to continue the
recovery efforts of concepts and traditions that are marginalized or unduly
stereotyped by dominant paradigms. Doing so can enrich our own approaches to the
teaching of rhetoric and composition, as I hope the next section demonstrates.

Imitatio as a model for a “Mimetic Pedagogy” of Rhetoric
In his 2011 article “Mimesis, Duality, and Rhetorical Education,” Robert Terrill revives
imitatio as a rhetorical pedagogy – he calls it “mimetic pedagogy” – as a way to
cultivate a sense of engaged, articulate, resourceful, and sympathetic citizenship in
students. Of particular interest to Terrill is imitatio’s inherent duality, which he
believes can help to break the “third wall” of the rhetorical classroom, “producing an
interactive space in which the world outside the classroom necessarily impinges on the
education and practice within” (301). When one emulates the work of an exemplar, he
or she “tries on” another self and inhabits another’s point of view. This is not a
parroting of the language of another, he argues, so much as it is a dialogue with that
person and with that person’s world. Such a mimetic pedagogy is important because it
“fosters an understanding of the self as an inherently doubled product of the ongoing
dialogues that characterize a democratic culture” (310). In doing so, it disrupts
notions of transparency and authenticity associated with a “discourse of sincerity”
that Terrill believes emerges from the notion of a central self whose utterances
fundamentally adheres to a “real me” (299). Imitatio’s insistence that one does not
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produce facsimiles of, say, Demosthenes but instead speaks as effectively as
Demosthenes, ultimately aims to “sustain the otherness, the strangeness of the model,
maintaining the gap between student and model” which prevents the collapsing of one
into the other (303).
We see in Terrill’s description of imitatio many of the themes pointed out
above and in previous chapters - its dual-aspect, its potential disruptiveness, its
production of difference – and get an idea of their importance to the contemporary
classroom. But I think instructors who follow suit might want to point out to students
how mimetic pedagogy has its roots not in Greco-Roman rhetoric but, first and
foremost, in the experiential knowledge of the body and a learning process that
reaches back to our first years of life. Merleau-Ponty describes language acquisition as
a phenomenon of identification through role-playing: “To learn to speak is to learn to
play a series of roles, to assume a series of conducts or linguistic gestures” (CRO 109).
He notes evidence that if a child up to two years of age “does not have a linguistic
model to imitate” – as is the case with children reared in isolation – he or she will
never speak like those who grew up in environments where they could identify and
assimilate themselves to those around them (109). This role-playing that is essential to
our knowledge of others and hence of ourselves remains an important form of
identification throughout our lives. Imitatio simply formalizes this vital knowledge
work in the service of communication and civic engagement. Haskins believes that
Isocrates, Plato’s contemporary and pedagogical rival, emphasized the repetition and
recitation of epic poetry and other texts because he believed that “by identifying with
what fictional and historical characters say and do, a student grasps the repertoire of
social roles and the range of situations more fully than does a person who receives
lessons in moral philosophy without ‘living’ its principles” (21). Indeed, because
imitatio is open to the language of others – as Terrill puts it - it resists “discourses of
monologic sincerity with ways of speaking that acknowledge and deploy a doublevoiced multisperspectivism.” It also cultivates habits of mind given to repurposing by
inviting students to see themselves as enfolded in a culture that “constantly is being
remade through the discursive intermingling of past form and present circumstance”
(312).25
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Being able to identify the situation of multiple stakeholders through roleplaying, and then repurpose the discourses of those stakeholders, is vital to
understanding how to construct an effective argument. Bryan Garsten writes of how
Cicero, in De oratore, has the character Marcus Antonius (a great orator of the Roman
courts) describe his first meeting with a client prior to a legal case. He makes his
client respond to this opponent’s case, a process that involves playing three roles
[personas]: “my own, that of my adversary, and that of a juror” (qtd 161). By role
playing himself, Garston tells us, Cicero’s Antonius sharpens his sense of the best
argument to make by partially adopting the point of view of all parties in the dispute.
Doing so allows an orator not only to feel the emotions the he wants his jury members
to feel, but to emotionally identify with the client he is defending: “[W]e cannot,
even if we are defending total strangers, keep on regarding them as strangers” (qtd
161). Such identification with what Garsten calls, following Seyla Benhabib, “the
concrete other” (actual individuals, not “the generalized other”) does not stop with
the individuals but extends to their “concrete situations” – their histories, identities,
commitments, and needs (198). Persuasive rhetoric ultimately is concerned with the
latter, the contexts in which individuals are situated, and ultimately strive not to
change the minds of people (which many will resist anyway, p. 4) but rather influence
situations by “looking for deliberative pathways” through language and beginning their
argument “inside the framework these pathways provide” (141).
Again, the strategies formalized under the aegis of mimetic rhetoric are rooted
ultimately in the experiential knowledge our bodies are constantly in production of.
We do not consciously seek to identify with others because we think it will help us in
some way. As brain researchers are fond of saying, we are “wired” that way – and this
wiring may very well be the seat of the kind of innate rhetoricity at work in the
example Rickert gives of an individual joining a circle of people. The neuroscientist
Marcel Kinsbourne believes that “a core predisposition of the human brain to entrain”
with others generates natural persuasive capacities that all humans share. Adopting
shared rhythms of behavior at the largely unconscious level of human interaction is
“more innately compelling than reasoned argument in inducing two, or many, to adopt
the same point of view” (172). Although he does not use the term “rhetoric,” it is
precisely rhetoric that is at work in this phenomenon:
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Entraining is compelling for people generally. I suggest that when one entrains
in another’s point of view, one is half persuaded simply by doing so. Being
persuaded by the other is not just an exercise in assessing the merits of their
case. Rather, being persuaded is as much emotional as it is cognitive, and the
mere fact of entraining is a step toward accepting the other person’s point of
view. (170)26
In Chapter 5, I will argue for a broadening of rhetoric beyond persuasive
argumentation so that it attends to multiple facets of communication that
argumentative models rarely take account of. For now, though, it is worth conceiving
argument as an outgrowth of intersubjective and – first and foremost – intercorporeal
entrainment. At the basic level of experience, our bodies move in accordance with the
bodies it interacts with. This movement remains a vital force even when we “argue”
with people in social and academic contexts where conceptual knowledge plays a
constitutive role in communication. As the rhetorician John Gage puts it, arguments
engage our “ability to move into different positions,”27 including positions that may
not be the socially “acceptable” version so many of us initially adopt (here Terrill’s
point about imitatio’s disruptiveness resonates). Argument is more than debating for
the sake a winning a forensic contest by proving to audiences that your make the
strongest case. David Lynch, Diana George, and Marilyn Cooper value it as a “crucial
social responsibility . . . . that is not just a matter of winning or losing but a way to
connect with others which may lead to change, not only in the world but also in
ourselves” (84). Hence, “agonistic positioning” generated through argument is
simultaneously confrontational and cooperative (63). Debra Hawhee describes how in
ancient rhetoric agon was conceived as not just an actual space for competition for a
prize (a better term for which is athlios) since what matters is not the outcome but
the process that leads to it. As a space she calls the “shared between” (which in
ancient gymnasia literally infused athletic with rhetorical training), agon, for Sophists,
was what produced rhetoric as a “gathering” of cultural, bodily, and discursive forces
(40). Inhabiting this space required “a particular modality of knowledge production –
knowledge held and made by our bodies” (40, 43). In other words, it is experiential
knowledge work that produces the rhetoric in which our arguments are steeped.
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Re-envisioning argument as ultimately rooted in in-between spaces may sound
somewhat unorthodox but in fact is quite intuitive. When Scott Marratto, following
Merleau-Ponty, describes a “two-sidedness” to our perceptual experience where the
body is both subject and object (Marratto, 85), he is speaking to the potentiality that
cognition is fundamentally reflexive. This reflexivity requires us to attend to the
reversible relationships between our bodies and the situations they are enmeshed in.
Merleau-Ponty asserts that the actual experience he has of his own body “runs counter
to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other,”
turning the body into a conceptual thought or idea that suppresses the experience of
the body in reality (PhP, 231). On the other hand, “true reflection,” which is
generated from our material rootedness in things, makes Merleau-Ponty realize that “I
am an intersubjective field, not despite my body and historical situation, but . . . by
being this body and this situation, and through them, all the rest” (525).28 True
reflection occurs at the conjunction of body and mind and reveals our reflexive
relations with others.
Barbara Couture describes phenomenological reflection as a “perceptual state
of attention” and notes its importance to rhetors (as Cicero’s example illustrates) who
must attend “both to their particular experience of the world and to their process of
interacting with others in order to accommodate others’ perspectives on shared
phenomena” (114). She believes it is time for rhetoric to move beyond traditional
models of argumentation since they cannot teach us “how to accumulate, build, and
synthesize a worldview from the particular positions that it encourages us to hone and
defend” (111). I will come back to this point in Chapter 5. But for now I would like to
conclude by suggesting that students would indeed benefit from a more reflexive
approach to rhetorical engagement, one that stems from their own bodies-in-theworld even while that engagement is formalized by models bequeathed by textbooks
and tradition. Earlier in this chapter I described Richard Boyd’s call for students in
university composition courses to study the dangers of mimesis – using Rene Girard’s
theories as their framework – in order to resist the double-bind he sees David
Bartholomae’s advocacy of discourse mimicry of ensnaring them in. Perhaps it would
be worth introducing students as well to the other dimensions of mimesis that this
dissertation is most concerned with. I therefore believe that a multifaceted
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phenomenological account of “imitation” can help us think not only about how we and
our students might go about composing arguments, but how those arguments speak to
dimensions of our experiences we are so familiar with that we often do not recognize
that familiarity. Attuning students to what Merleau-Ponty terms the style inherent in
making arguments reveals a vast experiential dimension to rhetoric that few, if any,
would have ever considered “rhetorical.” This is wonderful way to enhance how
students think about rhetoric – by revealing how they experience it on a daily basis –
and one that can be profitably accomplished in classes informed by what I call mimetic
multimodality, which is the subject of my next chapter.
1

“Futurist Painting: Technical Manifesto,” April 11, 1910. Quoted in Halliwell, 370.
In an artful critique of a book about Ezra Pound published in New Yorker magazine’s website, Louis
Menand deconstructs what he calls “the Pound error,” revealing how the “It” in “Make It New” is the
“Old” from which Pound cannot extract himself: “A great deal of Pound’s poetry therefore takes the form
of translation, imitation, allusion, and quotation. He is trying to breathe life into a line of artistic and
intellectual accomplishment, but it is a line of his own invention—a ‘tradition’ that includes, among
others, John Adams, Confucius, Flaubert, the Provençal troubadours, and Benito Mussolini. Not, prima
facie, a canon. This means that to understand what Pound is doing you often need to have read the same
writers, studied the same languages, and learned the same history that Pound read, studied, and learned
(or rely on the commentary of a person who has).” (June 9, 2008.) Accessed: July 20, 2014.
Available: http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2008/06/09/080609crbo_books_menand?curre
ntPage=all
3
Quoted in Berman, 73. Hence, Berman tells us, Plato had to attack poetry, mimesis, and the whole
Homeric tradition that involved identification with other people and things and therefore, in Plato’s
view, the surrendering of one’s own identity.
4
“Excised” may be too strong a word here since Aristotle did recognize the strong pull of emotion in
persuasion. But pathos in rhetoric was seen as a means to an end, a specific kind of “appeal” in the
service of a larger argument whose main thrust should be accomplished through logos (logic, rational
appeal, and the stuff of theoretical knowledge that Aristotle prized most highly) and ethos (appeal by
way of character, a form of practical knowledge that Aristotle valued less than theoretical knowledge but
more than the productive knowledge of the arts, including mimesis and rhetoric itself).
5
You will notice that imitatio will always be italicized in this dissertationwhereas mimesis is not. I do this
mostly to distinguish it from instances when I use the visually similar imitation. Imitatio is the Latin
translation of mimesis and stands for a school that became dominant in rhetoric and aesthetics during the
Roman Empire and continued to exert force throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance as well.
6
Chris Drew describes the pedagogy of sophistic training as a form of experiential learning in “Sophistic
Training and Experiential Learning: A Methodology of Mind-Body Syncretism” (Pedagogy, 7:2, Spring 2007,
pp. 303-8)
7
In earlier drafts of this dissertation, in fact, metis played a significant conceptual role. I even called my
theoretical approach “mime[ti]sm,” a combination of metis and mimesis (here I played on the fact that in
the word “mimetism,” an alternative translation of mimesis, one can see the spelling of “metis”). My
research has convinced me that metis and mimesis are deeply related concepts and tracing the contours
of that relationship was one of my original ambitions. Alas, time constraints and other commitments as a
graduate student prevailed on me to narrow the scope of this project, so I reluctantly jettisoned metis
with the ambition of returning to its conjunction with mimesis and experiential knowledge in other
venues.
8
Where Couture wants to erase the dichotomy between competing truths, Stormer goes a step further,
diluting the essential humanity of rhetorical action which historically has been dependent on matter
imagined as exterior to who or what is acting: “the capacity to act rhetorically is not because we’re
human but because we are material” (226, “Encomium”).
2
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One major distinction that can be made between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty is that the latter puts by
far more emphasis on the body as a sensorimotor subject. In Heidegger, the body tends to be absorbed by
the “world” in which it dwells, and it is this world that is central to his phenomenological analysis; for
Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, the body is our “primary medium for having a world” and the body is
at the forefront of his phenomenology – which is a phenomenology of perception.
10
The philosopher Baruch Spinoza famously described natura naturnas as “nature naturing.”
11
Kennedy argues that rhetorical ingenuity derives from instincts of self-preservation and manifold
emotional reactions and is evident in the “cunning” observed in animals when faced with a threat or
seeking to gain an advantage (26).
12
Occasionally I use the term “rhetorics” to indicate that there are multiple forms of rhetoric to be
drawn from. Although I use rhetoric in the singular here, I do not believe there is one monolithic Material
Rhetoric. Rather, the term stands as a category for several rhetorical approaches that take as
foundational conditions of materiality. It is common in my field to use both phrases interchangeably.
13
Boyd’s language suggests that the “self” is a distinct entity against which mimetic models are posed – a
subject. Francisco Varela describes the “self” as “transient, non-localizable, relationally formed” and
describes Marvin Minksy’s argument (in his book Metropolis) that we should hold onto an essentialist idea
of an autonomous self in order to safeguard the conceptual foundation of ethical behavior as “utter
nonsense” and an “inane waffle” (Poerkson, 48). This “view of the mind of an ethical actor [as being]
anchored inside that individual contracts empirical data” which reveal that “the mind we ascribe to an
individual is . . . already of a collective, intersubjective nature” (47).
14
The concept of reversibility is complex in Merleau-Ponty but I will here provide one simple example.
When Merleau-Ponty touches his right hand with his left one, the body registers a “double sensation” that
briefly disrupts the ordering of experience into subject and object. Is the left hand that feels the touching
the “touched” or the “touching”? (PhP, 106). This kind of reversible relationship that the body knows well
and has learned to negotiate is central to a larger ontological concept he develops of “flesh,” the worldly
fabric or web in which all things are enmeshed. Hence, reversibility can be applied to many situations.
When a rhetor gives a rousing speech, she “touches” audiences while simultaneously being “touched”
back by their rousing responses. Hence the audience influences the rhetor just as much as she is
influencing them. The rhetorical situation is shaped significantly by rousingness, a product of reversibility
(or what I will call later reflexivity).
15
In ancient Greece, debate was considered a kind of sport. A popular form of debate, eris, can be
translated as “wrangling” or “strife.” The goal of such arguments was to defeat your opponent, to in a
sense “pin him down” as one would an opponent in wrestling. Protagoras was apparently quite interested
in the relationship between athletics and rhetoric. Hawhee tells us that there is an agonistic metaphor in
the treatise in which he famously declared “Man is the measure of all things,” kataballontes, which
suggests the act of throwing over, as in wrestling. In addition, he wrote a treatise translated as “On
Wrestling” (Peri Pales) “wherein he appears to have demonstrated how the art of rhetoric could be of use
in the art of wrestling” (36).
16
This rhetorical pedagogy embodied “two central concepts” – kairos and metis – “at the heart of which”
was the notion of bodily transformation (86): kairos represented the “nowness” of time that pervaded
repetition and the difference it produced in the encounter with the immediate; metis (and here Hawhee
references Empedocles) was the intelligence that emerged from the encounter with the immediate, an
encounter that was “more than perception – mind meets and (masters) matter,” but instead was a “bodily
production, a mutually constitutive struggle among bodies and surrounding forces” (145).
17
I am reminded here of what the rhetorical scholar Joseph Dunne refers to as the “unofficial” or second
kind of techne he finds in Aristotle (a version of techne that is also of great importance to Martin
Heidegger). Unlike the first or “official” version of techne associated with the “reason” of episteme that
conceives of a maker (technites) as hylomorphically imposing a form on matter (249, 251), this second
“unofficial” techne in Aristotle presents the technites as “intervening in a field of forces, or as immersing
himself in a medium” where the materials were in more or less in “capricious motion,” requiring the
maker to adopt a strategy that was less involved “in imposing a form on the material than in turning some
of the energy in the material to his own advantage” (254, 256). This required a responsiveness to, an
“outwitting” of, both matter and situation of the kind Hawhee identifies in wrestling which drew on the
practical intelligence of metis (256).
18
It is unclear from my source is these quotations are Quintillian’s or the sources Potolsky cites here:
Russell, D. A. and Winterbottom, M. (eds) Ancient Literacy Criticism: The Principal Texts in Translation,
Oxford UP: 1972
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19
“Longinus” is the name given to an unknown rhetorician who may have lived in the first or second
centuries A.D. Because one medieval copyist attributed his most famous work, On the Sublime, to
“Dionysius Longinus, “some scholars believe the work may have been written by Dionysius of
Halicarnassas. Another candidate is Cassius Longinus, a Hellenistic rhetorician.
20
William Covino suggests that underlying this desire was the same kind of “associational thinking” that
was central to the “magical composing imagination since antiquity” that they were eager to stamp out
(68). He provides as an example John Wilkin’s influential 1668 Essay Towards a Real Character and a
Philosophical Language, which called for a language in which “the Names of things might consist of such
sounds, as should bear in them some Analogy of their natures; and the Figure or Character of These
Names should bear some proper resemblance to those sounds. . . But how this can be done in all the
particular species of things, I understand not” (qtd in Covino, 67).
21
This statement can be found at the Repetitio entry at Brigham Young University’s impressive online
catalogue of the Western rhetorical tradition, Silva Rhetoricae (The Forest of Rhetoric). Accessed: June
29, 2014. Available: http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/R/repetitio.htm
22
See Russell, D. A. (2001). Quintilian: The Orator's Education, Books I through XII. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 323-7, Book X
23
Cuddy is listed as the second author (after Dana R. Carney and before Andy J. Yap) of the 2010 article
published in Psychological Science called “Power Poses: Brief Nonverbal Displays Affect Neuroendocrine
Levels and Risk Tolerance” (21:10), 1361-1368. She has popularized this theory. Her TED talk at
TEDGlobal 2012 currently ranks as the fifth most viewed video on the TED website (out of more than
1,600 talks), viewed by over 12 million people. This number, of course, does not include views of the
video on sites like YouTube. (http://blog.ted.com/2013/12/16/the-most-popular-20-ted-talks-2013/)
24
Burke’s likening of mimetic expression as secular prayer, like Cuddy’s power poses, operate largely in
the realm of conscious intentionality: one must consciously decide to adopt certain behaviors with the
purpose of succeeding in certain situations. Noting Burke’s “absolute faith in the power of reason” (33),
Davis turns to Sigmund Freud’s psychological theories, which reveal that “suggestive influence is less
rational, less manageable, less consciously correctable than Burke allows” (33; italics in original), and it is
in her reading of Freud that she draws on the concept of mimetico-affective contagion. While that may
indeed be true, we should not lose sight of how mimesis operates at all levels of human experience,
including the conceptual and “rational” levels of consciousness.
25
One excellent example of this is the writer Montaigne, whose Essays “quite specifically call on the
readers’ mimetic capabilities, without which the writings remain mute” (Gebauer and Wulf , 94). The
author weaves into his prose a wide variety of other texts, but he quotes falsely and disguises quotations
so that in both form and meaning they differ from the original meaning. The writing subject plays with his
readers, hiding from them, changing his position, melting into the context of the work itself so that
theme becomes a reference point for the author and vice versa; in other words, not only does he play
with previous texts but he plays with the reader as well to the point where it becomes difficult to
distinguish between the I that is the author and the I that is the theme as well (95). His essays, say
Gebauer and Wulf, offer a version of mimesis that “give rise to a new intertextuality” while
simultaneously conveying to readers a sense of their own relativity, the “relativity of the I” (98-9).
26
Kinsbourne notes how the patterns of limbic system activation at in a baby’s imitating of a parent’s
smile do not differ widely from those in the Heil Hitler! cheer and salute (171). Clearly, applications of
this theory to the practice of rhetoric need to attend to these ethical dimensions. Marilyn Cooper’s
neurophenomenological account of the emergence of rhetorical agency coded as responsible offers a
useful model. In her 2011 article “Rhetorical Agency and Emergent and Enacted,” Cooper describes
responsible rhetorical agency as an awareness by rhetors “that everyone acts out of their own space of
meaning and to affirm one’s own meaning as absolute truth is to negate the other person” (442). Being
responsible requires acknowledgement of and respect for the difference of “concrete others” with unique
dispositions that have been shaped by habitual patterns of experiences (432).
27
Quoted in Lynch, George, Cooper, “Agonistic Inquiry,” 69.
28
In a note he wrote to himself in December, 1960, on the draft of his last work, which was published in
its incomplete form after his untimely death five months later (and posthumously titled The Visible and
the Invisible), he described a phenomenon that clearly has a mimetic dimension. The “specular image,
memory, resemblance,” specifically the “resemblance between the thing and the thing-seen,” are
fundamental structures “that are immediately derived from the body-world relation.” He tells himself to
“[s]how that our whole expression and conceptualization of the mind is derived from the structures: for
example, reflection” (271).
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Chapter 4: Bodies as Media in Multimodal Ecologies
From Mimesis to Multimodality: Toward a Theory of Multimodal Rhetorical
Praxis
I have shown how mimesis, relieved of its conventional association with direct
reproduction, helps us conceive of our bodies’ immediate relationship with our
material as the basis of experiential knowledge work – a type of work that has been
historically marginalized. I have at times noted how this work is produced across
“multiple” sensory and perceptual modalities that are steeped in our sensory-motor
body schemas. In this chapter, I will develop this dimension of mimesis, arguing that,
at the primary level of the body, experiential knowledge is acquired multimodally. I
will therefore emphasize the cognitive dimensions of multimodality upon which our
communicative acts are based. As noted previously, in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com,
multimodality tends to emphasize how communicative modes – specifically writing,
speaking, and visual design – are shaped by what Gunther Kress calls the “socialsemiotic” forces of culture. While Kress, as I will show, does not ignore the body’s role
in the production of meaning, this emphasis on the social forces of semiosis ultimately
attends to how culture shapes communication. While knowledge of these forces is
vital to effective learning and communication, it does not quite capture the whole
story. We learn and communicate first and foremost at the affective level of bodily
engagement with the situations we inhabit. At this level, culture is not always the
primary shaping force of our knowledge work.
We might recall how Merleau-Ponty describes as mimetic the body’s sensorymotor apprehension of experiential data and its “translation” into meaningful action
(CRO 146). This primary level of perceptual apprehension gives rise to human
communication, and childhood sociability is generated “on the foundation of mimesis”
(154; emphasis his). What he describes as the “power” of mimesis manifests itself
through “sympathy” or, following Henri Wallon, “syncretic sociability” (124, 125-6). It
is the schematic operation which “translates” the smile, yawns, and other expressive
actions that “all have in common a certain style of action, a certain gestural meaning
that makes of the collection an already organized totality” (118; emphasis his).
Because global identification arises from a “coupling” – Merleau-Ponty cites Husserl
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here – between the body schema of the perceiver with the body schema of the
perceived, there arises a kind of attunement (a sense of the familiar, that “certain
style”) wherein “the other’s intentions somehow play across my body while my
intentions play across his” (118-119). These intercorporeal transactions which allow
for global identification and communication are not generated by a single perceptual
modality but through multiple ones: kinesthetic, introceptive, cenesthesic, tactile
(116-117). These perceptive modalities altogether enact the “world” in which we are
situated.
It makes sense, then, that the cognitive operation linking perception to action
and action to meaning that Merleau-Ponty identifies with mimesis is called
multimodality by Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff in their 2005 article on the role
of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. According to them,
multimodality is a key characteristic of the sensory-motor system in that an action
activates
circuitry across brain regions [that] links modalities, infusing each with
properties of others. The sensory-motor system of the brain is thus
“multimodal” rather than modular. Accordingly, language is inherently
multimodal in this sense, that is, it uses many modalities linked together –
touch, hearing, motor actions, and so on. . . . Language exploits the preexisting multimodal character of the sensory motor system. (2).
In other words, our communication practices, including language, are shaped by the
interaction of neuronal clusters activated through our own bodily interactions others,
generating the data of everyday experience. Significant segments of these clusters
form the mirror neuron system. This system is clearly mimetic in that neuronal
patterns activated when a person performs an action are simulated when the person
observes the same action performed by another or, more coarsely, even imagines that
action being performed. This multimodal system allows for embodied simulation that
is “automatic, unconscious, and noninferential in the observer of actions, emotions,
and sensations carried out and experienced by the observed” (131).
As also noted previously, like Merleau-Ponty, Gallese too relates his
interactionist, multimodal account of the development of human sociability to the
concept of mimesis. In “The Two Sides of Mimesis,” he contends that at the moment
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of birth “humans are engaged in interpersonal mimetic relations” that occur in a
shared “we-centric” space (11). These bodily “instantiations of unconscious mimesis”
(9) are rooted in the sensory-motor system whose root neuronal operation integrates
three modalities of human experience: doing, perceiving, and imagining. This
cognitive multimodal model subtends what I call the “Big Three” model that largely
conceives multimodality in terms of print, oral and visual composition. I should point
out that Gallese and Lakoff are not alone in proffering cognition as fundamentally
multimodal. Shaun Gallagher believes that perception is “intermodal from the start”
(Gallagher, 3) in that our vestibular, proprioceptive, and visual systems are integrated
through connections made by intermodal neurons, including mirror neurons (81);
activations in these neural regions correspond to meaning that is “simultaneously
shared in the modalities of observation (of others) and action capability (of my own)”
(128). What Anna Gibbs refers to as “cross-modal” translation between a mother’s
shimmy and her baby’s squeal is articulated by Gallagher as a “natural intermodal
coupling of self and other” that occurs immediately, experientially, because of the
innate visual-proprioceptive/sensory modal linkage (81, 82; emphasis his). Elsewhere,
Gallagher and Andrew N. Meltzoff contend that this coupling involves an innate
“supramodal perceptual system” that allows an infant to immediately recognize “a
structural equivalence between itself and the other person” that enables imitation
(Gallagher and Meltzoff, 223).1
Imitation as mimesis, mimesis as multimodal: this conceptual linkage that is
rooted in our everyday bodily engagement with the people and things of this world is
just beginning to seep into the predominantly social-semiotic account of multimodality
that in recent years has begun to inform pedagogical approaches to technical
communication and composition. In the pages that follow, I will attempt to broaden
the social-semiotic account of multimodality that has been pioneered by the theorist
Gunther Kress so that it takes into account the prereflective, tacit, pre-social
multimodal functions of the body schema. I am not, however, the first to attempt this.
At the 2013 Eighth Congress of European Research in Mathematics Education, Laurie D.
Edwards, Francesca Ferrara, and Ornella Robutti proposed a way of “synthesizing” the
term mode or modality in a way that is helpful for analyzing mathematical thinking.2
They argue that the integration of the neural multimodality of Gallese and Lakoff into
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the predominantly social-semiotic modes affords “a broader definition for modality
that . . . goes beyond the notion of semiotic mode, and synthesizes the sensory and
neurological meanings as well: modalities are the cultural, social and bodily resources
available for receiving, creating, and expressing meaning.”
I will take a similar route in the chapter. Working within the phenomenological
framework I have been constructing of mimesis, I will argue for a cognitive account of
multimodality as a means of balancing out the current cultural account, and I will
argue why this is pedagogically important. I will begin by revising the history of
pedagogical multimodality by going back more than three decades before the New
London Group popularized the term in 2000 to Robert McKim’s cognitive theory of
multimodal integration, a concept that informed a multimodal course he helped
develop for Mechanical Engineering students at Stanford University in the 1970s. I will
then take on the strong orientation toward digital technologies in current multimodal
pedagogy by arguing for an expanded concept of media – and hence of multimedia –
one that resists, in some pedagogical contexts at least, the recent call for a distinction
between multimodality and multimedia. I will argue that at the level of cognition, of
learning and inventing, the blurring of the boundaries between what are considered
modes with what are considered media can prove to be pedagogically compelling. I
will then consider how the work of Gunther Kress, despite its complex classification
system and emphasis on social and cultural semiotics, actually facilitates the
expansion of multimodality to include its cognitive dimensions – dimensions that he at
several points associates with the concept of mimesis. I will conclude this chapter with
a case study conducted in the late 1990s by two researchers in technical
communication, Christina Haas and Stephen Witte, which nicely demonstrates how the
cognitive account of mimetic multimodality I develop in this chapter can be applied to
real-world application. This final section will segue to the following chapter which will
be devoted entirely to pedagogical applications of this approach in the fields of RhetComp and Tech Com.

From a Communicative to a Cognitive Account of Multimodality
Although the term multimodality is supposed to reflect an increasing awareness that,
as Gunther Kress puts it, the focus on writing and written communication “has
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dampened the development of all kinds of human potentials . . . cognitively and
affectively” in traditional classroom environments (“Visual and Verbal,” 75), in
practice students rarely attend to the cognitive and affective dimensions of
multimodal composition. This could be due in part to the general textualization of the
term, one that emerges from a puzzling classification schema that appears in the
introduction to Multiliteraries: Literacy Learning and the Design of Social Futures, an
influential collection of pedagogical essays published by the New London Group (NLG)
in 2000. Editors Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis subdivide “meaning” into six modes:
linguistic, visual, audio, gestural, spatial, and multimodal. Of all these modes, they
tell us, “the Multimodal is the most significant, as it relates all the other modes in
quite remarkably dynamic relationships” (28). Despite this statement, I find it a little
odd that the multimodal is listed here as a separate category, one of the six, when in
fact it seems to be a key characteristic to meaning itself. Cope and Kalantzis
recognize this when they observe how in “a profound sense, all meaning-making is
Multimodal” (29). But when they break down the Multimodal into two categories –
hybridity and intertextuality – their focus shifts away from cognition to the resources
that are drawn on in the composition of “available designs” (30). Although they
recognize that people inhabit multiple lifeworlds, providing multiple layers to
everyone’s identity (17), and note how the human mind is embodied, situated, and
embedded in social, cultural, and material contexts (36), the metalanguage they
develop for rethinking and revising our literacy practices are meant to elaborate their
concept of Design, which has a production-heavy emphasis and, therefore, unduly
emphasizes the written, spoken, and visual media platforms that have the most
popular currency in contemporary culture. The NLG’s popularizing of the term
multimodality has had far-reaching effects. Not only have teachers across the K-16
spectrum begun to move away from the long-standing assumption that students should
be enculturated to a monolithic (and primarily linguistic) literacy, many educators are
designing assignments that appeal to multiple learning styles and incorporate
marginalized literacies into their curricula.
So considerable has the influence of the NLG been that the group is assumed to
have actually coined the word multimodality around 2000.3 But that is not quite the
case. In fact, as a pedagogical term, multimodality has a longer and largely forgotten
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history – one that dates back to at least 1972 when it showed up in Robert McKim’s
textbook Experiences in Visual Thinking. A professor of Mechanical Engineering at
Stanford University, McKim developed this text as part of a course he helped to create
a decade earlier that emphasized visual and kinesthetic properties of learning for
mechanical engineers. McKim’s course influenced the creation in 1988 of a similar
course, ME 313, then called “Ambidextrous Thinking,” which has since morphed into
“Human Values and Innovation in Design.”4 The 1988 course was created by Rolf A.
Faste, a pioneer in human-centered design, to meet the needs of incoming Masters
students in the programs of Mechanical Design, Manufacturing Systems Engineering and
Product Design, and it served as an introduction to “the unique spirit and tradition of
the Design Division of Stanford’s Mechanical Engineering Department” (Faste).5 Faste
credits McKim with the course name. McKim subscribed to the then popular theory
that the right and left sides of the brain served different primary functions, and that
creativity emerged from the brain’s integration of those functions. More importantly,
though, the course philosophy was informed by a commitment to the idea that
“[b]rain-body functioning should not be and [sic] issue of either/or but rather
both/and,”6 and the course was designed to break down the artificial boundaries that
separated the two. Students practiced rapid sketching and free-hand drawing for the
first two weeks of the class, and as the quarter progressed approached problemsolving using a variety of techniques that included improvisational drama, athletic
visualization techniques, story boarding, and mind mapping; they were even
introduced to subjects like lucid dreaming, theta-wave bio-feedback, yoga, the role of
posture, and even focused humming and jazz dancing. Most importantly, the course
sought to instill in students a complex awareness as well of how our brains and bodies
interact in the process of thinking and designing.
Although McKim does not label his entire pedagogy multimodal, he does use
that word to describe a memory retrieval technique that he likens to Marcel Proust’s
multisensory remembrance of past things, which resulted in the inspiration to write his
most famous novel (98).7 This technique requires an imagination that does not rely
solely on visual imagery. “In our culture, we unfortunately tend to repress much
sensory experience,” McKim writes. This is unfortunate since the “feelings that
accompany the nonvisual senses are particularly intense” (98). To illustrate for
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students how the body absorbs information about an experience that needs to be
recalled, he quotes the German Gestalt psychotherapist Fritz Perls, who tells us that
imagining or recalling something like a landscape “requires more than just visualizing
pictures”:
[Y]ou must do more. You must walk in, climb the trees, dig the rich brown
earth, smell the blossoms, sit on the shadowed grass, listen to the birds
singing, throw stones in the stream . . . This sensomotoric approach, especially
that of touching . . . will develop your sense of actuality and will bring about
that eidetic memory (identity of perception and visualization) which in dreams
themselves is always present. (qtd 98)
This multisensory recall – in many ways evocative of imitatio’s attempt to enact actual
events that could be experientially felt by audiences – McKim calls multimodal
assimilation: trying to bring to consciousness sensory experience that has been
acquired by the body and, in a sense, stored by the body’s unconscious memory (98).
These “sensory modes” are not static; they are constantly engaged in what McKim
calls operations of thinking that occur below the level of conscious awareness. These
operations are vital to how we learn, and yet
[w]hen thinking is taught in the classroom, conscious modes of thinking are
stressed and subconscious modes are rarely even mentioned, much less
encouraged. One purpose of this book is to point to this educational oversight,
and to suggest ways in which you can become aware of and utilize thinking that
occurs below the threshold of your normal waking consciousness. (4)
Writing nearly thirty years before the New London Group popularized the term in the
fields of literacy and composition studies, this professor of mechanical engineering at
Stanford University employs multimodality in ways that, I believe, is theoretically
richer than the New London Group’s. Where the NLG emphasizes a design account of
multimodality, one that attends mostly to the social and semiotic dimensions of
composing, McKim provides a more cognitive account that clearly attends to the
body’s role in the making of meaning that subtends our designing practices. His
account clearly puts him in the general range of Gallese and Lakoff’s description of
the cognitive operations of the sensory-motor subject and Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology of the perceptive, living body. Below I will develop this cognitive
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account of multimodality further by re-envisioning the relationship between modes
and media – and hence between multimodality and multimedia – within the framework
of mimesis.

Mimetic Modalities and Cognitive Multimedia Ecologies
One of the challenges I face in advancing a cognitive account of multimodality is the
widespread attribution of that word to digital technologies or multimedia. Clair Lauer
notes that in the field of rhetoric and composition, multimodality and multimedia “are
not only defined similarly, they are often used interchangeably” (229). Indeed, that
seems to be the case. In the first chapter of Multimodal Composition: Resources for
Teachers (2007) Pamela Takayoshi and Cynthia L. Selfe focus almost exclusively on
how our “communication modalities” – moving and still images, animations, sound,
color – are “increasingly depending on digital communication networks” and, hence,
require us “to make informed and conscious choices about the most effective modality
for communicating in particular rhetorical contexts” (9; italics in original). Of the five
reasons they give in support of the attention teachers must give to multimodal
composing, three are explicitly related to digital technologies and all five reflect
rhetorical approaches to the affordances these technologies offer us. Elsewhere, Selfe
argues for an expanded semiotic theory that goes beyond the privileging of print and
takes “advantage of multiple expressive modalities” enabled by video and audio
editing systems, conferencing software, electronic white boards, digital video
cameras, digital audio recorders and multimedia sites like MySpace and Facebook
(“Movement,” 637, 639).
While I agree that the new “digital composing environments” (Takayoshi and
Selfe, 1) are important spaces students should learn to communicate effectively in, in
this section I want to focus on how certain expressive modalities are enabled first and
foremost by the human body that is situated in these environments. One way to do so
is to integrate into the concept of multimedia the medium that is the body itself,
which Merleau-Ponty asserts is “our general medium for having a world” (PhP, 169).
Technologies play an important role here, but only insofar as their use corresponds to
the intentional acts of our bodies. We cannot separate, he tells us, the skilled organist
from the organ he has habituated himself to since “so direct a relation is established
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that the organist’s body and his instrument are merely the medium of this
relationship” (168). If it is true, as Gallese and Lakoff argue, that the sensory-motor
system of that organist’s body is multimodal, then “the medium of his relationship”
with his instrument must in some way be multiple. Hence, at the most fundamental
level of perception – at the level, that is, of mimesis – terms like multimodal and
multimedia are less distinct and easy to separate from each other. In this section I
consider the nexus between these two concepts, for it is from this overlap that their
difference inevitably springs.
While we are not accustomed to thinking of our bodies as a “platform” of
media, such an idea is not alien to the media theorist Jussi Parikka. In Parikka’s hands,
the term media is not limited solely to conventional technologies; rather, media “are
a contraction of forces of the world into specific resonating milieus: internal milieus
with their resonation, and external milieus affording their rhythms as part of that
resonation” (xiv). In other words, media is not a thing separate from the mediator,
and all acts of mediation resonate with the forces it both generates and is generated
from. In this configuration of the term, media bears a close relationship to phusis (see
Chapter 2) in that “we do not so much have media as we are media and of media”
(xxvii; emphasis his). Like animals who “live in and of media” in that their worlds are
“formed of the constant interactional sensing, movement, and memory of their
surroundings,” so too do we inhabit a media environment that “is constituted of our
ethological bodies interacting with bodies technological, political, and economic”
(xxvii). This conceptualization of media as a milieu or Umwelt in which we are bodily
enmeshed is not a far cry from Merleau-Ponty’s claim that each object we encounter –
his example is a fireplace – becomes integrated with our body schema in that it, too, is
a “system of equivalences not founded on the recognition of some law, but on the
experience of a bodily presence” (PhP, 215). Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty describes the
body as “a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of the world,” and objects,
technologies, nature are simply “an annex or prolongation of [the body]; they are
incrusted into its flesh . . . [and consequently] the world is made of the same stuff as
the body” (E&M, 163). Our intercorporeal attunement to our situations, our ability to
recognize and interact with the things we encounter, is enabled though our
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enmeshment in a network of forces that Aristotle and the Greeks called phusis and
Parrikka calls media.
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the actions generated through
our bodily engagement with the multiple “media” of our worlds occur through
mimesis. In Chapter 1, I describe the “great phantom” that Merleau-Ponty
appropriates in relation to Diderot’s mimetic theory of character development. To a
large extent, the actor develops a character by relying on a “special operation of a
prelogical character” (which seems similar to what McKim calls subconscious
operations) rather than through “conventional imitation” (EO, 50). He or she seeks to
imaginatively inhabit that character’s world and allow its sundry forces to materially
shape the character. Once developed, the character expresses not only a unique
identity but the world in which that identity is situated. This in a sense requires an
engagement through multiple sensory and communicative modalities with the “media”
that constitute that character’s subjectivity and world. Habits, vocal accents, attire,
stride – these identity markers that we all have do not emerge in the vacuum of a
solitary self. Like the power-poses I refer to in the previous chapter, the actor bodily
“fakes it until he or she becomes it.” To accomplish this, the actor does what the
brain-damaged veteran Schneider is unable to do due to his permanent injuries: enacts
a virtual meaning from the actual experience. That is, he or she generates action
through perception that becomes meaning. Because of the way our body schema is
structured in relation to both ourselves and the world, this “existential operation”8 is
something which we all do on a regular basis: “the actor’s art is therefore only an
extension of the art which we all possess,” the only difference being that for the actor
it is “a much more complex case of such an operation” (53, 52).
This “art” is simply what Gallese identifies as mimesis: an embodied simulation
of the multiple forces at play in the situations we enter and attune ourselves to. In
doing so, we in a sense “imitate” certain processes of phusis or what Parrikka calls
“the technics of nature.”9 This latter phrase, according to Parrikka, “refers to the way
in which it is not only humans who fabricate artifacts to establish relations with the
world; the whole of nature can be seen as a dynamic process of relations, perceptions,
durations, and cohabitations that is creative” (“New APPS Interview”). Just as nature
is not an “extension” of the human, neither are media. Rather, “media are extensions
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of a variety of affordances of nature: of different materials, of different ways of
sensing, thinking, memorizing” (“New”).10 Considered within this expanded view of
media, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the “intentionality which links our body to the
world” (53) might be thought of as an intercorporeal interface – one that is enabled
through mimesis and allows for what Anna Gibbs describes as mimetic communication
between our bodies and the world at all levels of experience: affective, productive,
conscious. Because mimesis “produces the virtual by enabling ensembles of these
disparate media,” Gibbs argues that the body “is not so much a medium as a series of
media, each of which connects in its own way with technological media, including
writing” (201).
A similar perspective of body-as-media / media-as-body has recently been
advanced as a pedagogical framework for multimodal composing. In the introduction
to their 2012 Composing (Media) = Composing (Embodiment), a collection of essays on
composition theory and multimodality, Kristin L. Arola and Anne Frances Wysocki
argue that the integrated disciplines of Rhetoric and Composition are currently trying
to work with “a historically situated—mediated—sense that we are fragmented
between a perceiving and a perceived body, between a potentially expressive
mediating body and a body that exists only in mediation by others” (13). Offering
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the body is one’s primary medium – “taking medium here
in its grounding sense of that which is between, in the middle” (3) – Arola and Wysocki
advance a view not unlike Parrikka’s: media should be thought of not as a carrier of
messages but as a living environment in which we are “always already embedded—
embodied—in mediation” (4). While this is a step forward for multimodal pedagogy, it
is also ironically a giant step backward in time to the Sophistic rhetorical training that
occurred in ancient Greek gymnasia. Let’s briefly revisit this ancient pedagogy within
the context of an entwined multimodal/multimedia theory to see how it can shape
contemporary approaches to multimodal pedagogy.

Multimodal/Multimedia Ecologies for Sensory-Motor Subjects
As described in Chapter 3, the Sophists who infiltrated the gymnasia of Athens at the
start of the Classical era conceived of the agon as both an actual place (a site of
contest) and a virtual space that produced rhetoric as a gathering of forces, cultural,
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bodily, and discursive (Hawhee, 16). Unlike the staid Academy later established by
Plato where students studied mathematics and contemplated (Plato’s) philosophy, the
gymnasia that became the classrooms of the Sophists were a “network of forces” (128)
in which young men engaged with multiple media – wrestling, rhetoric, music, and
other bodily arts – that engaged multiple perceptual modalities. “This network of
objects, people, and practices and their attendant sounds and smells,” Debra Hawhee
tells us, “comprised a distinctive material setting for a highly textured, bodily
pedagogy” (128). The rhetorical and athletic training was mediated through mimesis
(“mimetic learning happens through a relation with someone or something else, an
observation and repetition of another’s actions and practices” [148]) and the
“habituated practices” resulting from their overlap
likely produced a set of linked habits – the habits of discursive moves and
wrestling moves, the habits of competing, pushing, developing, responding –
linked if not in the mind, then certainly in the body. (128)
One is reminded of Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “habit has its abode neither in thought
nor in the objective body, but in the body as mediator of the world” (PP 167). It is
habituated knowledge gained by experience and not conceptual wisdom acquired
through study that allows the experienced organist to play a variety of different
organs; because his body has “incorporated” the relevant directions and dimensions of
the general instrument, he can settle into the organ “as one settles into a house”
(168). Such an understanding of experiential knowledge was not lost of Plato’s
contemporary (and rival) Isocrates, whose school of rhetoric sought to cultivate
practical wisdom (phronesis) in students through the mimetic pedagogy of ethismos,
“habituation” (Haskins, 16). Albeit in a more formal manner than his Sophistic
predecessors,11 Isocrates subscribed to the ancient pedagogy mousike – the
musicopoetic subjects Plato attempted to replace with philosophy – which refused to
separate the “twin arts” of gymnastics and philosophy; like body and mind, these two
educational disciplines were “parallel and complementary” (qtd in Haskins, 15). In
short, the body served as the primary medium for learning for the ancient Greeks;
learning was achieved through multiple experiential modalities which linked that
medium with the multiple media that constituted phusis;12 and that linking was
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enabled through a process of rhythmic, repetitive, responsive habituation that the
Greeks associated with mimesis (see Hawhee, 135, 148-151).
Although ostensibly designed to create a strong athletes, effective rhetors,
philosophical thinkers, and civic leaders, this training regimen seemed to position
young men13 not simple as “students.” In a larger sense, the knowledge-making
process exploited the fact that they were also sensorimotor subjects. I borrow this
term from Scott Marratto, who uses it to describe Merleau-Ponty’s description of
painters like Cezanne. As Marratto observes, Merleau-Ponty’s painter (as a
sensorimotor subject) is “autofigurative” in that he is “a kind of point of passage, or
translation, where all of the elements of the art of painting can come together,”
which is true of the subjectivity of perception in general (105). While the painter has
“resources” to draw on – cultural traditions, established styles, personal histories,
skills and techniques, materials like oils and brushes – he or she does not draw on them
“knowingly.” Rather, “the know-how arises from within the sensorimotor dynamics of
the activity” itself, generated less by knowledge than by expressive movement (104).
In this sense painting does not reproduce what the painter sees or even the subjective
experience of seeing; instead it expresses the “voice” of things, it is, as Merleau-Ponty
puts it, “the language of the thing itself that springs from its configuration” (qtd 104).
There is clearly an overlap here of perceptual and sensory modalities with the various
media afforded by the activity of painting. The medium of the painting intersects with
the medium of the sensorimotor subject that itself intersects with the medium of each
of the resources drawn upon. The sensory mode of seeing intersects with those of
hearing and listening; the communicative medium of speaking, of language, intersects
with that of painting; the conscious or conceptual mode arising from the act of
painting intersects with the largely unconscious mode that is the action of painting
itself; and, of course, the body schema of the painter intersects with the larger
corporeal schema of the situation and thence of the world.
When Isocrates writes of how the ancient teachers invented and bequeathed an
education made up of “twin arts – parallel and complementary” – philosophy and
gymnastics (qtd in Haskins, 15) – he is pointing to an underlying philosophy of mind
that might also be called a philosophy of body. What we some call “higher-level
thinking” is not (meta)physically divorced from bodily action. Multiple perceptual and
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cognitive modalities are engaged with multiple expressive and communicative media.
At the base of all this is the correspondence between perception and motility that
generates an original motor response in the sensorimotor subject, what Merleau-Ponty
calls mimesis. This “correspondence” should not, however, be conceived as a
transmission, as if perception “signals” motility to combine with it to produce action.
It is better to think of this process as a dynamic interface – one that is multimodal or
even intermodal14 -- that is always-already engaged in the generation of phenomena.
Merleau-Ponty believed that perception is originally synaesthetic but that scientific
knowledge has made us “unlearn” how we really see, hear, speak, and feel by dividing
the senses into separate modalities (see Marratto, 69). Indeed, studies of macaque
monkeys reveal that mirror neurons fire not only at the sight of an action but at the
sound of it, enabling a “multimodal representation of action this is not linked to the
visual channel only” (Iacoboni, 92). Studies in transcranial magnetic stimulation, or
TMS, similarly reveal that the tongue muscles in human subjects listening to a speech
were more excited by words that required strong tongue movements to pronounce
than by words that were less strenuous to pronounce (92).
Clearly, mimetic identification is not something that you can control by
banning wayward performers and rhetors from an orderly society; it is a bodily and
neurological operation enabled by what Gallese and Lakoff call “multimodal
integration”: “sensory modalities15 like vision, touch, hearing and so on are actually
integrated with each other and with motor control and planning” (5). David McNeill, a
researcher in psycholinguistics at the University of Chicago, offers a similar model (and
one that nicely complements Merleau-Ponty’s claim that speech is primarily gestural),
theorizing that speech and gesture arise through the interaction of opposite
neurological operations and dialectically “co-occur” as two modes of representation
(imagistic and linguistic) that blend together as one. 16 Like the painter, we are all
sensorimotor subjects whose multimodal body schemas are linked – interfaced – with
multimedia ecologies to which we attune ourselves whenever we perform an action,
including those with the explicit purpose of communicating with others. At some level,
the ancient Greek teachers seemed to understand that conceptual thinking was best
achieved through body-engaged experiential learning practices.
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The Affective and Synaesthetic Modes of Mimetic Cognition
Examining the role of experiential knowledge work in learning and communication
requires that we look at past practices – ancient Greek education, imitatio, etc. – and
recover those experiential dimensions that have been marginalized through the
development of theories that have privileged conceptualism. But we also need to look
at more recent theories – many of which provide us with the tools that make recovery
efforts possible. One theory of importance here is affect. Like the concept of mimesis
that I have been developing throughout this dissertation, affect places emphasis on
bodily experience and how knowledge is constituted experientially through our
material interactions with people and things. In the next section, I show how affect
plays itself out in the multimodal pedagogy of Gunther Kress. Here, though, I would
like to provide a context for how affect relates to mimesis.
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Mark Hansen, a theorist of media and technology
who draws on phenomenology and cognitive science in his work, argues for a
movement away from discursive theories he calls “epistemological embodiment” to
more materialist theories he designates as “phenomenological embodiment” (27).
Such a shift should be accompanied by a philosophy of mind informed less by semiosis
than by mimesis – specifically the “corporeal mimesis” he derives from Walter
Benjamin’s mimetic theory (also discussed in Chapter 2). Hansen discerns in
Benjamin’s description of the poet Baudelaire how the cultivation of a “tactile
unconscious” allows for “bodily attunement” that allows him to absorb the “shocks” of
everyday living without recourse to conscious processing (Embodying, 248). This
attunement “transforms the poet’s body into a medium,” and this corporeal
engagement with the material space of his immediate situation channels “the energy
of shock into mimetic, psychologically rooted creative activity” (249). Elsewhere
Hansen turns toward Brian Massumi’s affect theory as way of illustrating how bioart –
something I will come back to in the next chapter – affords all of us who engage with
such exhibits the opportunity to absorb similar kinds of “shocks” Baudelaire was
apparently so adept of absorbing. In such exhibits, what we often “see” cannot quite
be fully articulated in terms of the visual experience alone. That is because
[a]ffectivity becomes the very medium of the interface with the image. What
this means is that affectivity actualizes the potential of the image at the same
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time as it virtualizes the body: the crucial element is neither image or body
alone, but the dynamical interaction between them. (New Philosophy, 130).
As we will recall, this interaction between actual and virtual is denied to the braindamaged veteran Schneider who cannot, as Merleau-Ponty shows in his Phenomenology
of Perception, immediately engage in the kind of “normal imitation” we all do
naturally when asked to perform even a simple task like a salute. That is, he cannot
apparently interface his sensory-motor system with a consciously evoked image of an
act he himself had performed automatically countless times. His injury has resulted in
the loss of a capacity to synthesize perceptions into a synaesthetic whole.
The division of our sensory perceptions into the Big Five – sight, smell, hearing,
taste, and touch -- has contributed to an impression that our sensorimotor system can
be empirically divided into parts and processes that “work together” while also being
distinct.17 Models like this one are helpful in developing conceptual knowledge
necessary for scientific research of the kind that has, for example, resulted in the
expansion of the life spans of humans in developed societies. But when the body is
rendered as an object, which is often the case in scientific discourses, the vital
experiential dimensions are often collapsed. Affect theory not only puts those
dimensions front and center, it revitalizes the body as a subject while interrogating
the clinical models that objectify it. Hansen notes how Massumi manages to
encompass “all the sensory modalities of bodily life” by simply broadening “vision –
the perceptual sense associated exclusively with “sight” – so that it more closely
reflects the fundamental synaesthetic operation of perception itself (New Philosophy,
110). In Massumi’s account, “optical vision derives from proprioceptive and tactile
‘vision’” (110). In this synaesthetic sense, we “see” with our bodies and not just with
our eyes.
While hard to conceptualize within the predominantly empirical framework
that has informed the curricula of the educational system we have grown up in, we
actually experience this phenomenon every waking moment of our lives. Some people
like Daniel Kish, a nonsighted man who developed a system of echolocation which
allows him to “see” as he rides his bike and walks the crowded streets of Long Beach,
California,18 actually inhabit a world in which a synaesthetic account of multiple and
overlapping senses is more applicable than the Big Five model in which the separate
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senses simply “work together.” Kish serves as a fine example of Hansen’s claim that
“affectivity infiltrates perception in a way that renders the latter . . . bodily and that
reveals the full richness – the multimodality or, as we might say, high bandwidth – of
embodied perception” (New Philosophy, 227). It is not uncommon to think of Kish’s
development of a sophisticated echolocation system as an extraordinary feat by a
gifted individual, or to consider the experiences of actual synaesthetes a neurological
disorder or “condition.” But I think it is more helpful to consider these occurrences
not as anomalies but as exemplifications of an innate skills-set we all have – namely,
the capacity to simultaneously experience multiple media multimodally. In the case of
Kish and many others, a particular disability simply creates conditions for the finetuning of an ability inherent in us all. We need to extend this logic to the pedagogical
realm.
While it may indeed be helpful for students to distinguish, as Clair Lauer
does,19 between multimedia and multimodality in production-based contexts, in
process-based contexts where cognition is understood as embodied, extended, and
situated, students would benefit from an understanding of the two as fundamentally
interrelated at levels we only become conscious of under rare or remarkable
circumstances. As I have pointed out repeatedly in this dissertation, such thinking,
while unconventional, is certainly not new. It is also reflective of significant recent
currents in scientific and philosophical thinking which seeks to move beyond
subject/object dualism by attending to the relationality of things. Being able to
discern, say, form from content can be helpful in creating useful ways to think about
doing something; but an overemphasis on the distinction can impoverish how we
experience the things we do and limit the ways we do them. Merleau-Ponty tells us
that form and content cannot exist separately from each other, that what is presented
cannot exist separately from the way it is presented (WP, 72, 75). Similarly, the
cognitive psychologist David McNiell tells us that the meaning of something being
spoken about by a person may not be fully “realized” until the final moment in which
it is expressed since that moment results from a synthesis of speech and gesture. “This
is an act of communication,” he notes, “but also of thought” (246). Both are
multidimensional since some dimensions of thought are presented in gesture (this need
not be a literal gesture but a kinesic form, an internal “growth point” or rough mental
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from which an actual gesture arises) while others are presented linguistically (246).
Observations such as these should inform our approaches to teaching multimodal
composing in the classroom, the subject of my next chapter. For now, though, I would
like to provide one example of how the form of cognition I am describing here – one
that is mimetic and multimodal – can be discerned in the problem-solving thinking of
an important thinker: the 20th century physicist Albert Einstein. Need to come back to
affect.

Albert Einstein: Multimodal “Sympathy” and the Materiality of Conceptual
Thought
As I hope I have made clear by now, at the fundamental level of cognition the media
that constitute our communicative acts cannot be separated from our perceptual
modalities in the enactment of meaning. Mimesis provides a useful framework in
which to conceive this relatively complex concept. We should recall how it is from the
“foundation of mimesis” that Merleau-Ponty believes the “system me-and-other”
emerges and manifests itself through sympathetic behavior (CRO 124, 125-6). Indeed,
as Eric A. Havelock points out, the early uses of the term in Greek culture “refers to
‘sympathetic behavior,’ not to abstract copying or imitation, and in great many cases
this behaviour is physical, a matter of speech, gesture, gait, dress, and the like” (qtd
in Haskins, 10). This behavior that resulted in the contagion of sumpaschein,20 of
course, was a manifestation of a way of thinking. This is what probably so alarmed
Plato since it ran contrary to his commitment to epistemic knowledge that could only
be acquired conceptually through rational analytic reflection. But the body’s
expressive insistence on playing a major role in the making of meaning can never be
completely repressed. Albert Einstein wrote of how he liked to be “sympathetically in
touch with experience” when thinking about phenomena (qtd in John-Steiner,
Notebooks, 16-17) and in his famous letter to Jacques Hadamard described the
important role visual and kinesthetic imagination played in his extremely abstract
conceptualizations:
The words of a language, as they are written and spoken, do not seem to play
any role in my mechanism of thought. The . . . 21 entities which seem to serve
as elements of thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which
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can be voluntarily reproduced and combined. . . . The above mentioned
elements are, in my case, of visual and some of muscular type. Conventional
words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously in a secondary stage,
when the above mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can
be reproduced at will” (qtd in McKim, 11)
It is remarkable to hear from so abstract a thinker as Einstein that certain of his
“elements of thought” were not only of a visual but a “muscular” type. Vera JohnStiener calls such polysensory thinking that is related to muscular movement “enactive
representation” (Notebooks, 16) and in studies of the notebooks and other material of
pioneering scientific thinkers reveals that Einstein was not alone in his reliance on
kinesthetic and visual modes of thought. Elsewhere she notes how many 20th century
physicists relied on “diverse modes of thought” (multimodality) and sought out
“multiple representational modes” (multimedia) in the midst of a major paradigm
shift (Creative Collaboration, 45). She cites Vivian Gornink’s observation that
“[w]hatever a scientist is doing – reading, cooking, talking, playing – science thoughts
are always there at the end of the mind” (qtd in Notebooks, 203). Often what Gornink
calls the “crucial flash of insight” that so many scientists and other thinkers report as
groundbreaking moments in their thinking emerge from the unconscious periphery and
not from the focal point one’s conscious mind is set to. This periphery is not some
purely mental space; it is generated by the body’s engagement with the very real,
very material world in which it is acting.
For example, after much mental deliberation concerning the paradoxes that
emerged when trying to theorize the velocity of light as it traveled through space,
Einstein reached his solution not by working out equations on a chalk board but by
simply glancing at the famous clock tower in Bern, Switzerland, while riding in a street
car one evening. “A storm broke loose in my mind,” he wrote later, which caused him
to replicate the situation as he perceived it at that moment by imagining a number of
clocks ticking in different locations in space – a dynamic image that paralleled time
with space and quickly led him to the theory of relativity.22 Prior to this flash of
insight, Einstein had considered the time/space conundrum in various ways. Working
through complex mathematic equations was one of them. But as he would later write,
“the germ of the paradox of the special relativity theory” that suddenly sprouted in
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the trolley car that evening was actually embedded in an image he visualized of
himself riding through space astride a light wave and looking back at the wave next to
him (John-Steiner, Notebooks, 85)23 This virtual representation Einstein had imagined
using the material of daily life (riding a vehicle astride another object) only attained
its full significance in the moment when he was actually riding a vehicle and paying
attention to the objects it passed (like a light beam) and which included Bern’s nowfamous town clock.
Such mimetic reciprocity between the conceptual/virtual and the
experiential/actual that Schneider’s brain injury had blocked was a major force of
Einstein’s intellectual processes. Gebauer and Wulf assert that “the often unconscious
blend of doing and knowing found in mimesis designates a particular type of thinking
or a faculty, which fuses the practical and technical skills we gain through experience
with our theoretical abilities to recognize and evaluate” (3). As a result, the concept
of mimesis
implies a resistance to splitting the human spheres of experience, action, and
symbolic production into two parts, one practical and the other theoretical. . .
. The history of mimesis as a whole makes reference to the mutual
interpenetration of spheres, to a nonrecognition of the split, to symbolically
constituted worlds (3).
A mimetic approach to multimodality, then, would resist its absolute distinction from
multimedia – at least in certain contexts, most notable those that attend to the
cognitive dimensions of doing and knowing, or experience, action, and symbolic
production. It is striking then, how students in university classrooms continue to learn
static forms rather than the variety of ways such forms become realized by those who
helped create them. How many students in the science, for instance, know what
E=mc2 means but not how E=mc2 was arrived at? This disconnect between conceptual
knowledge and experiential knowledge has impoverished education for too long.
We need to bring to the forefront of students’ awareness the interface that we
all cognitively and bodily have with the world we are enmeshed in, the situations we
move through, and the things we interact with. In the last chapter, I showed how
recent theories concerning the materiality of rhetoric are moving the field in a
direction that allows for a broader account of rhetoric – one that places greater
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emphasis on the experiential dimensions of thinking and communicating. This is
important for composition and technical communication since a largely transmissionbased, conceptual version of rhetoric informs so many writing and communication
programs. Changing how we think about and teach rhetoric, however, is not enough.
As I have been arguing, we need to rethink standard versions of multimodality since
multimodal composing is becoming increasingly popular in these programs. I now turn
to the work of the renowned theorist Gunther Kress, whose work in multimodality
never strays too far from the world in which we all compose and communicate.

The Role of Mimesis in Gunther Kress’s Pedagogical Multimodality
Anyone who writes about multimodal pedagogy cannot ignore the work of the
pioneering figure Gunther Kress, currently a professor of semiotics and education at
the University of London’s Institute of Education. While a complex thinker, Kress’s
advocacy of the need for educators of all disciplines to adopt a multimodal approach
to teaching and learning is based on some fairly simple observations. For example, in
an essay published in the 1998 collection Page to Screen in Kress compares a page
from a 1936 science textbook to one from a 1988 textbook, rightly pointing out that in
the older textbook the “major meaning was carried by language alone” while in the
more recent one “the main meaning is carried by the images” (64). While his
conclusion that the older book “was read from beginning to end” whereas the new one
“is not read at all, it is used” (65-6) is an assumption (the new book may indeed be
read from beginning to end and the older one may indeed have been used in certain
contexts), his observation certainly points out an important historical shift in
convention that is central to his point that visual modes of representation in modern
Western societies can no longer be thought of as mere supplements to print texts.24
Observations such as this one have resonated widely with compositionists who are now
integrating visual rhetoric into their writing classes.
Less known by compositionists, however, and hence less resonant in the
discipline, is his observation that since “the body is coming to be used as a medium of
communication, so aspects of bodily motion are increasingly used as modes of
representation and communication” (58). Although sometimes limited by a tendency
at to treat that body as the sole site of agency, as if it were disconnected from the
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situation in which it is moving, 25 Kress nonetheless moves us in an important direction
with this remark – and in this section I will trace the contours of that direction within
the theoretical framework I have developed thus far in this chapter. I should note,
though, that his nearly trademark emphasis on the “social-semiotic” dimensions of
modes/modalities tends to privilege culture as a monolithic force in the production of
meaning. While he acknowledges that “material qualities” inhere in material
substances, once that material is appropriated by a culture those qualities “become
part of the cultural and semiotic resources of that culture and [are] available for use
in the making of signs” (Multimodal, 69, 111). A theorist like Bruna Latour might point
out that this conventional notion of what constitutes the “social”26 tends to
instrumentalize nonhuman actants, transforming them into available resources (what
Heidegger called bestand or standing reserve) for their “use” by humans.
As a result of this conceptual tendency, along with his development of an
extremely complicated classification scheme that would make tough reading even for
Aristotle, Kress offers definitions of key terms that seriously limit their “use” in
discussions of multimodality that do not conform to their designated locations within
his complex framework. One key term, mode, is defined by Kress as “a socially shaped
and culturally given semiotic resource for making meaning”; food, clothing, furniture,
and so on, all have meaning “due to their social making . . . and the regularity of their
use in social life” (Social-Semiotic, 79). Media, on the other hand, he defines as “the
material resources used in the production of semiotic products and events, including
their tools and the materials used” (Multimodal, 22). A medium is a thing “separate”
from a mode even though in “design and production, they are hard to separate” (6-7).
Although he insists that “media are socially formed,” he recognizes that “the fact of
their existence can be considered pre-semiotic”; however, culture usurps these since
“certain of their pre-semiotic characteristics will place constraints on their semiotic
potential” once they are transformed or “socially (re)produced” (69). Kress’s tenuous
distinction between modes and media often collapses in his repeated attempts to
define and illustrate them – he describes both, for instance, as “resources” – and the
time and space he devotes to qualifying these definitions testifies that he is aware of
an underlying ambiguity. While making for a difficult read, this ambiguity nevertheless
provides an entrée to a richer understanding of how multimodality is inextricably
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woven into the multiple media from which it can only be separated within certain
well-defined contexts.27 That entrée is widened considerably with reference to
mimesis.
Fortunately, I do not need to spend much time here developing the connection
between mimesis and multimodality in Kress since he does that himself. As noted
previously, in his 2010 book Multimodality: A Social-Semiotic Approach to
Contemporary Communication, Kress credits the anthropological scholarship of
Christophe Wulf and “his work on mimesis, in particular” as pushing him to become
clearer in his own interests in meaning and learning, “especially in relation to ‘the
body’” (iv). In an interview at Florida State University in 2012, Kress said that we
need to “extend the notion of mimesis” so that “we can understand a whole range of
ways that humans instantiate knowledge,” specifically in how tacit knowledge at play
in our “engagement with the world and the transforming and shaping of one’s
identity.”28 Clearly Kress is aware not only of recent recovery and revisionist work
about mimesis but also its relevance to multimodal theory and pedagogy. Not only
does his description of mode as answering the question “How is the world represented
and how do I aptly represent the things I want to represent in this environment?” (114)
place mode squarely within the realm of mimesis (if we adhere to the conventional
association of mimesis with representation), his emphasis on the materiality of modes
(in order “to move away from abstractions” like the “linguistic system” and
“grammar” so that we can more profitably “link the means of representation with the
bodilyness of humans . . . and the possibility of seeing meaning as embodied . . .”
[83]) nicely approximates the account of mimesis I have been developing here. Finally,
Kress’s increasingly expanding theory of semiosis as “forms of meaning-making which
are founded as much on the physiology of humans as bodily beings” as they are on the
“meaning potentials of the materials drawn into culturally produced semiosis”
(Multimodal Discourse, 28) contributes the kind of balancing act I am trying to pose –
via mimesis interpreted phenomenologically – between conceptual and experiential
knowledges.
In the last chapter I referenced Kress’s example of mimesis in how repetition
operates gesturally in a science classroom. The teacher has drawn a diagram on a
blackboard that illustrates how blood circulates among organs in the human body.
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When the teacher “overlays” the diagram with a sequence of gestures in explaining
the process, he enacts a “tangibly, mimetically witnessed movement of the blood from
organ to organ . . . . [that is] physiological felt by the onlookers, mimetically
experienced in their bodies, and then gone . . .” (Social Semiotic, 86). This mimetic
moment is enacted multimodally and mediated by multiple media. The visual, verbal,
and gestural components of the explanation altogether allows for “different students
to engage with ‘the same’ issue via routes [i.e., media] which may be affectively,
sensorially, or culturally more congenial to them. At the same time it affords a fuller
exploration of the topic at issue” (169). From a neuroscientific point of view, the
gestural dimensions of the teacher’s explanation are simulated neurologically by
students’ mirror neuron systems; Kress tells us that such physiologically felt moments,
mimetically experienced through the bodies of students, are also of significant
educational value. But it is not so much what the teacher says or what the diagram
illustrates that matters here. It is the style in which the information is conveyed that
facilitates learning – a facilitation that occurs unconsciously at that bodily level of
learning Kress helpfully associates with affect. Communication is not only conscious. In
a world that is “mediated and made accessible through the semiotic categories that
culture provides,” Kress asserts, “[a]ffect is inevitably part of such a mediation; it
must have a central place in the theory of meaning,” and doing so requires us to
“erase the boundary between affect and cognition in this frame” (Social Semiotic,
109; italics in the original). It is this type of experiential learning is what McKim and
his colleagues at Stanford University sought to attune students to through their
innovative approaches to learning that resulted in the ME 313 “Ambidextrous
Thinking.”
I believe that an expanded cognitive account of multimodality – enabled in this
dissertation through the conceptual lens of mimesis – can explicitly integrate
experiential learning and knowledge into the rhetorical pedagogy that informs so many
programs in composition, technical and professional communication, and in
communication generally. Nathan Rivers, a scholar who advocates more collaboration
between the fields of technical communication and the cognitive sciences, offers one
example of how to do this by defining a rhetorical situation as “any moment of mind
extension, of augmenting human cognition artifactually and environmentally” (422).
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Affect, Kress suggests, seems to enable the extension of cognition in such situations. A
multimodal project such as a museum exhibit, he tells us, must attend to affect if it is
to rhetorically engage viewers. Because “rhetoric goes to the initial conception of the
exhibition and from there to the overall ‘shaping of the exhibition” in terms of the
multiple media29 employed – objects, lighting, captions, space – “the question of
affect has to be addressed in the case of the exhibition: the wrong affect will ‘turn
off’ potential visitors” (Social Semiotic, 177). What the exhibition designers must tune
into consciously we are all attuned to unconsciously in our daily activities. Paul Prior
and Jody Shipka, noting theories developed by the Vygotsky school, 30 observe that
when we sit at a table that table’s “meaning” is never singular; for each table we
encounter we “sense” its multiple referents, metaphorical extensions, and individual
subjective versions – warmth, family conflict, etiquette, and so on – and we
unconsciously situate ourselves into those which are (rhetorically) appropriate to each
specific situation. This “sense,” which I see as mimetic, they describe as a
“chronotopic31 interface of the embodied and representational, the social and the
personal” (208-9). As I will discuss at some length in the next chapter, our learning
and communication practices can be greatly enhanced by cultivating an awareness of
the situations we mimetically interface with as fundamentally rhetorical.
As noted above, Kress’s social-semiotic definition of mode would present more
difficulty if Kress himself did not provide the opportunity to move beyond that
classification. Fortunately, across the corpus of his work he provides many of such
opportunities. Clearly, affect is one of them. But a semiotic mode also offers many
affordances,32 allowing for the “linking” of entities – “humans with humans, with
places, objects; objects with processes; processes linked with processes” – many of
which “involve reciprocal actions between the participants” (119). Although linked
events, objects, and phenomena only take on full semiotic significance “as a result of
social decisions and judgements” (120), his awareness of their affordances certainly
takes into account “a whole range of ways that humans instantiate knowledge,”
including bodily knowledge obtained mimetically through one’s “engagement with the
world and the transforming and shaping of one’s identity.”33 The human experience
with the mode of color, for example, certainly offers “semiotic possibilities of a
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specific kind” (cultural associations with green land or blue sea, pink for girls and blue
for boys, etc), but it also offers
a specific sensory appeal, via sight and its physiology, and via both the
physiological/experiential meanings of colour for humans as
biological/physiological beings and the cultural/experiential meanings of colour
– the meanings deriving from specific cultural and
physiological/experiential/emotional effects (Multimodal Discourse, 27).
In less convoluted terms: the conceptual meanings we arrive at within cultural
contexts arise from our embodied interfacing with situations through their material
affordances. To truly understand how color operates in our lives we need to attend to
its affective dimensions. We therefore need a “new theory of semiosis,” Kress tells us
elsewhere, that offers an account for “the processes of synaesthesia, the transduction
of meaning from one mode in meaning to another semiotic mode, an activity
constantly performed by the brain” (“Visual and Verbal,” 76). In moments like this, it
becomes difficult to subscribe to the distinction between mode and media that Kress
has gone to such pains to sustain.
It is apparent here that Kress is operating on the same assumption as MerleauPonty – that perception is fundamentally synaesthetic. Unfortunately, because
“synaesthetic activity has been suppressed in institutional education, due to the social
and cultural dominance of language in the written mode in the public domain,” Kress
looks toward multimodality as a means of tapping into the marginalized “cognitive and
affective potentials of individuals” (76). The anthropological model of mimesis offered
by Christopher Wulf (whose book on mimesis, co-authored with Gunter Gebauer,
informs much of this dissertation) has helped Kress become “clearer” on his
understanding of how meaning and learning is instantiated by the body is important
here. Indeed, Anna Gibbs compares mimesis to affect in that neither is a “property” of
the body or the individual; mimesis, Gibbs tells us, should rather be thought of as a
trajectory which makes use of “vision, hearing olfaction, morphology, or behavior, or
several of these” in operations whereby one responds to the other, “a borrowing of
form that might be productively thought of as communication” (20, 19). Although
repressed by formal educational models, we all engage such cognitive and clearly
synaesthetic processes daily when our bodies help us navigate what Kress calls the
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“multimodal ensembles” of our immediate situations. Even a mundane act such as
crossing a busy street requires us to make a multimodal ensemble out of the many
resources available – an especially powerful operation for disabled people (SocialSemiotic, 161) which I noted earlier. This means that “[s]treetscapes constitute both
curricular and pedagogies” (168) in that the cognitive operations our bodies engage
when crossing a street are the same ones generated when we observe the science
teacher gesturing in front of a diagram representing blood circulation – also a
multimodal ensemble (168). It goes without saying that the affective, physiological,
mimetic dimension Kress assigns to the classroom example (86) is operative in crossing
the street and all our other daily activities.
Does the picture emerging here not in some way resemble Aristotle’s claim that
when we create something – a painting, a composition – we follow the process of
nature (mimeitai ten phusin?). Is not “nature” the ultimate multimodal ensemble that
we navigate mimetically? If so, then I believe that the composition theorist Byron
Hawk may want to rethink his assertion that traditional formalist, expressivist, and
audience-based rhetorics are grounded in a “positive, mimetic epistemology” – one he
opposes to the “holistic model” offered by Paul Kameen, which draws heavily on
Coleridge’s theory of intuition. As Hawk describes it, following Kameen, Coleridge
“wants to move away from the examination of things, which leads to dead
classifications, toward relations of things, which leads to a continuous transition and
reciprocity” (104). In Coleridge’s words:
[A]s soon as the mind becomes accustomed to contemplate, not things only,
but relations of things, there is immediate need of some path or way of transit
from one to the other of the things related; – there must be some law of
agreement or of contrast between them; there must be some mode of
comparison; in short, there must be Method” (qtd 104-5)
As described by Hawk, Coleridge’s “method” sounds a lot like mimesis both in the
phenomenological sense, in that “[m]ethod begins in embodiment,” as well as in the
Aristotlean sense, in that it must theoretically be “representative of the relations in
nature and continuously progress and change with them” since it is the “relations in
nature, not subjective genius, [that] drive intuition” (Hawk, 105). Since method is
“multiple and situational,” compositional practices like writing require “being open to
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the multiple paths that can emerge out of any given rhetorical situation” (47). Writing
about ships, Hawk says, requires knowledge of the oar, the stars, the helm, the sail,
the artillery, and so forth. In other words, to write adequately about ships the writer
must attune herself to the multiple affordances in the multimodal ensemble that
emerges from the semiotic domain of certain “ships.” In tracing the linkage of shipoar-sail-stars-etcetera she learns the concept ship in ways that are not transmitted
through a Wikipedia entry. In other words, she slips into the mimetic phantom that
enables ship to be virtually experienced, not just conceptualized. The Wikipedia page
is just one of multiple media she engages with in the process of learning, none of
which are easily separated from the perceptual modalities that enable her to achieve
a more complex awareness of all that constitutes a certain kind of ship.
In this section I have tried to show that despite Gunther Kress’s separation of
mode and media, his attention to mimesis and to the phenomenological body, to
affect and to affordances it responds to, ultimately prevent the kind of clear
distinction his initial definitions attempt to designate. The result is an ambiguity that
yields a richer theory of multimodality that can certainly contribute to rhetorical
theory and composition pedagogy. Admittedly, this chapter has been, like the ones
that have led up to it, very theoretical in scope. It is time now to consider how the
theory makes for praxis. The next and final chapter of this dissertation will be devoted
entirely to classroom pedagogy and to the design of curricula that puts that pedagogy
to work. But first, as a means of seguing to that objective, I want to look at a realworld example that I feel illustrates the multimodal/multimedia nexus I have
developed here quite effectively. It is to this example that I now turn.

“Embodied Practice”: Putting it All Together
In Chapter 2 I noted how the parent term of mimesis, mimos, originally denoted both
performer and performance, comparing that dual-meaning to Yeats’ famous
observation of the impossibility of separating the dancer from the dance. In a 2001
article published in the Journal of Business and Technical Communication, Christina
Haas and Stephen P. Witte set the stage for a case study they document with an
epigraph quoting the composer Franz Liszt: “Le concert, c’est moi!” With this
declaration, the authors tell us, Liszt “was not only declaring that music is inseparable
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from its performance but that differences in bodily manipulations of musical
instruments yield different music from the same score, a discovery that Liszt
repeatedly capitalized on in his own concerts” (413).34 This act of remediation is
imitatio at its best: the style (“the same score”) that the pianist taps into yields an
expression that is “different” from earlier performances, shaped as it is by the forces
at play in that specific situation in which the performer is immersed and hence
“representative” of – that is, he and his score and his remediation of it bring to full
expression all the forces at play on that particular occasion. The medium of expression
here is not just Liszt; it includes the concert and all that constitutes it, including that
particular audience in that specific location and that certain occasion. Hence, that
unique expression is enacted across multiple media through the engagement of
multiple sensory and perceptual modalities.
Haas and Witte extend Liszt’s performative remediation to writing and other
means of communication, which they describe as an “embodied practice” since its
“recurrent nature, its goal directedness, and its intimate linking with technologies and
with knowledge are always enacted in part through bodily and sensory means” (416).
Because embodiment “signifies a unification of mind and body,” they argue that “the
possibility of abstracting the body as an analytic category” (of the kind found in social
theory, literary theory, and cultural studies) is denied by “studies of everyday human
acts such as situated writing.” The authors claim that studying the embodied, situated
nature of writing “is one appropriate and useful way to pursue research on technical
communication and other kinds of literate performances” (417). In addition, the case
study around which their article is built helps to illustrate the mimetic approach to
multimodality and multimedia I have been developing in this chapter. Intriguingly,
although they do not explicitly frame their study as multimodal, in their conclusion
they tell us that
[w]e believe that a multimodal approach . . . and explicit attention to writers’
embodied practices will illuminate some thorny issues within writing studies –
issues that have to do with the nature and development of specialized
knowledge and expertise, with the interrelationship of complementary (or
conflicting) representation systems, and with the nature of power in
collaborative work. (448-9)
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As I argue below, their use of the term multimodal here cannot easily be dissociated
from the term multimedia in that the “multiple systems of representation” (444) that
emerge through the interactions of participants “entails the distribution of cognitions”
in which knowledge, expertise, and other cognitive acts are “shared – ‘stretched over’
. . . [and] across individuals, organizations, tools, technologies, and systems of
representation” (425, 430).
In their case study, Hass and Witt study the joint production and revision by
two organizations of a lengthy, 15-chapter standards document. This document would
“standardize procedures and products related to the infrastructure maintenance and
expansion of a small but rapidly growing city in northeast Ohio”; not only would it
mediate the work of people in various city departments (water, planning, engineering,
wastewater, etc.), it would “mediate the work and interactions of a wide range of
persons and companies doing business with the city for many years to come” (418).
The first organization is a large engineering firm made up mostly of civil, mechanical,
and environmental engineers; these “consulting engineers” are responsible for
developing the initial drafts of the document sections, gathering input from city
personnel, and revising the standards document. The second organization is the city
itself, specifically the employees who work in the engineering department under the
guidance of the city engineer; these “city employees” collaborated with the consulting
engineers on developing this document that would become a reference for anyone
involved in city maintenance and expansion (419). The document contains a range of
representational systems – charts, timelines, maps, sketches, tables, verbal texts, and
technical drawings – each of which, the authors argue, “requires distinct embodied
production processes using different material and computer-based technologies”
(418). The focus of their study, however, attends to another dimension of embodied,
thoroughly experiential knowledge that emerges during the joint meetings of these
two teams and which expressed itself in ways that none of the participants were
conscious of. The expression of this knowledge that was enacted during their meetings
significantly (re)mediated the writing and design of the specs document.
In order to illustrate how “embodied practice” came to bear on the project,
the authors focus on one small subsection of the standards document – a spec and
drawing concerned with channel easement – and carefully analyze approximately six
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minutes of a videotaped discussion between the consulting engineers and city
employees that took place in a meeting room in February 1999. They note that the
issue of channel easement is especially relevant for their purposes since it “brings the
phenomenological, material world – with all its unpredictability – directly into the
writing process” (424).35 Because so much of the city employees’ work is on-site or “in
the field,” their knowledge of the channel easement is “embodied,” that is
experientially acquired. This is contrasted with the largely conceptual knowledge
possessed by the consulting engineers who have less experience with the material
conditions of that specific easement:
Whereas the consulting engineers often represent what they do as practical or
applied science, their knowledge differs in significant ways from the knowledge
of those who must work with and within the material structures that engineers
design (e.g., a wastewater lift station) or specify (e.g., a channel easement).
In short, although the consulting engineers do not deal every day with such
material structures, the city employees do. Therein lies the difference in the
knowledge the respective groups bring to the channel easement discussion.
(435)
It is the experiential knowledge – “the practical and applied knowledge that derives
from the work within such material structures” – that they call “embodied
knowledge,” and this kind of knowledge is what the city engineers “repeatedly access
and activate in their reading and revising of the spec and drawing” of the channel
easement during this particular meeting (435). Their study reveals how this embodied
knowledge materially expresses itself and, in doing so, enacts an alternative
representation system to the official ones (the text about and the drawing of the
channel easement) produced by the consulting engineers in the room. This concern
with how situated cognition and embodied knowledge manifests itself through the
representation of a certain material reality aligns their study with key characteristics
of mimesis even though that term appears nowhere in their article.
The six-minute segment of the meeting studied by Haas and Witte involves a
disagreement between the consulting engineers and the city employees regarding the
accuracy of a drawing and its textual description prepared by the consultants. The
disagreement stemmed from the term top of the bank, which appears three times in
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the initial draft and was “apparently deployed to overcome the inherent difficulty of
materially fixing a channel easement as compared to fixing engineered structures on
the basis of, for example, surveying stakes” (436). Although the term is proffered as
nonambiguous, the city engineers quickly point to the need for some kind of “legal
definition” of that term (436). Haas and Witt trace their concern to a knowledge base
informed though actual experience, which the consultants – operating outside the
material conditions of the city and its channels – do not have. For the city employees,
“materially ungrounded verbal constructs such as top of the bank have the potential to
problematize the relationship between property owners or residents and the city
itself” – a problem that the city engineer, the engineering assistant, and the utilities
manager must contend with frequently (438). As one participant insisted, there must
be “some type of formula for establishing” the top of the bank or a “common point”
for deciding its location (438). As the authors studied the taped proceedings and
transcripts from this meeting, they observed how the “city employees repeatedly drew
on their embodied knowledge of antecedent and future states in critiquing the
engineering firm’s work in the channel easement subsection of the document, and
they repeatedly voiced their concern that top of the bank be fixed or grounded in the
material world” (439).
What the authors refer to as a “distribution”36 of the city employee’s embodied
knowledge – which they contend “permit[ted] the consulting engineers to revise the
spec and the drawing” (436) – was accomplished not only linguistically but gesturally.
These “embodied representations” played a “critical role in distributing the city
employees’ knowledge across all participants in the work group” (441). Purely
indexical gestures made by city employees – that is, gestures that focused on the
consultants’ drawing projected on the screen, the official representation of the
channel easement – emerged simultaneously with their vocal critique. Nonindexical
gestures made by the city team, such as the widening of hands to suggest a future
state where the width of the channel is legally and materially bounded in ways not
represented in the drawing, emerged as a “new representation” in opposition to the
official drawing and contributed to its revision by the consultants. The authors also
identify 24 instances of the gesture of pointing, 23 of which were directed toward the
screen on which the consultants’ initial drawing of the channel easement was
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projected. However, the actual objects at which members of the two groups pointed
differed. Working with a model of the deictic gestures offered by David McNeill, the
authors determined that of the 23 pointing gestures aimed at the screen, the four
made by the consulting engineers “all had as their object the literal drawing on the
screen”; of the 19 pointing gestures made by the city employees, on the other hand,
twelve “seemed to have as their object an entity from the material world represented
(for the city employees) by the drawing – a nonliteral object,” such as a bank or a
stream, which the city workers were familiar with from their on-site experience (443).
The authors conclude that the focus of the consulting engineers during most of the
meeting was on the document itself, not the material world it sought to represent
visually and textually that the city employees – in an act of expert imitatio – made
present through the gestural language of both body and speech. In fact, they believe
that for the city employees “the initial drawing no longer exist[ed] though it
remain[ed] projected onto one of the screens in the room” (442). Through their
actions of “representing” the channel easement without recourse to their own set of
visual and textual representation, their minds were situated elsewhere.
There is much to be learned from Haas and Witte’s study of this six minute
segment of the meeting between these two groups. This clearly multimodal ensemble
is a rhetorical situation, an agon, in which the primary argument is enacted across
diverse communicative media that are themselves generated on the basis of mimesis.
The city employees’ gestures – including the many pointing gestures – not only helped
to enact a alternative representation system to the official one projected by the
consultants on the screen, they seem to have emerged through a sympathetic
entrainment, a syncretic sociability, physically (but quite unconsciously) enacted by
the city employees’ embodied simulations. These simulations even roughly
“represented” certain dimensions of an absent agent – the channel easement itself
and its network of material and social relations – that nonetheless came to serve as a
third party to the negotiations. These unofficial representations, Merleau-Ponty might
point out, allowed for the channel itself to express its own properties; that is, the
world of the channel speaks through the language and gestures of those who
perceptually inhabit that world, and it is made material through the communicative
modes and media that become operative through their representational actions. I
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think this case study nicely illustrates the how the term media is impoverished when
its signification is associated solely with print and electronic modes of information
delivery, and how – at the level of cognition and practice – its intimate relationship
with our perceptual and sensory modalities warrant the case for thinking multimedia
and multimodality together, first, before seeking to establish the difference that
arises as a palpable production process begins to take shape.
As I noted earlier, this dissertation has maintained a strongly theoretical focus.
Haas and Witte’s case study helpfully serves as a segue to a “real world” account of
how the mimetic theory I have used to re-envision rhetoric and multimodality can be
applied pedagogically. This will be the subject of the next and final chapter.
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It should be noted that Gallese and Lakoff distinguish multimodality from supramodality in the following way:
Supramodality refers to information that arises from “association areas” that are distinct from the sensory motor
system and which integrates information from the motor system with information from sensory modalities.
Multimodality, however, refers to what “is neutrally enacted using neural substrates used for both action and
perception” and that the “modalities of action and perception are integrated at the level of the sensory-motor system
itself and not via higher association areas” (5).
2
This conference paper does not have page numbers. A pdf is available at the CERME 8 website:
http://cerme8.metu.edu.tr/wgpapers/wg16_papers.html
3
Clair Lauer of Arizona State University, for example, attributes the coining of the term to the NLG. See “Contending
with Terms,” 227.
4
Here is the current (March, 2013) description of the course: “ME 313: Human Values and Innovation in Design.”
“Introduction to the philosophy, spirit, and tradition of the product design program. Hands-on design projects used as
vehicles for design thinking, visualization, and methodology. The relationships among technical, human, aesthetic,
and business concerns. Drawing, prototyping, and design skills. Focus is on tenets of design philosophy: point of view,
user-centered design, design methodology, and iterative design.”
https://explorecourses.stanford.edu/search?view=catalog&filter-coursestatus-Active=on&page=0&q=ME313
5
Rolf A. Faste’s article about the class was published in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in Innovations
in Mechanical Engineering Curricula for the 1990s (New York, November 1994), which is no longer in print. All further
references to this text will therefore not be cited. A pdf (with no page numbers) of the article is available at the
website for the Rolf A. Faste Foundation for Design Creativity here: http://fastefoundation.org/publications/
6
It is interesting that this clearly multimodal pedagogy stemmed from a dual-aspect theory of the brain, one that
divided it into left and right sides. As I noted in Chapter 2, Aristotle was inclined to conceive mimesis as having two
aspects, requiring an observer to enter a more complex awareness of the mimetic act by keeping both aspects
conjointly in focus.
7
He quotes Ernest Schachtel on Proust: “In Prousts’ account, visual sensations are far outnumbered as carriers of …
memories by those of the lower, more bodily senses, such as the feeling of his own body in a particular posture, the
touch of a napkin, the smell and taste of a flabor, the hearing of a sound – noise or melody, not the sound of words.
All these sensations are far from conceptual thought, language, or conventional memory schemata” (qtd 98)
8
Merleau-Ponty describes the body schema as a “system whose different introceptive and extroceptive aspects
express each other reciprocally, including even the roughest of relations with the surrounding space and its principal
directions” (CRO, 117). Hence, “[i]t is through my body that I understand people, just as it is through my body that I
perceive things” (PP, 216).
9
While Parikka does not state that humans and animal “imitate” nature, it is worth noting that he cites Roger Caillois’
“famous writing on mimicry and the praying mantis” as works that shaped his thinking of a “slightly alternative
cultural history and media theory” (New APPS Interview: http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/03/new-apps-
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interview-jussi-parikka.html. Accessed March 1, 2012.) He also discusses Caillois’ work in his book, specifically in
relation to digital gaming, on pages 105-110.
10
Parikka’s book in a way brings us all the way back to Empedocles, who claimed that humans learned the technical
arts by mimicking animals. Parrikka offers insects as a figure for thinking media as an extension of nature. He reverses
the “insects as media” logic implicit in the popular swarm metaphor to “media as insects.” Insects are an “invention”
of nature that will outlast humans. They reflect those sides of our experience that are non-conscious: affect, instinct,
and knowledge that stems from embodied relations with their milieu. See his interview with the New APPS blog for an
overview of his book’s themes: http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/03/new-apps-interview-jussi-parikka.html
11
Although Isocrates identified himself with the ancient Sophistic tradition, like Plato he was appalled by the rigid
formulae and deceitful trickery practiced by the multitudes of sophists of his time. His speech “Against the Sophists”
captures his attempt to distance himself and his educational doctrine from their pandering activities. The Wikipedia
webpage (accessed April 13, 2014) describes his speech here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Against_the_Sophists
12
Clearly, I’m using pairing phusis with Parrikka’s broadened description of media. However, that pairing Hawhee
borrows a term used by Democritus to describe the philosophy of mind that seems to have informed these ancient
pedagogies. “Phusiopoiesis” derives from Democritus’s statement that “Nature and instruction are similar; for
instruction shapes the man, and in shaping produces his nature (phusiopoiei)” (qtd 93). Pedagogically, according to
Hawhee, it “occurred in a tangle of dynamics and forces” (108) that included not only the immediate environment of
the gymnasium as a “network of practices” (97) but the intimate, often erotic and painfully stringent relationship
between instructors and students (100-108).
13
Apparently women did not enter these male-dominated spaces. We might conjecture that a handful of exceptional
women might have participated in these bodily arts from time to time. However, no historical evidence exists to
support that conjecture.
14
Marratto notes that James J. Gibson refers to the phenomenon of synaesthesia as “intermodal” or intersensory (69)
15
Gallese and Lakoff note that there are other modalities involved in the “multimodality of actions” (such as the
somato-sensory component, or what it feels like to grasp something), but they do not discuss them (4-5).
16
This theory has it correlates in composition theory. Kristie S. Fleckenstein, for example, invents the term imageword
to semantically account for the dual logics operating in “ecological systems of meaning”: image (an immersive is logic)
is the incarnation of meaning in various modes and modalities and word (an emergent as-if logic) is the linguistic
manifestation (Embodied, 33).
17
At the neurological level, this is called by Gallese and Lakoff “supramodality,” in which each association mechanism
is a distinct mental operation.
18
There are many news stories and videos available online about Daniel Kish’s incredibly accurate way of navigating
complex landscapes. This ABC News video (accessed June 12, 2014) is one of them:
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/video/blind-man-echolocation-13688305
19
“’Multimodal’ is a term valued by instructors because of its emphasis on design and process, whereas ‘multimedia’
is valued in the public sphere because of its emphasis on the production of a deliverable text. Ultimately, instructors
need to continue using both terms in their teaching and scholarship because although ‘multimodal’ is a term that is
more theoretically accurate to describe the cognitive and socially situated choices students are making in their
compositions, ‘multimedia’ works as a gateway term for instructors and scholars to interface with those outside of
academic in familiar and important ways” (225).
20
Halliwell associates this term with “sympathy,” “fellow feeling,” and “identification” (80)
21
The ellipsis here replaces a word that in some texts is rendered as “psychical” (for example, McKim, 11) and in
others as “physical” (for instance, John-Steiner, 85). I cannot determine which is the actual term since both renderings
are found in multiple texts where this phrase is quoted.
22
See Michio Kako’s account of this experience (“The Theory Behind the Equation,” posted October 11, 2005) at the
Nova series webpage on the PBS website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/physics/theory-behind-equation.html
(Accessed April 1, 2014).
23
The quotation comes from Kako’s account (ibid). I cite John-Steiner since the general description of his visualization
can be found on that page in her text; however, a readable, public-friendly interpretation of that visualization (using a
police pursuit) is illustrated in Kako.
24
Paul Prior cites this example in particular to illustrate his “sharp disagreement not only in terms of basic questions
of theory but also often in terms of readings of particular texts offered as illustrations” and cites examples of other
texts from the same time period as Kress’s first science text that do not conform to his interpretation. Kress’s
periodization of texts, he argues, “erases (or discount[s]) social and communicative hybridity,” an approach that
“could easily lead us to a multimodal replay of the orality-literacy debates of the 1980s” (26). This tendency by Kress
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derives in part from a “remarkable theoretical claims are driven by an abstract theoretical commitment rather than
by close and serious consideration of the actual semiotic landscape.” Because Kress’s “certain classifications” (a
problem I have with Kress as well) limit the scope of interpretation of multimodal practices and their affordances,
Prior advises us to look at the work of James Elkins, Elizabeth Rohan, and Anne Wysocki for “more complex”
approaches to multimodal education. (26)
25
As I will show shortly, Kress does indeed stray from an anthropocentric account of agency. However, in many of his
real-world examples he often invests full agency into the human textmaker. In his ESL Classroom article, his
description of the work produced by children does not attend to the role played by material and other actants in the
networked situation of the classroom (339-40). A multimodality theorist like Jodi Shipka, who I will discuss in the
pages ahead, uses Actor Network Theory as a framework for classroom activities.
26
As opposed to, say, Bruno Latour’s concept of “social” as a dynamic network of associations between human and
nonhuman actants that cannot be reduced solely to human groups (ethnic, class, subculture, etc). Latour develops
this perspective of “the social” across the body of his works, but it is perhaps most directly articulated in his 2005
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory.
27
Because mode answers the question “How is the world best represented and how do I aptly represent the things I
want to represent in this environment?” meanings are made material “with specific ontological effects . . . . according
to the intentions of the rhetor and designer” (114). Clearly, I need to depart from this hylomorphic and culturally
deterministic definition of mode. I will do so, however, by way of Kress himself. Fortunately, because Kress’s
classification system – which extends across several of his works – is so inordinately complex, it collapses under its
own weight. Once the barrage of italicized terms designating categories, subcategories, and sub-subcategories
recedes to the background – where it belongs – Kress’s theories have much to offer the mimetic approach toward
multimodality of the kind I develop here.
28
A transcript of this interview was accessed on 29 July 2013 and is currently available at
http://www.english.fsu.edu/rhetcomp/transcripts/kress_transcript.pdf
29
This is not he term Kress uses. It is mine.
30
This was an informal network of psychologists, educators, medical specialists, and neuroscientists associated with
Lev Vygotski and Alexander Luria. The school spanned several cities in the former Soviet Union from the 1920s
through the 1940s. In opposition to Cartesian dualism, they developed a philosophy of mind (loosely referred to as
cultural-historical psychology) in which body, brain, and behavior were integrated.
31
The term “chronotope” is borrowed from Bakhtin and can be described as time-space: “For Bakhtin, the
chronotope became emblematic of a fractured ontology – a complex fluid unfinalized and unfinalizable world—in
which representational chronotopes (those on paper, in talk, and in the mind) co-evolved with embodied
chronotopes, the actual concrete times[,] places, and events of life” (Prior and Shipka, 186)
32
The psychologist James J. Gibson developed his theory of affordances in the late 1977s as part of an “ecological”
theory of (mostly visual) perception. An affordance is a property of an object that allows for an “action possibility.”
Such possibilities differ according to situations, both immediate and global. A window pane affords a human the
opportunity to break through and escape from an enclosure while simultaneously denying such an opportunity to a
fly. Hence the affordances of objects in a very real sense constitute our respective “worlds.”
33
A transcript of this interview was accessed on 29 July 2013 and is currently available at
http://www.english.fsu.edu/rhetcomp/transcripts/kress_transcript.pdf
34
Haas and Witt here refer to Frank R. Wilson’s The Hand: How Its Use Shapes the Brain, Language, and Human
Culture. New York, Random House: 1998.
35
They continue: “Unlike roadways, which are primarily or completely designed and constructed by people, channels
are naturally occurring phenomena, such as streams and creeks of various kinds that can change through natural, but
largely unpredictable, processes” (424).
36
This term evokes the theory of distributed cognition in which knowledge is seen as not confined to an individual but
is distributed in her or his material and social environment. It is most dramatically developed by Edwin Hutchin’s
study of nautical navigation of an Iwo Jima amphibious assault ship in his 1995 book Cognition in the Wild. Applying
what was then the dominant metaphor of cognitive science – cognition as computation – to a ship’s complex
navigation system, which includes but is not limited to the cognitive processes of humans, Hutchins shows how
cognition is distributed among all entities, human and nonhuman, by virtue of their organization by cultural activity
systems.
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Chapter 5: Integrating Experiential Knowledge into College
Curricula
It is now time to apply my phenomenological interpretation of mimesis to pedagogy.
As I noted in the introduction, one key objective of this dissertation is to integrate
experiential knowledge into the rhetorical theory that informs so many undergraduate
programs in composition and technical communication. While I do not wish to collapse
the distinction between these two different academic disciplines, it is important to
recognize the role the rhetoric of persuasion plays in both fields and the significant
pedagogical overlap between them. One reason for this overlap is purely logistical.
Because Composition and Technical Communication programs generally are housed in
English departments, it is not unusual for instructors of composition (and even
literature) to teach courses associated with “Tech Com” (like, for example,
undergraduate technical writing) and vice versa, allowing for significant pedagogical
crossover between the two curricula.1 In Composition the market is currently flooded
with textbooks that emphasize rhetoric as persuasive argumentation,2 and this
rhetorical orientation has worked its way into Tech Com. This is quite obvious from
even a casual glance at the “Teaching Resources” currently available at the website of
the Association of Teachers of Technical Writing (ATTW), which reveals rhetoric’s
central role in a variety of undergraduate technical communication courses offered at
both the undergraduate and graduate level at numerous U.S. universities.3 In addition,
many of the most commonly purchased technical writing textbooks explicitly designate
persuasive rhetoric as a key or even primary context for technical communication.4
Rhetorical principles used in making persuasive arguments inform the
instructional guidelines of Freshman Writing Programs (FYPs) across the United States.
Many of these composition programs had adopted an institutional model of
administration that conforms generally with guidelines established by the Council of
Writing Programs Administrators (CWPA), a national organization for composition
administrators, faculty, and graduate students. Although the CWPA recommends that
students explore writing for different purposes and audiences across a variety of
genres, such activities are generally ancillary to the privileged form of the academic
research paper. This form is rhetorical in that it is widely conceived as an “argument,”
one that seeks to promote and defend a claim – formerly called a thesis – by appealing
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to audience using reasonable evidence (logos), thereby establishing the writer’s
credibility (ethos). This form of “argument” may be conceived as both classical in its
application of Aristotelian appeals in service of a purpose within an analyzable context
and neoclassical in its approximation of the scientific method: the “claim” begins as a
hypothesis; it is researched and then modified into a thesis-as-claim, which is then
defended empirically by evidence that seeks to establish its validity.5 In the current
paradigm as represented by the CWPA’s national guidelines, rhetoric in undergraduate
writing programs is generally articulated as persuasive argumentation and the thesisdriven research paper is its standard bearer for this type of communication. 6 Because
this form is directed primarily at academic audiences (or else it employs academic
conventions such as proper citation and documentation styles), students are
automatically oriented to adopt a deliberative or (perhaps less frequently) judicial
position rather than take the kind of epideictic stance that was of such great import to
ancient practitioners of imitatio.7
The imperative to persuade and convince audiences that has become a central
objective of so many composition programs is also at work in Tech Com. This results
partly from the fact that most undergraduate Tech Com programs provide instruction
to students who are majoring in non-“technical” fields, including the sciences and
business or professional majors. It is for this reason that nearly all the Tech Com
textbooks include chapters on professional correspondence (business letters, memos,
emails), career documents (resumes, cover letters), business plans and proposals,
grant writing, and reports. Even core topics like usability are broadly adapted to suit
the purposes of non-technical majors. These genres are “technical” not because they
deal with technology but because they deal with specialized discourses related to the
private and public sectors. Hence, “technical” writing for many undergraduate
programs means writing for professional purposes outside the academy. Because of the
competitive nature of the professional and industrial sectors, students must know how
to communicate persuasively – how to “sell themselves” to potential employers by
convincing them not only of their qualifications, their professional ethos, but of their
ability to participate in the “selling” of products, proposals, legislation, and so on.
This orientation to industry makes persuasive rhetoric a particularly useful pedagogy.
Where student writing in composition classes tends to be shaped by a privileging of the
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academic argument, in Tech Com their writing is often shaped by a pedagogy that
privileges the reified formats associated with the professional sectors.
I believe that the current emphasis on persuasion and argumentation in RhetComp and Tech Com serves to instrumentalize rhetoric by emphasizing outcomes that
take the shape of forms – thesis-driven evidence-supported academic arguments,
hierarchically structured technical reports, compelling grant proposals. These forms,
like the eidos of Platonic metaphysics, contribute to the privileging of conceptual
knowledge in the college classroom. While it is certainly necessary for students to
learn how to use these forms so that they can successfully work within the structures
of the professional environments they pay universities to help prepare them for, the
curricular reification of forms in a sense metaphysicalizes them; they become ideal
formats that are then applied across genres, hylomorphically imposed on the matter
that is writing and creating a static cookie-cutter approach to communication that
standardizes iconic representation and stifles innovative expression. Presentation
software programs like PowerPoint, for example, can be employed in remarkably
effective ways, but most people mimic the templated approach (text lists, bulletpoints, occasional pictures) that has become the norm and which even some textbooks
even provide examples of.8 As discussed in Chapter 3, even in its formalized rhetorical
instantiation as imitatio, mimesis eschews rote mimicry. As Seneca proclaimed, a
rhetor must resemble another as a child resembles a parent, not as a picture
resembles its original (cited in Potolsky, 57-58).
I believe that students should be encouraged to think of forms and templates
as helpful suggestions on how to structure a visual presentation. Because they are
familiar, they serve as what Merleau-Ponty calls style that we tap into “in an imitative
way” that helps guide us toward an original expression of meaning. The key, then, is
to get students to think “outside the box,” to tune into their experiential knowledge
of all things related to, say, PowerPoint (presentations they have seen where it
“worked,” “made a difference,” “hit home the point,” as well as those where it was
an obstacle to communication or just plain boring) as a way of moving beyond the
conceptual structures (visual and textual hierarchies of information) built into the
program’s templates. It is not the templates we should imitate, it is the style of
presentations-using-PowerPoint we know from experiences that we pick up on, again,
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“in an imitative way,” repurposing those templates so audiences will sense the
familiar in our visual presentation but also be engaged by the innovative manner in
which they are employed.
Later in this chapter I will reveal the theoretical parallels between the mimetic
tradition and the currently popular pedagogy in multimodal pedagogy of repurposing
through remediation and remix. But here I want to stress the importance of balancing
material rhetorical approaches to learning with the conventionally persuasive ones
that emphasize strategies for developing arguments. A material rhetorical model
insists on the central role of the body in developing and refining our skills in learning,
thinking, producing, and living. This is not an alien idea that we must think hard about
in order to conceptualize. It is the kind of learning we engage in all the time but have
taken for granted. In his 2011 book Being Alive, anthropologist Tim Ingold devotes a
whole chapter to the significance that arises from the seemingly simple act of sawing
through a plank of wood. He breaks down that significance into three “themes”: the
processional quality of tool use, the synergy of practitioner, tool, and material, and
the coupling of perception and action (53). The sum of these themes is implicit in the
action of sawing itself, which has the effect of bringing “together the resistances of
materials, bodily gestures, and the flows of sensory experience, rhythmically
coupl[ing] action and perception along the paths of movement” (16). 9 This movement
reveals how cognition is essentially distributed in that the
entangled currents of thoughts that we might call “mind” are no more confined
within the skull than are the flows of materials comprising corporeal life
confined in what we call the body. Both spill out into the world. (16)
Consequently, the carpenter “who has a feel for what he is doing” is not separate
from but situated in “a context that includes the trestle, the wood, and all the other
paraphernalia of the workshop” (60, 58). “Mind,” then, emerges as a kind of network
with the body serving as a medium. This physical activity that the body engages is
experiential knowledge work and as long as our living bodies move through the worlds
we inhabit we are always producing, developing, and refining this knowledge.
As noted earlier, Merleau-Ponty calls our direct enmeshment in corporeal life
intercorporeity. Through the perceptual interface of our body schema with our
immediate situation “intentional threads” link our muscles and nerves with the tools
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and other objects with which we interact (PP 121). The medium that is one’s “vehicle
of being in the world,” the real phenomenal body is so “interinvolved” with a definite
environment that “to identify oneself with certain projects and be continually
committed to them” (94) is something we do automatically. Lakoff and Johnson tell us
that conscious thought is just the “tip of an enormous iceberg” that floats on the
ocean of what they term the cognitive unconscious: “It is a rule of thumb among
cognitive scientists,” they assert, “that unconscious thought is 95 percent of all
thought – and that may be a serious underestimate” (13). It follows, then, that most of
our knowledge is acquired unconsciously, and that conceptual knowledge – especially
formalized conceptual knowledge of the kind we are supposed to learn in classrooms –
is the frosting the cake. As vital as this thin outer layer is, we cannot ignore the
knowledge work we acquire through body-engaged (or what is more popularly known
as hands-on) experience. Although much of it is unconscious, it is still knowledge work
and any institution that is committed to enhancing knowledge in people – including
university programs in writing and communication – needs to create conditions in order
to maximize such work.
Even if it is true, as Lakoff and Johnson tell us, that these “other” complex
forms of thought may not be accessible to conscious awareness and control (11), an
understanding of cognition that extends beyond the conscious mechanisms of the brain
and the purposeful actions of the mind needs to be made front and center whenever
administrators and instructors set about establishing a meaningful curriculum. In doing
so, we need to move beyond finite sets of product-based learning outcomes by
attending not to what should be learned in our classrooms but how we learn, and how
this learning situates us in institutional, cultural, environmental, and ethical contexts.
This is why familiarity with the conceptual dimensions of mimesis that were known to
the ancients can be of such import to current rhetorical theory. “If pedagogy is to
accomplish a categorical integration of the individual and the world,” Gebauer and
Wulf tell us, “it must make sufficient room for the operation of mimetic abilities,
which has the added benefit of avoiding desensualization and abstraction” (319). In
other words, we need to descend from the high plane of conceptualism and root
ourselves, first and foremost, in the material world that metaphysics has sought for so
long to transcend but which our inherent mimetic abilities refuse to let go of. The
162

“sufficient room” Gebauer and Wulf call for, I believe, needs to take into account
what Merleau-Ponty has called bodily space. The Greeks called this bodily space hexis,
and it was indistinguishable from the habits and practices we perform with our bodies.
When a man is doing something he is learning, Parmenides asserted, “the constitution
of his limbs [hexis] is that very thing which thinks” (qtd. in Hawhee, 58). In a similar
vein, M.A. Wright interprets a paraphrase of Empedocles by Aristotle in this way:
“when men change their hexis they change their thinking” (qtd 58).10 Bodily space is a
fundamental site of cognition and an integral element of any learning environment.
Students in our writing and communication classes – as in all classes in all disciplines –
need to understand the vital role their experiential knowledge plays in everything they
do. I believe that such an understanding will help them not only to become better
thinkers but more attuned beings – attuned not only to the work they do but to the
situations in which that work is done.
In Chapter 3 I matched up my phenomenological take on mimesis with material
rhetoric as a means of reintegrating the body, and along with it experiential
knowledge, back into rhetorical philosophy. In Chapter 4, I presented a mimetic theory
of multimodality (and multimedia) that includes the body as a medium in the
construction of knowledge. In this chapter I will consider how this all plays out
pedagogically. I will begin by considering play – playing with, tinkering, fiddling with –
as an essential form of praxis that our programs in Rhet-Comp and Technical
Communication needs to take seriously. I will make the case for a complete
materialist overhaul of what we call information and, relatedly, data, arguing for a
more data-driven as opposed to hypothesis-driven approach to research – research,
that is, which is inventive and not simply a task students take on in order to write a
“research paper.” Drawing on the links I have made previously between multimodality
and mimesis, I will then offer a way of expanding how we currently address writing in
our classes in such a way that it is intimately connected to the related modalities of
speaking, reading, listening, and writing called OVAL (an acronym for oracy, visuacy,
auracy, and literacy). I will then consider how in multimodal composing the concepts
of remix and remediation are, in addition to being contemporary instantiations of
classical invention practices associated with mimesis and imitation, pushing
composition and technical communication to adopt a more “real-world” approach to
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learning and communication that begins not with forms and formats but with our
bodily engagement with the material we later seek to formally structure for certain
communications. I will conclude this dissertation by arguing that we need to rethink
rhetoric beyond persuasion, and specifically the model of persuasive argumentation
that informs – and, in my view, impoverishes – so many undergraduate composition
programs. Drawing again on mimesis and multimodality as I conceive them
phenomenologically, I argue that we balance the more traditional transmission-based,
claim-anchored, symbol-oriented rhetoric of persuasion with a more reflexive, datadriven, affective rhetoric of influence.

“Tinkering” and “Fiddling”: Enhancing the Bodily Space of Learning through
Play
Aristotle believed that our life’s long process of education begins with mimesis. He
writes in his Poetics that “imitation [to mimesithai] and the joy derived from it are
natural to human beings since childhood” (1448b2);11 poetry, music, and other arts, he
continues, gradually developed from humans’ “natural instinct for imitation and for
tune and rhythm” (1448b7). Ekaterina V. Haskins observes how the first stage of
learning described in this passage – “our spontaneous identification with and mimicry
of sights and sounds” that Aristotle links to joy [to chairein] – emerges not through
contemplation but through play (27). For humans as well as for many animals, bodily
miming has for long been a form of play – charades, for example. But as Johan
Huizinga and many other scholars have argued, play is about much more than simply
having fun or “clowning around.”12 In proffering a mimetic framework of cognitive and
practical activity as a specific form of “praxis” through which “the world comes to be
through our enactment” (37), the theological ethicist William Schweiker draws on
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s interpretation of mimesis (see Chapter 4) as spiel – “play” –
through which, in Schweiker’s words, “the emergent power (physis) of reality or
nature presents itself” (25). For Gadamer, all that constitutes the world, phusis,13 is
essentially mimetic, hence always in a state of “performative enactment that includes
us, and hence is always already structured figuratively, at once ideal and real,
intelligible and phenomenal” (26, emphasis in the original).14 Where Aristotle tended
to see mimetic play as a starting point the lifelong learning process whose ultimate
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telos would be conscious learning and inferential thinking (Haskins, 27),15 Schweiker,
following Gadamer and other thinkers, takes a long-term view of mimesis “not as
iconic copying but as the praxis of figuration . . . . through which we participate in a
meaningful world” (24).16 We are, through the playful art of practice, constantly
engaged mimetically with our world.
Translated into pedagogy, mimesis as figurative praxis, as play, asserts that
learning is primarily experiential. Similarly, Marilyn Cooper, in words that echo
Merleau-Ponty’s description of mimesis as a correspondence between perception and
motility that generates an organized action, describes learning as essentially “a
matter of gradual attunement of movement and perception that comes dominantly
through practice, a lot of playing around with stuff” – stuff being pieces of wire or
grass, string, words, cell phones, computer programs – “in any kind of production or
invention” (“Being Linked,” 28, 24). By equating the term practice with play, as
Gadamer and Schweicker do, Cooper also touches on the mimetic dimension at play
here. While in one strict sense of the word, practice is a term associated with the
development of skills through mimetic repetition, as in “practice makes perfect,” in
other senses practice signifies situations in which the body becomes materially
engaged in activities that generate knowledge. Traditional education has made much
of the former formulation of mimesis. The emergence in recent years of experiential
learning paradigms makes the time right to explore how knowledge work is conducted
in terms of the latter.
Two separate studies by scholars in the fields of technical communication and
engineering studies help to point us in this direction. The technical communication
scholar Dorothy Winsor reveals how body-engaged practice is vital to the knowledge
work of six engineering students whose internships at an engineering center for a large
manufacturer of agricultural equipment she followed from 1999 to 2002. Winsor found
that a primary mode of learning for these interns resulted from “their hands-on
contact with the organization’s objects, and their playing around with the tools
available to them” (26). The formalized training sessions the interns received that
were “very similar to school class work,” while valuable in that “they conveyed a large
amount of information in a compressed amount of time,” were not their primary
access point to what she describes as the “distributed cognition operating at Agricorp”
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(12).17 Rather, the interns’ knowledge developed through a “kind of learn as I go”
manner, by “fiddling with” the software programs and other aspects of their company
they were learning about. She likens the interns’ use of the phase “fiddling with” to
the engineering ethnographer Gary Lee Downey’s similar study at an engineering firm
where student interns described their learning of CAD systems as “playing with” the
programs. Downey speculated that the word play suggested building familiarity with a
program or machine in a way that differed from what we normally think of learning in
school. “This kind of learning,” Winsor tells us, having observed it as well in her own
case study, “involved experiencing the machine rather than understanding it
abstractly as the way to gain knowledge” (16). In other words, the most meaningful
knowledge-work was experientially acquired by the intern’s material engagement with
things, not the abstract information conceptually transmitted through formal training
and school work. The “meaning” of things – the tools, objects, people, company,
professional field - was generated mimetically through body-engaged interaction with
the material that constituted their work.
Huizinga believes that the most essential qualities of play emerge from our
“faculty of repetition,” which helps to structure play in such a way that “the elements
of repetition and alternation (as in the refrain) are like the warp and woof of a fabric”
(10). As noted previously, it was this faculty that the ancient Greek teachers of
rhetoric and wrestling sought to cultivate with their mimetic pedagogy.18 It is perhaps
this faculty that allows for the “almost imitative way” Merleau-Ponty says we naturally
adopt when acquiring new knowledge and habits through a “rearrangement and
renewal” of our body schemas (PhP 382, 166). Even the simple act of reading a text is
fundamentally embodied, he tells us, in that “patterns are formed as I look, and these
are endowed with a typical or familiar physiognomy” (167) – a kind of intercorporeal
attunement, I might add, not unlike that which allows a newborn to imitate her
mother’s smile. In the repetition of this act of looking at a text while reading, our
body schemas tap into a “style” to which it has been attuned previously. This style
threads its way across different perceptual modalities. “When I sit at my typewriter,”
he continues, “a motor space opens up beneath my hands, in which I am about to
‘play’ what I have read” (167). The “modulation” from the mode of visible space (“the
reading of the word”) to that of manual space (“the performance of the movement”)
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enabled by the body schema is a naturally occurring operation, according to Gallese
and Lakoff, of our multimodal sensory-motor system.
The repetitive structure of play seems, then, to facilitate knowledge work.
That Merleau-Ponty uses the verb “play” in describing the typist’s modulation from
reading to writing suggests this. Play is quite literally what the subject of his next
example – the experienced organ player – does when he settles into the space of an
instrument whose dimensions have been incorporated into his bodily space through
habituation (PhP 167-8). It is that “performance of movement” we all engage in when
we “think” through the knowledge we have acquired experientially. Merleau-Ponty
gives to this practical, experiential knowledge a name: praktognosia (162). It is bodily
knowledge that allows for imitation, the “knowledge in the hands” that allows the
typist to “know” where the keys of a keyboard are as he knows where his own limbs
are, “a knowledge bred of familiarity” (162). Without having to make use of any
symbolic or objective functions, this type of practical, experiential, ultimately
mimetic knowledge should be “recognized as original and perhaps as primary” (162).
For centuries, body-engaged experiential knowledge has been marginalized by
the privileging of conceptual knowledge in Western education. But now that paradigm
is shifting. I contend that multimodality is one site where this educational shift is
occurring. Consider, for instance, the Situated Multimedia Arts Learning Lab (SMALLab)
that was founded in 2010 at Arizona State University’s School of Arts, Media, and
Engineering (and which has since branched off as its own company). In this mixedreality “student-centered learning environment,” students collaborate and interact
with sonic and visual media through vocalization and full-body 3D movements in an
open physical space. SMALLab aims to “cultivate the students’ sense of ownership and
play in the learning environment” (Birchfield, et al, 2). Created by an interdisciplinary
team of researchers in education and human-computer interaction, SMALLab is an
attempt to advance theories of embodied cognition19 in schools and other learning
institutions such as museums.20 Because cognition is “grounded in the sensorimotor
system,” SMALLab’s high-tech mixed-reality learning environments encourage students
“to physically explore concepts and systems by moving within and acting upon an
environment” (2). Multimodality is the term the authors employ to describe the
“bodily kinesthetic modes of representation and expression” that are put into play in
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the multimedia environments afforded by SMALLab (3). I would like to point out the
difficulty in distinguishing between modes and media in their definition of
multimodality:
By multimodality we mean interactions and knowledge representations that
encompass students’ full sensory and expressive capabilities including visual,
sonic, haptic, and kinesthetic/proprioceptive. Multimodality includes both
student activities in SMALLab and the knowledge representations it enables. (3)
In the context of SMALLab environments, cognition is generated through multiple
modes of perception and distributed across media that include the bodies of students
and their sensorimotor systems.
The knowledge work students produce is called by the authors – appropriately,
in my view – composition. In this scenario, composition is not limited to writing
academic essays; instead, it refers to how students “compose new interaction
scenarios in service of learning” though human-computer interaction tools21 and
experiences” (4). Embedding physical interaction into objects for composition – which
has a rich history in Human-Computer Interaction research and application –
specifically helps to advance what the authors call embodied multimodal composition
by encouraging “composition, learning, and play” (5). Defining play as “the capacity to
experiment with one’s surroundings as a form of problem-solving,”22 the
multimodal/multimedia learning space of SMALLab products affords students the
opportunity to learn through a kind of unstructured “tinkerability.” One such example
is a “layer cake” used to teach geologic time. This game divides a classroom of
approximately 25 students into four or five teams that together compose a layer-cake
structure. The game can be structured in at least two ways: as completely open
ended, as an “exploratory compositional process,” or in a more goal-directed manner
in which students collaborative reconstruct a layer-cake structure in reference to a
“script” of geologic layers. In response to sonic and imagistic representations of
certain geologic conditions, students use interactive devices to grab virtual rocks,
fossils, etc., and place them in sedimentary layers projected on the floor of the
SMALLab environment.

23

Play is structured by the interaction network but is open-

ended as well, since the play activity can take different forms according to the
metarules set by the instructor (12).
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SMALLab recognizes the importance of integrating experiential knowledge into
educational frameworks. Even though it has long been hypothesized that “bodily
kinesthetic modes of representation and expression are an important dimension of
learning,” the authors correctly note how these modes have been “severely
underutilized in traditional education” (3). What makes SMALLab worthy of our
attention is how it seeks to balance conceptual knowledge with experiential
knowledge work. This is evident in, for one example, an interactive tool it developed
to teach students about centripetal force. Operating the device allows “students to
experience centripetal force kinesthetically” while providing the opportunity “to
instruct and to reify the concept that objects released from centripetal force travel in
a tangent at the point of release” (italics mine).24 In the following sections I will offer
a model that attempts to integrate experiential learning and knowledge into the
teaching of composition and technical communication, balancing it with standard
conceptual approaches that privilege persuasive argumentation and formats. Doing so
requires broadening how we use and think about concepts such as information, data,
research, and ultimately – and most importantly – writing, reading, speaking, and
listening.

Body-Engaged Data-Driven Research: The Materiality of Information
In their article about SMALLab, the authors at one point use the word “information” in
a way that I would like to flesh out and build on in this section. Because cognition is
embodied and hence “grounded in the sensorimotor system,” they write, perception
and action are not “separate and sequential stages in human interaction with the
physical world [but] occur simultaneously and are closely entwined” (2). Therefore we
need to interrogate the conventional understanding of information of Western
education:
Traditional didactic approaches to teaching strongly favor the transmission of
conceptual structures [information coded as symbols, words, equations], and
there is evidence that many students struggle with the process of translating
these into spatial representations. By contrast, information gleaned from the
SMALLab environment is both propositional and imagistic as described above.
(3)
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The “above” here refers to their previous paragraph’s description of multimodality,
which includes both student activities and the knowledge representations they enable
– doing and thinking combined into an integrated function. The significance that
emerges when students in SMALLab materially “interact with computation using
innovative multimodal interfaces such as 3D physical movements, visual programming
interfaces, and audio capture technologies” is what these authors call information (3).
In conceptual knowledge frameworks, information is comprised of facts and
details about a subject that is transmitted from a sender to a receiver. The Wikipedia
page on information, for example, currently describes information as “the content of
a message . . . [that] can be encoded into various forms for transmission and
interpretation. For example, information may be encoded into signs, and transmitted
via signals.” The Latin informationem (nominative informatio) means “outline,
concept, idea” and in Old French (informacion, enformacion) was associated with the
act of advising or instructing.25 Geoffrey Nunberg describes this conceptual account of
information as “a kind of abstract stuff present in the world, disconnected from the
situations that it is about” (111). It is against this conventional understanding of
information as abstract and “disembodied” that Phillip Thurtle and Robert Mitchell pit
their 2004 book Data Made Flesh. This collection of fourteen essays are meant to serve
as a theoretical foundation for what the authors call “materialist information studies.”
Information, the editors argue, is fundamentally embodied, and each essay “focuses
on those moments when information and flesh coconsitute one another” (2). Drawing
from an account that first emerged in the 1950s at the Macy Conferences that
foregrounds the “inherently contextual nature of information,” Thurtle and Mitchell
promote information “not as the coded ‘content’ of messages, but rather, as
something that enables, and emerges through, communicative acts” (9). 26 Because
communication occurs across an array of bodies – human, technical, cultural,
environmental – information cannot be extracted from the embodied contexts in which
it is enacted.
The composition theorist Kristie S. Fleckenstein offers a similar account of
information. The model that conceives information abstractly conforms with the
Cartesian model that separates mind from body. But a model that posits “mind” as
somatic – “a permeable materiality in which mind and body resolve into a single entity
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which is (re)formed by the constantly shifting boundaries of discursive and corporeal
materialities”(286) – grounds information in the cognate body that is itself grounded
in a material situation. Fleckenstein eschews the transmission model of
sender/receiver of coded messages by comparing information to the mixing that goes
on in a cell in which DNA, RNA, ribosome, proteins, and other material processes serve
variously as sign, object, and interpretant: “Information does not exist in the gene or
in the environment, but is constructed in the developmental context” (288). Writing
somatically is her alternative to “the kind of disembodied writing privileged by the
academy” whose insistence on maintaining “rigid boundaries” between genres, theory
and practice, and other dichotomies “permeat[e] research methodology” (299, 303).
In this section, I contend that the form of the standard research paper that we
are all taught in writing classes from middle school onward, and which serves as the
basic structural model of this dissertation, contributes to a transmission view of
communication by conceptualizing information as abstract symbolism. I contend as
well that the privileging of this form and the manner in which it is taught is due to its
approximation of the so-called scientific method. This hypothesis-driven method for
making empirically-based arguments has for long been the ideal model for all
academic writing, and this is the manner in which it is taught to undergraduates. After
students become generally acquainted with a topic, they are asked to develop a
hypothesis – more commonly called a “claim” in Rhet-Comp and Technical
Communication – which they then seek to prove by accumulating data as evidence in
support of that claim. With the hypothesis guiding the inquiry, data are then collected
and composed into sets that either prove or disprove the hypothesized theory that
allows for the establishment of the thesis, a kind of “Truth” whose successful
transmission to audiences – frequently the grading teacher with a background in
rhetoric – substantiates the argument and establishes the ethos of the arguer. This
argument-based, hypothesis-driven format greatly informs not only the kind of
academic writing emphasized in many freshman composition courses but also in
undergraduate technical communication courses.27
While it is unlikely that the standard argumentative research paper is going to
go away any time soon, we can still broaden the genre in such a way that student
writers can engage in more experiential knowledge work. I believe one way to do this
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is to adopt a modified version of the kind of data-driven methodology many
researchers in the sciences have turned to in recent years. According to K. Eric
Drexler, a pioneering figure in molecular nanotechnology, scientists in a number of
fields are now rethinking the standard scientific method. He attributes the first
“break” with the prevailing view that “research must always be conducted as a
hypothesis driven enterprise”28 to lessons learned by scientists working on the Human
Genome Project in the 1980s. The methodology employed by these scientists was
primarily data-driven approach. Data-driven methodology becomes “practical when
experimental methods can amass enormous amounts of data, enough data to test more
hypotheses than any mortal scientist could conceivably imagine.” 29 Driven by powerful
new data technologies – also known as Big Data – and new computational methods,
scientists are increasingly advocating that “we collect data first, then see what it tells
us.” This is the opposite of the hypothesis-driven approach, according to which
researchers “try to guess the truth, and only afterward collect experimental data to
test whether the guess predicts the results.” He explains:
The basic idea is that if we can collect enough data to form a large, rich
picture — as in modern genomics, but not in old-style gene-by-gene
investigation — then we are likely to learn something by looking at it. . . . But
what does it mean to ‘look at it’? For these methods to work, we must know
enough about patterns (repetition, correlation, difference, functional
correspondence…) that we can recognize some of them and separate the real
patterns from the statistical illusions.
Drexler recognizes that the recognition of patterns can be seen as a hypothesis, but it
is a “humble” one that carries with it “no pretense of vast insight.”
If we divorce Drexler’s description from the software technologies with which
data-driven research is currently associated, we see that this kind of research is not
new. In fact, I would argue that is precisely this method that – albeit belatedly -earned the renowned cytologist Barbara McClintock the Nobel Prize in Physiology and
Medicine in 1983 for work she had done decades earlier on maize that led to her
discovery of genetic transposition. It has been well-documented that McClintock’s
belated recognition stemmed in part from attitudes toward women that permeated
the male-dominated scientific world of the 1940s and 1950s. But gender was not the
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only thing McClintock had to contend with. In a 1973 letter to the British geneticist
J.R.S. Fincham, McClintock claimed to have stopped publishing detailed reports of her
findings when she realized the extensive “lack of confidence in the conclusions I was
drawing from the studies" on the controlling elements in maize and their unique
operations. In another letter that same year to maize geneticist Oliver Nelson she
described how difficult it was “to bring to consciousness of another person the nature
of his tacit assumptions” that had calcified into such a “fixity” about these elements
that all she could do was “await the right time for a conceptual change.”30
The conceptual change she refers to here seems to refer to a scientific
paradigm. It suggests that McClintock’s largely data-driven approach – her search for
emergent patterns – did not fit the scientific community’s commitment to hypothesisdriven methodologies. Not only did her emerging methodology depart from the
dominant paradigm, how she conceptualized data seems remarkably similar to recent
revisions of information as described above. According to her biographer Helen Fox
Keller, McClintock described the human mind as always “processing and integrating
data far more complex than we can possibly be conscious of” (102). As the data
McClintock accumulated during her six years of research on corn became so “complex
and confusing” she left much of it to be processed subconsciously as she immersed
herself further and further into the material context of her corn plants. Although
McClintock did indeed establish identifiable data sets that she presented formally
along with her findings, these emerged from a much larger flow of information – what
today might be called Big Data – that she could not possibly subject to analysis. But
these large data flows were cognitively processed nonetheless, resulting in what she
famously described as a “feel for the organism” – her code word for a “living form, an
object-as-subject” (126, 199).31 While she consciously focused on the fine stripes of
recessive tissue of a segment of corn material, Keller tells us, “a prodigious amount of
cognitive processing intervened between the spots of pigment she could actually see
on the corn plant and the controlling elements she eventually came to write about”
(126). As a result, the annual reports she wrote for the Carnegie Institute of
Washington reveal “the unfolding of her theory as a hierarchy of hypotheses, each
more abstract and further removed from the objects of perception than the one
before, yet, in concert, providing an internal logic so compelling as to give anyone
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who grasps that logic the sense of being able to ‘see’ the abstractions themselves”
(126). In other words, McClintock’s method of recognizing patterns as they emerged
from vast amounts of data exemplifies Drexel’s claim above that data-driven research
produced “humble hypotheses” with no pretenses of vast insight.32 In this sense,
McClintock was indeed ahead of her time when it came to anticipating the current
paradigm shift in scientific method.
I think McClintock’s story might serve as model for how we address research in
our composition and communication courses. Research should be, first and foremost,
learning. In rhetoric, this is invention; the objective of persuasive argumentation, if it
is to play a role, comes much later. Research that is conducted with the aim or
proving or disproving a proposition may be a helpful heuristic in some circumstances,
but we need to recognize how such an approach narrows the learning process. As I will
discuss in the next section, students have been taught to read texts for conceptual
information – ideas, arguments, facts – and to think of data in purely objective
contexts. So narrow is their focus that they lose their attunement to the larger flow of
information that gave McClintock not just conscious knowledge of the organism but a
material feel for it – the data she encountered and processed were not abstractions
but materially constituted.33 We need to ground research first in the material world
our students inhabit and in doing so demythologize the concept so many students have
of “research.” For many, this loaded term is associated with papers they had to write
in high school classes on subjects they didn’t care about. Writing “research papers” is
part of the grind they must endure, another hoop to jump through in their educational
experience. It is the result of a laborious attempt to find “sources” – facts, statistics,
quotable things, “data,” – that they can cite in their papers in support of their
argumentative claim, which of course enhances their chances of getting an A in their
English class. They hate writing them just as much as teachers hate reading them. We
need to think strenuously about transforming our curriculums so that students can
actually learn about the subjects they study rather than perfunctorily constructing
claim-driven “arguments” about them.
I contend that part of our job as instructors of writing and communication is to
inspire students to think differently about the meanings of concepts like information,
data, and research. We need to remind them how for thousands of years before there
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were libraries, before even there were cave paintings, human beings learned how to
survive and set the building blocks of civilization by assessing and evaluating the
“sources” at their disposable: which plants could be mixed with others to produce a
certain medicine, which clay powders when mixed with so much water produced the
best earthenware, which animals had certain vulnerabilities in certain situations, and
so forth. The indigenous tribes who inhabit the Andaman and Nicobar islands
collectively survived the massive tsunami from the Indian Ocean earthquake in 2004
that killed over 230,000 people in fourteen countries because their lives were steeped
in generations of research – yes, research – which allowed them to read the material
“data” all around them, including the behavior of animals and birds, and then literally
“head for the hills” before the tsunami reached their coasts. This attentive
attunement to the world all humans inhabit is the foundation of research and, hence,
even of formal scholarship. Research is something we all do on a daily basis and mostly
unconsciously: we enter a situation, collect information, analyze it, and act
accordingly. It’s a cognitive disposition in humans.
The developers of SMALLab recognize this. And while their innovative products
offer fun and innovative ways of teaching students complex concepts by situating them
in technically enhanced ambient environments, there are also the ambient learning
environments that come to us all free-of-charge: the “real world.” I would like to
conclude this section by considering a multimodal, data-driven research project that I
feel nicely demonstrates how experiential knowledge work is conducted by students in
the material settings of this everyday world whose ambience emerges as they engage
with the information they acquire for their final papers and presentations.
Karen E. Moynihan, an English teacher at Central Catholic High School in
Lawrence, Massachusetts, had her students create a multimodal project that was
initially inspired by her reading of Susan Orlean’s book The Orchid Thief. To write her
book, Orleans “immersed herself in orchid culture,” hanging out with botanists, orchid
lovers, historians, flower store owners and conducting standard research in multiple
genres. Moynihan asked her students to do what Orleans did. Students would choose a
collectible and do “real-life research” by immersing themselves “in a subculture and
examin[ing] it from multiple vantage points,” including the perspective gained through
being - by becoming - the collector (69). The students came in with a variety of
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objects—Depression glass, pipe sets, vinyl records, comic books, Barbies (70). After
doing some traditional research on these items, they began to immerse themselves in
the actual cultures - museums, yard sales, flea markets, specialty shops, talking with
people and observing the activities that happened there (71). At the end, they
produced a multimodal project that included the Big Three: writing (a creative
nonfiction account of their experiences, including incorporation of research), visuals
(images and graphic representations like pie charts and column graphs), and audiovisual representations (including videos) (73-5). The collectibles project was a great
success. Moynihan describes students as “animated” when they presented or talked
about their projects. “I’m glad I did these ridiculously uncomfortable things,” one of
them said. “I had never been pushed outside of my comfort zone,” said another; “I
actually [got] out there and engulf[ed] myself in the world of trains”; “it was so
different from anything I had ever done in school” (75).
What Moynihan describes in her article is not just how a multimodal
composition came to be; she describes bodies being affected by bodies, both human
and non-human, in multiple ways, always effecting a transformation—a becoming of
something new. One student attended a comic book convention. In doing so, this
student became immersed in a collective, a complex ecology in which humans
interacted with nonhumans and the meanings that became central to her observations
were generated in various fields of interaction. She describes people “with lists,”
flipping through “boxes,” haggling over “prices,” faces that were “disappointed,”
“overzealous,” “excited,” all articulating around a central communicative mode: a
comic (72).34 The observer, enmeshed in this ecology of multiple modalities, reports
not only of being “very interested” in what she encountered but being affected: “I
couldn’t believe I hadn’t found this special club of collectors sooner.” Another student
reports on a Saturday afternoon she spent with her grandmother, a collector of
Depression glass. Since “most of her collection was packed away,” the afternoon was
“spent unpacking the glass and setting it up for a photo session.” The things which
allow for their storage - boxes, wrapping paper - are not focused on by Moynihan, yet
the role they play is none the less revealed in her narrative of this girl’s experience:
“With each piece they unwrapped, the granddaughter heard another piece of family
history or the story of where and when her grandmother had acquired the piece” (72).
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The granddaughter reported that “more importantly” than writing the research paper
was the “bonding time” she got to spend with her grandmother. The girl’s ensuing
visual, written, and aural multimodal project emerged out of this complex multimodal
ecology.
Moynihan describes how another female student added a DVD to a fifteen
minute PowerPoint presentation she gave on her father’s pipe collection. It showed
images of the pipe “as well as an explanation of how to load a pipe with tobacco,
tamp it down, light the pipe, and puff.” This may seem an innocuous representation,
but there is more: the actions required to prepare a pipe for smoking have been
performed predominantly by men in a culture in which certain practices, and hence
the objects associated with them, were segregated by gender. Unable to find a woman
pipe smoker to interview, the girl asked her father to teach her how to smoke a pipe.
“There she was on the DVD,” Moynihan tells us, “smoking a pipe” (75).
Beyond this multimodal project’s aural, oral, written, and visual
representations, what we have is essentially a drive for data (see Chapter 4).
Information is discovered but enacted as (female) fingers retrieve loose tobacco from
a pouch, a pipe’s cavity accommodates the tamping of that substance at a level
commensurate with its circumference, flame ignites from a match or lighter and
interacts with the tobacco so that smoke is produced, and hence the act of “smoking a
pipe” emerges in this intercorporeal schema of multiply interacting modes. In the
process, the human actor is transformed, becoming more than just a student-doingmultimodal-project to emerge as a haecceity, as young-woman-smoking-a-pipe.
Multiple meanings emerge here, all dependent on the material modes (again, what
Kress and Van Leeuwan call “media”) of a truly multimodal ensemble - one that brings
into contact or “conversation,” among many other things, the body of a female
teacher, the body of a female student, and the bodies of female humans in a culture
where the set of artifacts known as “pipes” were historically segregated by gender
(and oftentimes age).
It is not surprising to learn that Moynihan’s initial promise to her students
(made on the day she introduced this project to them) that “[o]nce you have done all
the field work, the paper will write itself” (a cue taken from Jeffrey D. Wilhelm’s
mantra “You Gotta BE the book”), was largely realized. “[S]tudents found that once
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they started to write,” she tells us, “they couldn’t get the worlds out fast enough”
(74). That is because, like McClintock, in the process of immersing themselves in the
world of that which they were researching, they developed not just conceptual
knowledge but a feel for the objects they studied. It worked. For the writing
component, Moynihan departed from the traditional research essay and instead asked
them to write from a first-person perspective in the form of creative nonfiction, but
with research “embedded” (74). As a result, students had a better feel for the writing
itself since it, like their research, was not a separated out as a stage or component
but was integral to the knowledge-making experience. “I had to write about both my
research and my personal experience at the same time,” one student wrote. “I had
never been required to write about both in the same paper; it was always one or the
other” (74). This integrative approach influenced what some students consider to be
the hardest part of all: the writing. But as one student reported: “I learned that
writing is very pliable… I feel like this paper, more than anything else I have ever
written, has allowed me to grow as a writer” (74). The intrigue of discovery and, yes,
even play that were components of their research experiences also facilitated their
writing. “What surprised me about this paper was that I had fun,” said another
student. “[W]hen I started writing, trying to create a piece of creative nonfiction
ended up being an interesting challenge. I was shocked!” (75).
Although Moynihan does not use the term “data-driven,” her assignment is
precisely that. The students took a grounded approach to research (as I did with this
dissertation; see my section on my method in my introduction) in that they did not
enter their project with any preconceptions or hypotheses. They simply immersed
themselves in a series of situations that constituted the “world” of train sets, Barbies,
pipes, and so on. The significance, the meanings, the theories emerged as they
materially interacted with the data they encountered. Standard data in the form of
quantifications and facts were not ignored (in fact, the students had several “library
days” and produced pie charts, column graphs, and other visualizations for their final
project); they were simply not privileged over the data and information derived from
experience. By mimetically “becoming” like the subjects they studied – the pipesmoking woman, the comic book collector – a level of identification was reached that
allowed for students to feel their topics in ways most students never experience when
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composing standard research-based academic essays. Moynihan’s multimodal project
illustrates how immersive, body-engaged, experiential learning can support new ways
of thinking about information, data, and research and literally transform the
curriculum without jettisoning – in fact, by building on – traditional models of
production and assessment. This is one high school English class students will look back
on with appreciation.

The OVAL of Body Engaged Learning: Integrating Modalities
In the previous chapter, I criticize the New London Group’s ambiguous treatment of
the term multimodality, which on one hand they describe as central to all meaningmaking activity while, on the other, schematize it into two categories - intertextuality
and hybridity – thereby limiting the scope of its multiple meaning-making roles. In this
section I again seek to broaden that scope in order to argue that the mimetic
interaction between listening, speaking, reading, and writing – an interaction that
occurs always at the level of our sensory-motor system even if we are engaging in just
one of these modes35 – strongly encourages undergraduate writing instructors to think
these four communicative modalities together, as a kind of multimodal ensemble,
which the privileging of writing in the contemporary academy unfortunately resists.
We should remember, though, that the current emphasis on writing is a relatively
recent development. For more than 2,000 years, reading, writing, speaking, and
listening altogether “were cornerstones of Western rhetorical studies” (Ratcliffe,
195). But in the 19th century a “new style” of education developed that saw the “study
and analysis of written texts” begin to replace the “old” classical style that valued
forensics, oratorical performance, debates, orations, and declamations (Selfe, “The
Movement of Breath,” 620-1). As a result of this pedagogical shift, by the end of the
twentieth century “the ideological privileging of writing was so firmly established that
it had become almost fully naturalized” (627).
Undergraduate Rhet-Comp and Tech Com curricula are very much entrenched
in this now old “new style.” Although composition theorists have for long recognized
the overlap between these four modalities, the fact remains that the vast majority of
undergraduate composition programs are writing-based. They are collectively called
“First-Year Writing” (FYW) programs and their directors “Writing Program
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Administrators” (WPAs). Similarly, many undergraduate Tech Com courses are listed
and taught as “Technical Writing” even though the discipline calls itself Technical
Communication. And while textbooks in Rhet-Comp and especially Tech Com devote
considerable attention to public speaking and graphic design, it is writing that
receives the most comprehensive and detailed explication. The pedagogical
framework established by textbooks and programmatic assessment protocols
structurally marginalizes the intricately related modalities of reading, speaking, and
listening. Because multimodality insists that facility in communication requires
literacy in all four modes of communication, it promises to restore a more integrated
view of language that resonates with both the neurolinguistic theories I have drawn
on36 and the mimetic pedagogy of ancient Greek gymnasia as described by Hawhee and
referred to previous chapters. In this section I argue that we need to bring all four of
these communication modalities front and center in the “writing class.” If it is true
that our body schemas and sensory-motor systems are inherently mimetic and
multimodal, then a body-engaged pedagogy that attends to the experience of
communicating through listening, speaking, reading, and writing seems especially apt
for this purpose.
To help me illustrate a mimetic-multimodal pedagogy that both embodies and
integrates these four modalities. I will refer to this as OVAL, an acronym for the
combination of oracy, visuacy, auracy, and literacy.37 I like the term OVAL not only
since it is easy to remember but because its suggestion of circularity and connectivity
suggests the mimetic interactivity between these four modalities that we know occurs
neurologically when we engage with language. I begin by turning to the work of the
late reader-response theorist Louise Rosenblatt, whose ideas on how readers
“transact” with texts had considerable influence on compositionists in the 1980s.38
Although Rosenblatt eschewed the term “interaction” in favor of transaction,39 her
theory supports what I see as an interactive mimetic coupling between text and reader
that occurs during the event of reading:
In ecological terms, the text becomes the element of the environment to which
the individual responds. Or more accurately, each forms an environment for
the other during the reading event. Sharp demarcation between objective and
subjective becomes irrelevant, since they are, rather, aspects of the same
180

transaction – the reader looks to the text, and the text is activated by the
reader. (18)
Rosenblatt distinguishes between aesthetic reading and efferent reading. Whereas
efferent reading is concerned primarily with extracting usable information, aesthetic
reading requires an acute sensitivity to how language operates. In aesthetic reading,
the concept of transaction “emphasizes the [reader’s] relationship with, and
continuous awareness of, the text,” including concentration on the words of the text,
which is “perhaps even more keen than in an efferent reading” (69, emphasis in
original). While I personally do not care for the terms aesthetic and efferent, I do
believe that the kind of reading designated by aesthetic takes into account the feel of
written language. In Rosenblatt’s model, students who read aesthetically become
especially attuned to language as they read it – and this includes spelling conventions,
grammatical styles, and punctuation. Such close engagement with language can
clearly support the acquisition and refinement of their writing skills as well.
In my view, reading aesthetically as described by Rosenblatt is reading
mimetically – that is, reading with our bodies so that we experience the text and our
specific interactions. Robert Terrill believes that an explicitly mimetic pedagogy
encourages students to learn how to continuously “toggle switch” between “looking
through” language and “looking at” language (304).40 Rosenblatt argues that aesthetic
reading asks students to “inquire more deeply into how the abstracting and
conceptualizing activities involved in the use of language are related to the stream of
feeling in which they are embedded” (43). This stream metaphor resonates with
Keller’s use of flow to describe the emergence of data from cytological world of corn
plants in which McClintock was so palpably immersed. It also speaks to an account of
information as bodily experienced in that “the reader’s primary concern is with what
happens during the actual reading event” in the flood of associations, feelings,
attitudes, and other extra-textual information that is generated through what
Rosenblatt appropriately calls an event (25; emphasis in the original). The manner in
which readers attune themselves to this reading event is multimodal in that, as
participants in this event, they manage to synthesize all these textual and non-textual
elements into a meaningful structure by “listening to” while “looking at” both
themselves and the language of the text (25, 18). Readers’ listening and looking here
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are more than just conceptual metaphors because through their transactions they
actually “sense” what the “visual and auditory stimuli” of the text are enacting (21).
The world that emerges from this reading-cum-listening-cum-looking event “becomes
part of the experience which we bring to our future encounters in literature and life,”
creating what Merleau-Ponty calls a style that we will always mimetically attune
ourselves to when encountering similar events.41 What the brain-damaged Schneider
was not capable of doing when asked to imitate a salute – to mimetically “slip into the
phantom” of the virtual that is generated by action in the actual (see Chapter 2) – we
all do when reading mimetically and aesthetically.
Rosenblatt’s conflation of the visual act of reading with the auditory act of
listening does what our sensory-motor body schemas do all the time as we experience
the world. Because our educational systems classify reading as a distinct mode that is
separate from listening, each of which is distinct from the modes of speaking and
writing, it becomes possible to conceptually hierarchize them. Whereas what I call
OVAL was once an integrated system for rhetorical invention, now, as Krista Ratcliffe
points out, reading and writing are the dominant tropes, with speaking placing a
respectable third and listening running at “a poor, poor fourth” (195). This slighting of
listening is the result of several cultural trends: the gendering of speaking as
masculine and of listening as feminine, the historical privileging of sight or
“ocularcentism,” the foregrounding of “speaking and writing as means of persuading
audiences,” and the appropriation of Western rhetorical theories to theorize writing
(198-201). But even though listening has been displaced, claims Ratcliffe, it has not
been erased (202) and rhetorical invention is one site she offers for its restoration in
writing classes.42 Cynthia E. Selfe reaches a similar conclusion about this currently
neglected mode, showing how aurality – a term that blends listening with vocal
production – “has persisted in English composition classrooms in the midst of a culture
saturated by the written word” (“Movement,” 618-19; emphasis hers). It exists in the
metalanguage of writing through metaphors of “voice,” genres such as “oral reports,”
even dissertation “defenses” (633-4). Selfe proffers an “expanded semiotic theory”
that attunes students to the “sonic environments” (617) they inhabit primarily by
attending to the affordances of digital media tools that many students have access to
these days. Composition must move beyond writing to composing across a variety of
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media: digital videos and audio podcasting, multimedia social networking sites, blogs
and online correspondence – students must become aware of how to compose in
“these new forms of expression” that are now standard features of social and
professional communication (639).
I agree absolutely. But at the same time I feel it is important for students to
see themselves as integrated in these new forms of expression, to conceive
technologies as expressive not only of their persuasive purposes and goals but of
broader intentional forces. That means focusing attention not only on the technologies
that enable composing in digital media but on the cognitive situatedness of bodies in
all acts of invention and communication. An OVAL-based pedagogy, then, would put
the body front and center in its multimodal framework, perhaps by emphasizing the
synaesthetic overlap between different modalities in language use that I describe in
the previous chapter. We should recall Gallese and Lakoff’s claim that language “uses
many modalities linked together – sight, hearing, touch, motor actions, and so on” (2).
Rosenblatt believes that speaking and listening, like reading and writing, are
“interrelated aspects of an individual’s transactions with the environment” (185).
Therefore, to read aesthetically, one must in a sense listen “to the sound and rhythm
of the words in the inner ear, [pay] attention to the imprints of past encounters with
these words . . . the chiming of sound, sense, idea, and association,” all of which
come together to constitute “the complex structure of experience”(26). The writer
Margaret Drabble tells of how when she is writing she actually hears her own written
prose: “I hear all my sentences out loud. . . . I hear it in my head to a very marked
extent” (qtd in John-Steiner, Notebooks, 32). Later when she hears someone reading
her book aloud, she finds it “odd” in how their voice differs in terms of accent and
emphasis from her own imagined voice that she hears while writing (33). What this
tells me is that when Drabble writes, she listens to her prose. Her prose, then, speaks
to her in a voice that is at once her own but also, as revealed later, different from her
own (33). This distinction becomes evident when hearing another voice articulating
her own prose, indicating that Drabble’s hearing of her own prose while writing is also
a form of reading it – and more, even revising it.
I believe that we all engage to some extent synaesthetically with language,
most certainly when we write. But this dimension is something that rarely if ever is
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attending to in standard writing classes. Even rarer is the textbook that actually asks
students to explore this vital dimension of communication that we experience
constantly but neglect. That is because our textbooks attempt to teach students
concepts – the formats and formulae, conventions and strategies – rather than attune
them to the dormant literacies they already possess by virtue of being human beings
who use language to communicate. The numerous anxieties and frustrations that so
many students report, like “writer’s block,” often result from an overload of
disembodied conceptual information that they try to impose hylomorphically on a
situation that they should instead be asked to dwell in. Writing academic “papers,”
especially, has been taught to them in largely hylomorphic terms. Not having a feel for
academic voice, academic style, academic structure, as David Bartholomae has
famously pointed out, forces them to invent the university in trying to replicate the
ideal “paper” for their freshman composition class. This is a huge burden to bear, and
it is one reason why students experience anxiety about writing academic essays,
developing writer’s block, or end up writing “bullshit” papers which roughly follow the
standard models they think their instructors want but lack any intellectual
engagement and editorial attention.
The OVAL model offers instructors an alternative way to address writing and
communication. It broadens the focus beyond abstract concepts like “paragraph
structure” and “dangling modifiers,” “claims” and “arguments,” “audience” and
“logos/pathos/ethos,” and other conventions by putting attention on how we
experience discourse. Because it grounds language in our multimodal sensory-modal
systems, it encourages students to experience reading as seeing, writing as listening,
speaking as writing, and sundry other combinations would be an innovative way to
begin any class in technical communication and composition. Drawing students’
attention to their listening skills would support and potentially improve both their
speaking skills and their reading skills, which in turn might improve their writing
skills.43

Remix and Remediation as Contemporary Instantiations of Imitatio
OVAL might also be drawn on to round out theories of remix and remediation that
have in recent years informed much pedagogical discussion in both composition and
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technical communication. Is not Drabble’s hearing of her own prose while writing a
remediation of the print discourse she is in the process of producing in the same way
that the person who speaks her prose aloud, and which she listens to, is a remediation
of the produced prose? In this section, I would like to emphasize how the multimodal
component to remix and remediation is fundamentally mimetic.
This is not hard to do. Kathleen Blake Yancey notes that remix - “the
combining of ideas, narratives, sources – is a classical means of invention, even (or
perhaps especially) for canonical writers” including Shakespeare, Coleridge, and Keats
(5, “Redesigning,” italics in original). Remix is a slightly more specialized articulation
of the wider practice of remediation, through which “nearly every medium is
re/mediated on another medium. . . . [so that] we create the new in the context of
the old and based on the model of the old” (Yancey, “Postmodernism,” 747).44 As
discussed at length in Chapter 3, the classical means of invention Yancey calls
remediation has a name: imitatio, the Latin translation of mimesis. According to
Matthew Potolsky, as the “skillful imitation of role models and the ability to make
something new out of old traditions,” imitatio “anticipates what literary theorists
have called intertextuality, the notion that all cultural products are a tissue of
narratives and images borrowed from a familiar storehouse” (50, 53-4). Just as the
Renaissance scholar Erasmus’s renowned Adages sought to provide available designs
appropriated from classical sources so that the writers of his day might gain “sure
footing in their own use of classical materials,” so too do present-day sitcoms and
popular music, hip hop, fashion, and numerous other forms of composing achieve their
uniqueness in a way that can never be described as “absolute” because of the
“creative use of existing ideas and conventions” (54). Writing as well about
Renaissance instantiations of mimesis, Gebauer and Wulf criticize the totalizing
restriction “to the mere reproduction of existing models” and argue that we need to
“conceive this process of re-presentation as a process of creative transposition” (90).
In writers like Erasmus, Montaigne, and Shakespeare, the new work “changes and
supplements the model, bringing into existence something that did not previously
exist” (91). In contemporary visual culture, this creative process of remediation can be
observed – and possibly reaches its culmination45 – in the electronic character of video
images in which “[i]mages are mixed, come into relations of exchange with other
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images, and are referred mimetically to still others” in a process that contributes to a
“fundamental transformation of contemporary image worlds” (320).
We cannot ignore the importance of mimesis or its more formal instantiation as
imitatio to any statement that includes the term transformation. The same goes for
composing across multimedia. Kalantzis and Cope tell us that designing “is never
simply a repetition of Available Designs” since every moment of meaning “involves the
transformation of the available resources of meaning” (22). Composing in any medium,
according to Kress, is a dynamic process of “transformative engagement in the world,
transformation constantly of the self and that engagement, transformation of the
resources for representation outwardly and inwardly” – a learning process Cooper links
to the comics theorist Scott McCloud’s observation of his young daughter’s learning of
an arts program by playing with tools not explicitly built into the program: “This
ability to play with the new tools, to learn them from the inside, is our best hope of
understanding them” (“Bringing Forth Worlds, 32).46 Jody Shipka, who advocates
multimodal frameworks for teaching composition, reflects on colleagues’ comments
about how her classes seemed more “fun” because of their emphasis on creativity.
While her students’ final products did not resemble familiar or traditional-looking
texts, this framework still requires them to “conduct research, compose various kinds
of written texts, and respond both purposefully and appropriately to different kinds of
rhetorical situations” (Toward A Composition Made Whole, 107). In other words,
traditional approaches to writing and communication are followed, in a sense
“copied,” but in a manner that transforms the final compositions into forms or designs
we might deem original. Indeed, in Robert Terrill’s appropriation of imitatio as a
“mimetic pedagogy,” students are encouraged to cultivate “habits of mind” that invite
them to see how they are “enfolded in culture, and in turn understand that culture is
constantly being remade through the discursive intermingling of past form and present
circumstances” (312). In writing and composing, students are always already
repurposing something whose familiarity enables them to transform it into an available
design for others to repurpose.
What can be applied to classrooms can also be applied to the programs that
help shape what goes on in them. Yancey describes how between 2005 and 2008, the
graduate program in rhetoric and composition at Florida State University was
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redeveloped in order to better prepare students for the twentieth-century. The
framework was informed by the concept of remix. Although she makes it clear that
this framework did not conform to the “Great Model” approach (“a method designed
to re-create an exemplary program in a new location, a program perhaps lauded as
ideal”),47 she and her colleagues recognized that what made the development
possible, at least in part, “was the set of practices and spaces already in place,
practices and spaces permitting re-design and remix” (“Redesigning,” 10). Recognizing
how “across the country, many programs are incorporating digital technologies at least
optionally,” the redevelopment team – made up of both faculty and graduate students
– researched existing models and then created their own version by “threading” digital
technology, multimodality, and “electronic rhetoric” throughout the entire program
(11, 7).48 While the new, transformed model has “benefitted generally, in a remix
culture, from programs that came before, both nationally and locally” (7), it has its
own cutting-edge originality in that the cognitive and practical dimensions of the
process itself, re-seeing and re-mixing of existing models, have been incorporated into
the program: “if we value the opportunity to re-see and to remix, we need to build reseeing and remixing into the model” (11; emphasis in the original).
Yancey elsewhere provides an example of how remixing and reseeing can be
applied pedagogically. Noting how portfolios of the kind required by most
undergraduate composition programs are exercises in remediation in that they
“refashion other media” that are embedded in similar contexts (“Postmodernism,”
747),49 she looks toward online digital portfolios as a remediation of traditional print
ones. As opposed to print portfolio that “seems remediated on a book,” has usually
one reader, the teacher, and is public only “in the small sense: in the classroom”
(748), the online digital portfolio links to “worlds outside the student’s own purview to
show multiple and complex relationships,” and has a readership which “is multiple, as
are the ways of processing the portfolio” (750). Unlike the one-time-deal afforded by
most print portfolios, digital portfolios can span courses and be a continuous space
where students compose, creating multiple iterations by “returning to the original,
carrying forward some prose and reworking it, creating new images, raising new
questions” (751-2). In this obviously mimetic process, the student actually “composes
identity between, as it were, electronic drafts” – an important affordance of the
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dynamic, interactive, ongoing project of maintaining a digital portfolio since
“[i[dentity is itself a composition” (752, 757).
In addition, the digital portfolio lends itself well to what M. Ann Brady and
Joanna Schreiber call “rhetorical performance portfolios” (343), a pedagogical
concept that attempts to link directly work done in technical communication
classrooms to the kinds of professional workplaces most students these days expect
their university courses should be helping to prepare them for. Where Yancey focuses
primarily on the representation of identity, Brady and Schreiber advocate portfolio
development as a way for students to “embody – that is, to fully understand in the
moment – their professional identities as technical communicators or the multiple
roles they are capable of playing as they complete their education” (346). In addition
to performing rhetorical memory work in which students produce “an inventory of past
events intended as heuristics – as ways to invent content anew” (347), the authors
advocate that students attend to their work “as affecting and being affected by
others” (349). This involves participating in an on-going self-assessment that attends
to “the role of emotion in work [as] a way to help students move from inventories to
the invention of their professional identities” (349), very much embodying the
performance that is otherwise represented by their portfolios. Their case study of one
technical communicator, Brenda, who developed a professional portfolio in the form
of a self-assessment in her place of employment, reveals how her attention to
emotional dimensions helped her flesh out “the complexity of her work [that] was
invisible to others in the organization” (354). While helping her develop an argument
that rebutted criticism by one manager regarding her communication skills, her
inventory of the many intricate details of her work, including the “affective nature” of
much of her work, served as “an opportunity to invent a new organizational
conception of what successful communication work could be” (355, 354).
As these examples illustrate, remix and remediation can help move
composition and technical communication beyond the static forms and concepts that
have for long informed writing pedagogy. Of particular import to this dissertation
remix and remediation contribute to a mimetic model that can guide Rhet-Comp and
Tech Com into the twenty-first century. Creating publicly-shared digital portfolios
brings what is learned inside the classroom into the digital public sphere. Conceiving
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of the portfolio as an embodied performance, a kind of ongoing play, helps students
understand that identity itself is essentially fluid. As we have learned from imitatio,
representations of identities are always being transformed, remediated, and remixed
in order to engage new occasions and audiences. In this way does mimetic
representation blend reciprocally with mimetic expression across multiple modalities
and media, from the digital to the cognitive.

Beyond Argument: Toward a Rhetoric of Influence
I will conclude both this chapter and this dissertation with a consideration of how the
mimetic-multimodal theory I have developed might be used to broaden the current
rhetorical pedagogy that informs so many programs in Rhet-Comp and Tech Com. As
stated earlier, that pedagogy very much emphasizes persuasive argumentation, a
relatively linear transmission-based model in which rhetors are conceived as
constructing arguments with the objective of persuading audiences to adopt a certain
perspective or take some kind of action. In the classical model upon which this
paradigm is based, rhetors draw from their conceptual toolbox a number of
prefabricated devices - rhetorical appeals, enthymemes, anaphoras and epistrophes –
to help them achieve the desired telos of the argument: a persuaded audience.
Textbooks adjust this model to meet the demands of the academy, emphasizing
formats and methodologies that promote a largely empirical research-based form of
argumentation of the kind evident in the CWPA’s and ATTW’s modeling material. In
this section I will argue for broadening this paradigm to include rhetoric conceived
more generally, and much more experientially, as influence.
What I mean by a rhetoric of influence can be illustrated in example I borrow
from the compositionist Byron Hawk. In his 2004 article “Toward a Post-Techne; or,
Inventing Pedagogies for Professional Writing,” he draws on Martin Heidegger’s
revision of techne to distinguish between “doing as action,” which I associate with
conceptual thinking and rhetorics of persuasion, with “doing as enaction,” which I
associate with experiential awareness and a rhetoric of influence. “Just being in a
situation,” he writes, “enacting what the body knows, doing what the body does,
linking that body up to that context” of the situation is doing as enaction (387). He
then provides a simple example to illustrate what he means by this:
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[A]s a new professor I did not come into my department trying to immediately
change things to the way I thought they should be. Rather, I did my best to
integrate myself into the institutional and curricular structure. But in doing so,
that situation is changed. Courses have happened that wouldn’t have happened
otherwise. Arguments have been made that wouldn’t have been articulated.
Advising practices have changed. Conversations have changed. The situation is
becoming something other than (more than?) what it would have been in my
absence. (387)
Hawk’s example of what he calls post-techne50 bears significant similarity to what
Davis calls originary rhetoricity, the “suggestive influence” of an originary
persuadability which she likens to Lacouthe-Labarthe’s “constitutive mimesis” and
Borche-Jacobsen’s “mimetico-affective contagion” (24-35, 33). By moving through our
worlds and interacting with the people who inhabit them, things happen, arguments
are made without recourse to conscious deliberation – a point demonstrated quite
effectively, I feel, by Haas and Witte’s case study with which I conclude the previous
chapter.
I contend, like Davis and Rickert, that the conditions generated by our
seemingly innocuous movement through the world – conditions that are central to
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception – constitute a distinct form of rhetoric.
I say distinct because it is not heavily Aristotelian rhetoric that has been handed down
through the traditional canon – that is, a rhetoric of persuasive argumentation; rather,
it is more like rhetoric conceived through a Heideggerian lens of techne (Hawk tells us
that the “ic” in rhetoric “implies techne, or the combination of art and technique”),
which “puts abstract, technical knowledge [transmitted conceptually] and lived,
habitual knowledge [acquired experientially] on equal footing” (Hawk, “Toward a
Post-Techne, 374). A similar balance is struck by mimesis, according to Kenneth Burke,
who tells us in Attitudes Toward History that “in pronouncing the two ‘m’s,’ with
approval, the Greek philosopher did not merely conceptualize, but also acted. His
word, you might say, would be more like a dance than like a concept” (243; emphasis
in the original).
We have encountered this before in the parallel I made between the dualmeaning of mimos and Auden’s question about how to separate the dancer from the
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dance. The same goes in for self and other in all our interactions, which Merleau-Ponty
and Gallese both assert are intercorporeal as well as intersubjective. Intersubjectivity,
according to Gallese, should be “viewed first and foremost as intercorporeity” since it
is our bodies in interaction with the bodies of others, not their “selves,” that leads to
social identification (“The Two Sides of Mimesis,” 13; emphasis in the original). As he
has pointed out, from the moment we are born, our bodies, through our body
schemas, are mimetically attuned to the intentions of others through embodied
simulation, producing a “shared body state” (Gallese, “Intentional,” 144). Rhetoric
emerges from this shared space. For Burke, rhetorical communication is enabled not
though some abstract spirit but though palpable substance. Our shared
“consubstantiality” power the intentions (his word: “motives”) that arise through our
interactions. “In being identified with B,” he writes in A Rhetoric of Motives, “A is
‘substantially one with a person . . . [y]et at the same time he remains unique, an
individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct
substance and consubstantial with another” (20-21).
In earlier chapters I referenced Gibb’s example, drawn from Daniel Stern, of
how difference is produced in moments of “cross-modal” imitation – what she calls
“mimetic communication” between a mother’s shimmy and her infant’s cry. There is a
rhetorical dimension to this interaction: where the mother, according to Gibbs, “is
attuned” to the baby’s actions, the baby “knows how to solicit the mother’s
attention” through actions which, in later months and years, are accompanied by
language (197). This “affective attunement” facilitated by our “mimetic capacity for
synchrony” with others (197) is not conscious persuasion so much as it is an embodied
expression of influence. Similarly, and in language that echoes Hawk’s distinction
between doing as action and doing as enaction, the philosophy scholar Paul Dumouchel
explains how
mimesis, unlike explicit imitation, of one person by another, is never
something that one agent does to another, but something that people do to
each other, something that always involves reciprocally more than one person.
… This reciprocal influence takes place at the pre-individual level. In this
sense, mimesis takes placed at a level at which agents are not subjectively
aware of the influence they exert on each other. (79).
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It is interesting that Dumouchel attaches pedagogical significance to this preindividual mimesis by reminding us of how even explicit imitation that results from
instruction, such as learning a craft or sport, “typically disappears into the experience
of doing whatever it is that you are doing” (77-8). This language echoes Hawhee’s
description of ancient Greek mimetic pedagogy as habituation, when “knowledge of
fundamentals becomes bodily rather than conscious” (142), a vital component in a
rhetorical training that “exceeds the transmission of ‘ideas,’ and rhetoric the bounds
of ‘words’” (160).
A rhetoric that exceeds the bounds of words and transmission of ideas is what I
am calling a rhetoric of influence. It springs from the domain of experiential
knowledge and points to a bodily dimension of communication that, despite
theoretical interest in recent years by rhetorical scholars, has not made a significant
impact at the level of programmatic initiatives and curricula where persuasive
argumentation continues to serve as the dominant model. At this level, it may be
worth conceiving of the rhetoric of persuasion as an example of what Peter Brown
calls articulate power, something that is “defined and agreed upon by everyone (and
especially its holders!)”; but there is also inarticulate power, “forms of influence less
easy to pin down” that are intangible or imponderable, sometimes even unacceptable
or “difficult to understand” (qtd. in Covino, 2).51
In the realm of rhetoric, the late scholar Michael Calvin McGee calls the
tradition that has commandeered rhetoric for centuries “idealist” and offers his
“materialist perspective” as an alternative (19).Throughout much of its history, argues
McGee, rhetoricians thought of writing, literature, and oratory as specialist “art”
forms and appreciated the ability to persuade or inform audiences. Up through even
the 1950s, persuasive oratory was a particular “art” form, and rhetoric – with its
ancient literature consisting of advice – was conceived as a “body of principles” on
how to become proficient in that art (20-1). This “artistic” idealism privileged rhetoric
to such an extent that rhetoricians developed an “incredible sensitivity” to any
description of rhetoric – likening it to a knack, for instance52 - that detracted from its
artistic status as oratory of the “ethics of teaching students the techniques of
persuasion” (21). Aristotle, he claims, did not speak from experience but, rather,
“arrived at descriptions of internal motivations and mental processes by inference
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from observing the function of Greek communication in societies,” and his basic
conceptual formula – consisting of a speaker, speech, audience, occasion, and
purposeful change – resulted in a “product-model of rhetoric” (22). “Audience” for
Aristotle, in McGee’s view, was just a lump of clay, important “only in having
properties resistant to the creative touch of the ‘speaker’” (22). The result was a
highly conceptualized account of rhetoric in which a “speech” and its canonical
components (invention, disposition, style, memory, and delivery) are grounded in
nothing more than a “mental process.” In his materialist account of rhetoric, any
“speech” is part of a larger phenomenon encompassing speaker, the speaking, the
audience, occasion, and change all of which are grounded in “the moment of
experience” (23).
I believe that we need to move in the direction McGee, Davis, Hawk, Rickert,
Cooper, Brady, and an increasing number of other scholars are pointing to. We need to
conceive rhetoric as being in a watershed moment, a paradigm shift, in which the
traditional conceptual (“idealist,” transmission-based, symbolic) account of its being
the “art of persuasion” needs to be, at the very least, balanced with one that attends
to its experiential (“materialist,” reflexive, affective) dimensions. We need to
recognize the limitations of the argumentative model. As the political theorist Hannah
Arendt puts it, through speech and action we insert ourselves into a web of relations,
“a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction and every process is the
cause of new processes” (190). Within such fluid circumstances, the telos-driven
objective for any action will always be tapered by an awareness of its inevitable
“boundlessness” (190). Hence the doing of an action for Arendt is not a far cry from
Hawk’s account of doing as enaction in that action always “depends on the resonance
which it finds in the medium of relations and the ‘innumerable conflicting wills and
intentions’ into which it is inserted” (184).
Rhetoric could benefit from this notion of resonance, which Joseph Dunne
describes as the degree to which one’s “action strikes a chord in others who will cooperate with it and carry it along to completion.” The power of action is not a
property of the agent “as it is the whole constellation in which he acts” (93). It is time
to acquaint students with a rhetoric that does not aim always for the human heart
(pathos) and human mind (logos) with the end-purpose (telos) being to persuade. A
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rhetoric reconceived as mimetic and multimodal – phenomenologically embodied and
always-already engaged with material existence – contributes to a rhetoric of
influence. I prefer the term influence because it allows us to retain rhetoric’s
traditional adherence to persuasion (as in “the speaker influenced him to change his
vote”) by subsuming that concept, hence freeing rhetorical action from its direct
investment in appeals. Because it moves beyond a linear transmission view of
communication, it opens rhetoric up to the very real role played by contingency and
chance in communicative acts. It is entirely possible, for instance, for the
unanticipated expression on the face of a single audience member to so affect a
rhetor that the entire tenor of a speech may not be delivered as intended even though
the linguistic utterances remain exactly as scripted. In this sense, the rhetor/audience
distinction is blurred with the audience influencing (“persuading”) the rhetor just as
much as the rhetor seeks to influence the audience – a simple example of reversibility
not unlike Merleau-Ponty’s (subject) touching his own hand (object) and being touched
back (neither/both). A rhetoric of influence can account for feedback loops in those
complex ecologies we call rhetorical situations. It allows for rhetors to touch and be
touched back by the “concrete others” who comprise a particular audience, allowing
for the enactment of what Cooper calls “responsible rhetorical agency” (“Rhetorical,”
441-2).
There are other reasons why I prefer influence to the term persuasion. First, it
is less tied to the argumentative imperative assumed by some rhetoricians 53 that
insists that all communication has some pushy persuasive purpose. While some scholars
(Rickert and Davis, for instance) have attempted to broaden the term persuasion, it is
nonetheless hampered by its etymology, which means to “strongly” [per-] “urge” [suadere] to the point of “inducing [someone] to believe (something).”54 Armed with
logos, pathos, and ethos, the rhetor marches into a sociopolitical agon with a
hylomorphically constructed argument in hand, her ultimate goal or telos: to convince
or persuade. Influence, on the other hand, retains a sense of movement – in- (into, in,
on, upon), -fluere (to flow) – and allows us to move beyond the sense of agon as a site
or argumentation to what Hawhee describes as an experiential encounter, a
“gathering of forces – cultural, bodily, and discursive – thus complicating the easy
portrayal of rhetoric as telos-driven persuasion” (16). As such, it promotes a pedagogy
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that situates students in environments with which they gradually couple, learning by
doing, by playing, by writing and reading and listening and speaking across multiple
communicative media, unburdened by the imperative that their communications must
ultimately serve to convince others to accept specific claims.
A rhetoric of influence, I feel, gives to the fields of Rhet-Comp and Tech Com
the opportunity to take into account how our bodies influence and are influenced by
the human and nonhuman bodies with which we interact as we move through the
ultimately material worlds we inhabit. Its reflexivity opens us up to others in ways
transmission-based persuasion does not by recognizing how communication emerges in
the intercorporeal interface between bodies. This interface serves as a nexus for
multiple sensory and perceptual modalities whose moments of integration generate
significance, “meaning,” thanks to the function that Merleau-Ponty described as
mimesis – an ancient concept that I hope I have shown is as relevant today as it has
been to so many teachers, rhetoricians, and philosophers throughout its long history.
Putting our bodies at the center of any pedagogy, rhetorical or not, requires that we
attend to the kind of knowledge generated in that nexus. I have termed this
embodied, affective, materially engaged knowledge experiential and believe that it
should play a much more integral role in how we teach writing and communication.
Bringing to students’ attention the existence of this knowledge – how it operates, how
it is used, how it facilitates learning at all levels, including highly conceptual levels – is
not so much a matter of instruction but of attunement. While to some this may sound
like a radically new way to think about education, in many ways, as I have shown, it is
quite ancient. As we move deeper into our so-called Information Age of technological
sophistication, it is vital that we cultivate our innate sense of mimetic attunement
with the world to which we are fundamentally anchored by our bodies’ sensory-motor
schemas and the knowledge generated through that attunement. It is, after all, the
knowledge we acquire experientially that so often helps us to navigate our world’s
sundry conceptual complexities.

1

Robert J. Connors provides a history of the discipline in his 1982 article “The Rise of Technical Writing Instruction in
America” (reprinted in Central Works in Technical Communication, Eds Johndan Johnson-Eilola and Stuart A. Selber,
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New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 3-19). This history documents the relationship between the
emerging field of technical writing and the English departments in which so much of it took place. He concludes that
as the 1980s open there will still be “arguments being made that the technical writing course should be taken out of
the hands of English teachers, but these arguments are as old as technical writing instruction itself and will likely
prove no more effectual now than they were in the 1920s,” and he foresees with much accuracy how “technical
writing will be an acceptable field of study for English graduate degrees in many schools by the end of the decade”
(17).
2
For example, the popular textbook Everything’s An Argument by Andrea Lunsford, John J. Ruszkiewicz, and Keith
Walters is described as showing students “how to analyze all kinds of arguments — not just essays and editorials, but
clothes, smartphone apps, ads, and Web site designs — and then how to use what they learn to write their own
effective arguments” (Available:
http://www.bedfordstmartins.com/Catalog/product/everythingsanargumentwithreadings-sixthedition-lunsford.
Accessed: June 27, 2014). The Allyn & Bacon Guide to Writing (6th ed. 2010), another popular textbook, is described as
“widely praised for its groundbreaking integration of composition research and a rhetorical perspective to writing and
reading” (Available: http://www.pearsonhighered.com/educator/product/Allyn-Bacon-Guide-to-Writing-The-BriefEdition/9780205823154.page. Accessed: June 27, 2014). The 7th edition of Diana Hacker’s classic A Writer’s Reference
(now co-edited by Nancy Sommers) includes a new sample argument paper that “shows students how to support an
argumentative thesis, address counterarguments, integrate visuals, and document sources” (xviii; Boston: Bedford St.
Martins, 2010).
3
Sample syllabi from instructors of technical writing and communication classes currently available at the ATTW
website provide evidence of the dominance of rhetorical pedagogy in the field. The three syllabi offered for
“Communication Theory” are explicitly rhetorical. The summaries of several syllabi for undergraduate “Technical
Communication” also indicate rhetorical approaches that students took in those classes. (Available:
http://attw.org/teaching/course-syllabi-and-materials. Accessed: June 25, 2014).
4
In the preface to his most recent edition (4th) of his widely-used textbook Technical Communication Today, RichardJohnson Sheehan tells us that the book “is grounded in a solid core of rhetorical principles that have been around for
at least two and a half millennia. In fact, these core principles hold up surprisingly well in this Information Age and are
th
perhaps even more relevant as we return to a more visual and oral culture” (xxi; 4 ed. Pearson Education, 2012). In
Strategies for Technical Communication in the Workplace, Laura J. Gurack and John M. Lannon describe technical
communication to students as “persuasive and truthful” and lists persuasion as one of three “primary purposes of
technical communication” (7-8; 2nd ed., Pearson Education, 2013). And Paul V. Anderson, in Technical Communication:
A Reader-Centered Approach, describes the “two essential qualities” of effective technical writing as usefulness and
persuasiveness (9-11) and returns to both qualities in many chapters (8th ed. Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning,
2014).
5
A good example of this can be found at the popular Purdue OWL website, which many university writing instructors
send their students to for reference. “An argumentative paper,” the website tells us, “makes a claim about a topic and
justifies this claim with specific evidence. The claim could be an opinion, a policy proposal, an evaluation, a cause-andeffect statement, or an interpretation. The goal of the argumentative paper is to convince the audience that the claim
is true based on the evidence provided.” (Available: https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/545/01/. Accessed:
June 29, 2014).
6
I see the “current paradigm” as reflective of the WPA Outcomes Statement for First Year Composition. “Rhetorical
Knowledge” is the first outcome described in this statement. It is defined as the student’s ability to “focus on a
purpose,” “respond to the needs of different audiences,” “use conventions of format and structure appropriate to the
rhetorical situation,” and other skills so that they meet the “expectations of writing in their fields. The statement
emphasizes the importance of “the uses of writing as a critical thinking method”; “the interactions among critical
thinking, critical reading, and writing; and that students should be able to “understand a writing assignment as a
series of tasks, including finding, evaluating, analyzing, and synthesizing appropriate primary and secondary sources.”
(Available: http://wpacouncil.org/positions/outcomes.html. Accessed June 7, 2014). In addition, the WPA’s current
“Assessment Gallery” provides an idea of the extent to which persuasive argumentation has become the standard
bearer for academic discourse in composition programs. The Assessment Gallery is a section on their website that
provides model assessment protocols (called “assessment narratives”) of student writing programs. One of these,
Frederick Community College, identifies the purpose of students’ composition as threefold: “informing, arguing,
persuading.” The narrative of Seattle University’s Writing in the Disciplines (WID) assessment narrative draws on
observations by composition theorists like Susan Peck MacDonald in its emphasis on “disciplinary argument” as the
ideal to which they contrast “pseudo-academic writing.” Since several departments stress the importance that its
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students develop argumentative abilities, “faculty need to teach disciplinary methods of inquiry, research and
argument in their sophomore- and junior-level courses through better assignments and instruction.” According to
faculty at Carleton College, writing skills that augur success include “writing thesis-driven arguments,” an “essential
aspect of college writing” that their assessment attends to. Stepping a bit outside the box is the University of
Kentucky, whose narrative notes how its most recent learning outcomes “reflected the new emphasis on critical
inquiry and experientially-based research and writing, a shift from its former and more narrow focus on argument and
exposition.” (Available: http://wpacouncil.org/UK. Accessed: June 7, 2014).
7
In Chapter 3, I describe how the “law of propriety” (to prepon) was applied to occasions in which the larger
argument was promoted by the rhetor’s evocation of an historical event. This evocation sought to “enact” the event
as a felt experience. The occasion of the telling hence mimetically simulated the occasion being enacted, if only for a
moment. I view these moments in which rhetors sought to palpably enact a historical event as epideictic in that they
attended to the affective dimensions of those particular audiences on those particular occasions.
8
For one example, see Chapter 11 of The Essentials of Technical Communication (Elizabeth Tebeaux and Sam Dragga,
Oxford UP, 2010). In the section “Choosing Visuals to Enhance Your Purpose and Your Meaning” (258-64) a number of
sample PowerPoint slides are given to illustrate the do’s and don’ts of using this presentation software program. The
examples, both good and bad, do not stray from the basic templates provided in the program, replicating bulleted
lists, which conform to the “guidelines” given by the authors that presentations “must be simple, and they must be
clear and easy to understand” (258). Richard Johnson-Sheehan’s Technical Communication Strategies Today, Pearson,
2001) provides similar sample slides consisting of bulleted lists in which minor topics are bulleted under main topics
th
(235-44). Mike Markel’s Technical Communication (10 ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012) provides a sample slideshow
presentation that, while certainly well structured, is less beholden to built-in templates and widely employed
conventions (611-20).
9
This citation, along with the indented one below, comes from Ingold’s introduction to his book and not from the
chapter in which the sawing action is described at length. I quote these lines because they provide a nice summary of
the chapter’s three themes.
10
The quote by Parmenides comes from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1009b. The paraphrase of Empedocle’s fragment by
M.A. Wright is of a sentence from same passage in Aristotle, which Hawhee provides a direct citation of (57): “For
Empedocles says those changing their bodily condition (hexin) deem to change their thought (phronesin).” Wright’s
paraphrase can be found on page 235 of his book Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1981.
11
This and the following citation come from Haskins, 26-7.
12
We are all homo ludens (“man the player”) if you believe, as Huizinga does, “that genuine, pure play is one of the
main bases of civilization” (5). If that is true, then mimesis is indeed – as Rene Girard has argued, in his own way (see
Chapter 3) – central to the development of human civilization.
13
I retain the alternative English spelling physis in the previous sentence since it is embedded in a direct citation but
use phusis in my own sentence to maintain consistency with my use of this term throughout this dissertation.
14
We should recall here that Gadamer also believed that rhetoric developed from a “native talent for practical
mastery,” “a natural power that everyone possess to some degree” (“On the Scope,” 20-1) as I noted in Chapter 3.
15
Please note that I am focusing here on one of the less well-known instances of non-aesthetic mimesis in Aristotle (I
mention the others in Chapter 2) -- mimesis as applied to learning in general and not necessarily to the creation of art.
16
In addition to Gadamer, Schweiker look to Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida as thinkers who “have reopened the
discussion of mimesis and its problems” (22).
17
Agricorp is a pseudonym.
18
I should note that Huizinga does not associate this faculty with mimesis but instead with methexis, which he
associated with identification and not mimetic “representation” (a footnote indicates that he is drawing on
information from Jane Harrison’s Themis: A Study in the Social Origins of Greek Religion, Cambridge, 1912, p. 125).
The function of a cultic rite, for example, cannot be called mimetic because it “is far from being merely imitative; it
causes the worshippers to participate in the sacred happening itself” (15). Clearly, Huizinga subscribes to an
extremely narrow and conventional definition of mimesis here. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, mimesis
has long been associated with identification – Plato’s great aversion to it, in fact, stemmed from this quality – and I
believe that Huizinga’s definition of play conforms very much to many instantiations of mimesis that I have covered in
this dissertation.
19
Embodied cognition argues “that perception, cognition, and action, rather than being separate and sequential
stages in human interaction with the physical world, in fact occur simultaneously and are closely entwined”
(Birchfield, et al, 2).
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20

SMALLab provides an overview of their history, team, and mission – replete with videos of their products in use by
students – at their website: smallablearning.com.
21
The authors list novice level tools such as Star Logo, Scratch, and Lego Mindstorms, among others (5)
22
This definition is borrowed from J. Jenkins, et al. Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media
Education for the 21st Century, MacArthur Foundation, 2006.
23
The product is described in great detail by the authors (10-12). A video demonstration may be found online as well
and is currently (May, 2014) available at SMALLab’s You Tube page:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16QEop2fF4Y
24
This text comes from one of SMALLab’s introductory videos on the YouTube page for Arizona State University’s UTO
Academic Technologies. See “Smallab Centripetal Force Lesson” (0:24/8:22) at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFiXtcXRpVE.
25
See the Online Etymology Dictionary entry on information:
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=information
26
The Macy Conferences were a series of meetings held between 1941 and 1960 that brought together scholars from
a wide variety of scientific fields and disciplines with the aim of promoting unity and communication between the
sciences. The subject of defining information was especially important for the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics,
which were held between 1943 and 1954, where much discussion focused on mathematical and nonmathematical
definitions of “information.” The authors credit N. Katherine Hayles fruitful exploration of these discussions in her
book How We Became Posthuman (7, 9).
27
For just one example, Mike Markel’s widely used textbook Technical Communication includes an entire chapter that
serves as a base for several genres of technical documents described later in the text. The chapter, “Communicating
Persuasively,” begins with this proclamation: “Technical communication, like any other kind of writing, calls for
making persuasive claims and supporting them effectively” (183). The modified thesis, the claim, is “the idea you are
communicating” and the “conclusion you want your readers to accept.” It is supported by “right kinds of evidence,”
the “information you want your readers to consider,” including commonsense argument, numerical data, examples,
and expert testimony (189). (10th ed., Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012).
28
This quote comes from a passage Drexler provides on his blog from an article published in the magazine Science (11
April 2003: Vol. 300 no. 5617 pp. 286-290) by Frances S. Collins, et al.
29
All references to Drexler’s discussion come from an article posted on his blog Metamodern: The Trajectory of
Technology called “The Data Explosion and the Scientific Method” (November 25, 2008). Accessed: May 5, 2014.
Available: http://metamodern.com/2008/10/25/the-data-explosion-and-the-scientific-method/
30
These passages from her letters can be found at the profile of Barbara McClintock on the National Library of
Medicine’s website. Accessed: May 5, 2014. Available: http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/LL/p-nid/52
31
Fleckenstein writes that McClintock’s ability to “immerse herself in the material context of her corn plants” was
made possible through a “deep reverence and capacity for union with that which is to be known.” Her feeling for the
organism “dissolves the boundaries between self and other, creating a being-in-a-material-place that comprises corn
plants and scientist” (296).
32
McClintock’s data-driven approach was so open, in fact, that some of the patterns that emerged from the multiple
data sets she was working with, while not germane to the designated objectives of her experiments, were of great
importance to researchers in other fields. For example, one data set involved the geographical distributions of
particular chromosomal types. As with other data sets, “she began to discern patterns” that would make it be
possible to trace the migratory patterns of the people who settled and traded in the Americans. Because corn is a
crop and therefore dependent on human intervention, “the biological history of the maize plant would permit a
reconstruction of the migratory history of humans” – a discovery that would be of great interest to anthopologists but
not to cytologists (182).
33
Ruth Berman, a feminist critic of Western scientific traditions, describes McClintock’s view of scientific work as
“profoundly materialist.” She argues against the proclamation by some of McClintock’s admirers and detractors that
the biologist was a kind of mystic because her methods and thinking did not conform to the “mechanistic mode.”
Mystics “pull away” from the material world in which McClintock immersed herself: “McClintock’s knowledge flows
directly from her daily contact and interaction with her maize plants. She knows – by sight, smell, touch, and a variety
of conscious and nonconscious observations – all the details of all of her organism’s daily lives. She immerses herself
completely in her material, its changing environment, and the many stresses that affect it. This material communion
includes careful observation, experiment, and analysis. This is not mysticism; this is complete materialism” (248-50;
emphasis in the original).
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34

It may be fruitful to think of these collectibles as things that “gather,” as a bridge for Heidegger (“BDT,” 150-2), and
of the students’ immersive experience as a way to “dwell” in a certain world so that later they may “build”—in this
case, produce their multimodal project—from their locations in that world (157).
35
Here I hope you will recall earlier references to theories in cognitive neuroscience that posit our body’s sensorymotor system as inherently multimodal (Gallese and Lakoff, 2).
36
Language is said to “exploit” that multimodality (Gallese and Lakoff, 2) while simultaneously allowing for a
segregation from “the original multimodal perceptive world” even though, at the level of intercorporeal
communication, we can never “annihilate the shared we-centric space” of that original world (Gallese, “Mirror,” 529).
37
This acronym is mine and I should perhaps explain the spelling of these terms. “Oracy” is a shortened version of
what is more popular called “oral literacy.” It was coined by the British education researcher Andrew Wilkinson in the
1960s and is discussed at length in the book Oracy Matters: The Development of Talking and Listening in Education (
Eds. Maggie MacLure, Terry Phillips, Andrew Wilkinson, Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1988). Although in
this text oracy includes listening, other scholars – for example, Cynthia E. Selfe – use aurality as a blended term for
both skillful listening and oral production. Because orality is associated with the mouth and not the ears, I am
reluctant to collapse it oral production into aurality or aural skills in oracy despite the close relationship between both
modalities. The term auracy is mine and means aural literacy or literacy in listening. The term visuacy, for visual
literacy, is relatively new with its first official instantiation apparently occurring in a report conducted on behalf of the
Australian Government and released in 2008 by its Department of Education, Employment, and Workplace Relations.
The report, composed by Diana Davis, a visiting senior professorial research fellow at Australian National University, is
available online (accessed June 22, 2014) at this url:
http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/36372/NRVE_Final_Report.pdf).
38
Although less common now, freshman composition courses in the decades leading up to the 1990s included
reading and writing about literature. This was commonly the case with the second class of a two-semester sequence
in freshman writing. Pedagogical theories about the teaching of literature and reading were seen as supportive of the
English component of this general education curriculum. The work of Rosenblatt and other reader response theorists
are featured in The Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from Ancient Times to the Information
Age (Ed. Theresa Enos, Routledge Press, 1996).
39
Following John Dewey and other pragmatist theorists of education, Rosenblatt felt that the term “interaction”
unduly separates subject from object “because it implies separate, self-contained, and already defined entities acting
on one another – in the manner, if one may use a homely example, of billard balls colliding” (17). I should point out,
though, that her description of transaction very closely approximates how the term interaction is often used in
phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and this dissertation: “’Transaction’ designates, then, an ongoing process in
which the elements or factors are, one might say, aspects of a total situation, each conditioned by and conditioning
the other” (17).
40
He borrows this concept from Richard Lanham.
41
You may recall from Chapter 1 how Merleau-Ponty illustrates style and expression through the example of the term
“rogue.” Before reading Stendhal, he has a general familiarity with what “rogue” is. As he reads about Rossi the
revenue man, the “sedimented” knowledge of “rogue” that he began with breaks up, “the cross-references multiply,”
until there is an entirely new expression of rogue (PoW, 102).
42
She offers rhetorical listening as being, among other things, a “performance that occurs when listeners involve both
their capacity and willingness . . . to locate identification in discursive spaces of both commonalities and differences”
(204; emphasis in the original). This identification is a purely conscious act, the aim of a “strategic idealism” based on
a desire for an intersubjective receptivity, not mastery” in engaging with others (205). While the ethical implications
of this approach are admirable, ultimately rhetorical listening as described in her article is a highly conceptual
endeavor unrelated to actual aurality.
43
Rosenblatt describes aesthetic reading as less concerned “with the information being acquired than with the
experienced meaning” (38) and with readers’ “continuing awareness of the text” in terms of both signs and symbols
(29). When students are encouraged to read not just for disembodied information but with an awareness of the
material text in front of them, they will begin to notice how written language works. Marks of punctuation
(semicolons, dashes, quotation marks) and grammatical structures (subordinate clauses, modification) do not always
need to be learned conceptually by consulting writers’ handbooks. By close, sensitive, mimetic/aesthetic readings of
texts, students will begin to pay attention to things that often slip by, the so-called Lower-Order Concerns. Instructors
can, using a handbook or a grammar website, explicitly teach students that, in MLA style, a full-stop is placed inside a
closing quotation mark except when the citation is followed by a parenthetical citation, in which case the full stop
come after the closing parenthesis. But students who are mimetically attuned to the material operations of language
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can learn this on their own, experientially, by simply looking at and listening to the text while reading it. For example,
“She… she said what?” can reveal how quotation marks, question marks, italics, and ellipses function in written
discourse.
44
Yancey’s assertion references observations made by Marshall McLuhan and, later, by Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin
in their book Remediation (Cambridge: MIT, 2000)
45
In language that might remind one of the theories of Baudrillard, Gebauer and Wulf end their exhaustive study of
mimesis with this comment about the “contemporary tendency for everything to be turned into an image,” which
speaks to the narrowing of the gap between empirical and mimetic worlds in visual culture that is itself one of twelve
dimensions they identify with mimesis: “The ultimate result is that everything becomes art, becomes a play of images
that no longer refer to anything, that no longer function as models, but are equivalent to nothing but themselves. The
distance between the mimetic and the prior world, the intermediary space, ceases to exist once mimesis has become
all-encompassing, and the mimetic and the other world collapse into each other. The total extension of mimesis is
simultaneously its end” (320).
46
Cooper cites Kress’s article “Gains and Losses: New Forms of Texts, Knowledges, and Learning,” Computers and
Composition (22:1), p. 20, and McCloud’s book Reinventing Comics: How Imagination and Technology are
Revolutionizing an Art Form (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 32.
47
She borrows this term from Richard Young and Edwin Steinberg’s “Planning Graduate Programs in Rhetoric in
Departments of English,” Rhetoric Review 18:2, 2000: 390-402.
48
An alternative was to have a single class devoted to digital technology, but given recent cultural shifts that are
transforming the fields of rhetoric and composition they felt that it should be included “as both a method and
concept throughout the program” (7).
49
This quoted phrase comes from a direct quotation provided by Yancey from Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s
Remediation, Cambridge: MIT, 2000, p. 19.
50
The theory of mimesis that I develop in this dissertation has close conceptual parallels with techne as described by
Martin Heidegger and revamped as “post-techne” by Byron Hawk. According to Hawk, in Heidegger’s view of techne,
the subject is situated “as a body in a complex network of relations that influences the body and is influenced by the
body” (“Toward a Post-Techne,” 374). When one composes in these ambient environments “techne emerges only
through enacting relationships,” driven not from one’s conscious mind but from the situation itself (384). He labels
this emergent form of techne “post-techne” to distinguish it from accounts that limit techne to instrumentalist
functions.
51
The original sources is Brown’s book Religion and Society in the Age of Augustine, Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock
Publishers (Reprint Edition, 2007), p. 124.
52
The denigration of “knack” by rhetoricians eager to preserve the elevated status of rhetoric as “art” needs to be
interrogated. In ancient Chinese – specifically Taoist – philosophy, the spontaneous wuwei spirit embodied in a
crafter’s skill is translated as “knack.” Joseph Needham tells us how in Taoist thought materials as variable as wood
and clay and crude metals could only be worked by people “who learnt from decades of experience, to know the
signs, the ‘smell,’ the physiognomy, of the materials suitable for [their] purpose.” This knowledge was conceived as
what we call knack: “The craftsman could not express his procedures in logical terms. In fact, he could not explain at
all; he could only show. . . . Apprenticeship was subjective and personal, not a matter of intellectual understanding,
not at all the appreciation of mathematical functions describing the behaviour of deeply analyzed physic-chemical
entities.” The Shorter Science & Civilization in China: 4, Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 23
53
The title of the popular textbook Everything’s an Argument quite succinctly captures this reductive view of rhetoric.
54
Online Etymology Dictionary, “persuasion,” http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=persuasion (Accessed
June 10, 2014).
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